




A Mainframe Security Rosetta Stone

Translating Concepts and Commands Between Mainframe Security Products



Reg Harbeck
Mainframe Analytics Ltd.



#SHAREorg



SHARE is an independent volunteer-run information technology association that provides education, professional networking and industry influence.



Agenda

- What's a Rosetta Stone?
- About this session
- Introducing the z/OS security packages
 - RACF
 - ACF2
 - TSS
- Mapping the concepts and commands
- Where to find out more
- Q&A

What's a Rosetta Stone?

- The Rosetta Stone is a stone with writing on it in two languages (Egyptian and Greek), using three scripts (hieroglyphic, demotic and Greek)
- Knowing one enabled learning the other two



(See <http://www.ancientegypt.co.uk/writing/rosetta.html> for more.)



What This Presentation is Not

- A Roadmap for converting between mainframe security products
- A Sales Pitch for any specific security product(s)
- Exhaustive or highly-detailed or expert-level
- Perfectly unbiased (but I'll try)

The Goal of this Session

- To build on your knowledge of one (or more) mainframe security products to introduce the other(s)
- To review the basic concepts of mainframe security
- To show how each security package maps to them from a high-level
- To review some sample constructs and commands and how they map between products
- To increase appreciation of mainframe security in general

Introducing the z/OS Security Packages

- IBM RACF® (RACF)
- CA ACF2™ (ACF2)
- CA Top Secret® (TSS)
- All use SAF
 - System Authorization Facility
 - Invoked for security access checks, passes the request along to the appropriate security system
- All have Security Databases (“Directories”)
 - Not X.500 directories but highly-efficient legacy systems
 - Now accessible from X.500 via LDAP

RACF


- Resource Access Control Facility
- The original mainframe security system (1976)
 - Unless you count UADS, the password file and dataset protection bits
- Uses dataset protection bits with discrete profiles; deleted with protected object
- Generic profiles more policy-based, not attached to objects secured
- IDs are called “user IDs”

RACF

- Four kinds of security profiles:
 - User
 - Group
 - Each user belongs to at least one Group
 - Dataset
 - General Resource
 - Both Dataset and General Resource profiles may be Discrete or Generic, and both have Access Lists
- Security database
 - One or more pairs of primary and backup

ACF2

- “Access Control Facility 2” aka “ACF2”
 - Developed by SKK (Schrager Klemens and Krueger) in 1978 and marketed by Cambridge
 - Cambridge was acquired by UCCEL, who was acquired by CA in 1987
- “Resource Oriented”
 - Resources are defined and permitted through rules
- IDs are called “LIDs” (for Logon IDs)
 - Are substrings of UID strings which are used for access determination



ACF2

- UID (user identification) String:
 - 1-24 character long “pseudo field” constructed of logonid record fields such as department, location, job function and logonid
 - Allows for grouping of users
 - Often contains user-defined fields
 - Allows grouping in access rules
 - Multi-valued Logonid fields-allow multiple views of a single UID
 - Example: @UID LOC, DIV, DEPT, JOBF, LID

CH F OP SCH TLC492

LOC = Chicago

DIV = Finance & Data Processing

DEPT = Operations

JOBF = Scheduler

LID = TLC492

ACF2

- Rules:

\$KEY(SYS1)

BROADCAST UID(CHFSPSYS) R(A) W(A) A(L) E(A)

BROADCAST UID(*) R(A) W(A)

PARMLIB UID(CHFSPSYS) R(A) W(A) A(L) E(A)

PARMLIB UID(*)

PROCLIB UID(CHFSPSYS) R(A) W(A) A(L) E(A)

- Edited, Compiled, Optionally Decompiled
- Default deny
- Eg. SYS1.PARMLIB: Chicago (CH) Finance & DP (F) Systems Programming (SP) SYSPROG (SYS) = Read(Allow), Write(Allow), Alter(Log but Allow), Execute(Allow)

- Three VSAM key-sequenced data sets
 - Logonid database
 - One record per logonid
 - Central source for most user data*
 - *Other user data on Infostorage Profile records
 - Rule database
 - Contains all data set access rules
 - Infostorage database – includes the following records:
 - GSO (global system options)
 - Resource rules (all non-data-set access rules)
 - XREF (cross-reference records)
 - SCOPE (limit the authority a specially privileged user has)
 - SHIFT (define periods of time when access is permitted or prevented)
 - PROFILES (security information extracted by SAF RACROUTE=EXTRACT)

Top Secret


- “Top Secret Security” aka “TSS”
- Developed by Northern Lights Software in 1981
- Acquired by CGA Software Products Group
- Acquired by CA in 1985



Top Secret

- Security database: one file
- IDs are called “ACIDs” (pronounced **ay**-sids, for ACcessor IDs)
- Tree Structured
 - Everything (including ID’s) owned by someone
 - MSCA (Master Security Control ACID) is at the top of the tree
- Resources “owned” and “permitted”
 - By/to ACIDs, Zones, Divisions, Departments, PROFILEs and “ALL Record”

- Hierarchical organization



Zone

Division

Department

Users

Defining IDs

- RACF:

```
ADDUSER user_id DFLTGRP(group) PASSWORD(pwd) OWNER(group/  
user)
```

- ACF2:

```
SET LID
```

```
INSERT logonid PASSWORD(pwd) [some uidstring field(s)]
```

- TSS:

```
TSS CREATE(acid) DEPARTMENT(dept) PASSWORD(pwd)
```


Controlling System Entry

- Batch
 - RACF:
 - SETROPTS JES(BATCHALLRACF) forces all BATCH users to be defined to RACF
 - SETROPTS CLASSACT(JESJOBS)
 - PERMIT SUBMIT.*node.job.userid* CLASS(JESJOBS) ID(*userid*) ACCESS(READ)
 - ACF2:
 - Specify the JOBCK option of the GSO OPTS record
 - SET LID
 - CHANGE *logonid* JOB
 - TSS:
 - TSS ADDTO(*acid*) FACILITY(BATCH)

Controlling System Entry

- TSO
 - Master Catalog Alias, SYS1.UADS
 - RACF:
 - `ALTUSER userid TSO(PROC(logonproc))`
 - ACF2:
 - SET LID
 - CHANGE *logonid* TSO
 - TSS:
 - TSS ADDTO(*acid*) FACILITY(TSO)

Controlling System Entry

- CICS
 - RACF:
 - ALTUSER *userid* CICS(OPCLASS(*opclass*))
 - Or just permit application id in class APPL
 - ACF2:
 - SET LID
 - CHANGE *logonid* CICS CICSCL(*opclass*)
 - TSS:
 - TSS ADDTO(*acid*) FACILITY(CICS) OPCLASS(*opclass*)

Revoking/Suspending Accounts

- RACF:
 - ALTUSER *userid* REVOKE
- ACF2:
 - SET LID
 - CHANGE *logonid* SUSPEND
- TSS:
 - TSS ADDTO(*acid*) SUSPEND

- Defining Security for Datasets

- RACF:

- Discrete profile:

- ADDSD 'dsname' UACC(access)

- Generic profile:

- ADDSD 'dsname-incl-generic-char' UACC(access)

- or

- ADDSD 'dsname' UACC(access) GENERIC

- ACF2:

- \$KEY(high-level-qualifier)*

- dsname-extent UID(pattern-for-UIDs) R(A) and/or other accesses*

- TSS:

- TSS ADDTO(*acid*) DSNAME(*dsname*)

Access

- Permitting Access to Datasets
 - RACF:
 - PERMIT '*dsname-profile*' ID(*userid*) ACCESS(*access*)
 - ACF2:
 - \$KEY(*high-level-qualifier*)
 - dsname-extent* UID(*pattern-for-UIDs*) R(A) and/or other accesses
 - TSS:
 - TSS PERMIT(*acid*) DSNNAME(*dsname*) ACCESS(*access*)

Access

- Grouping Access
 - RACF:
CONNECT *userid* GROUP(*group*)
 - ACF2:
SET LID
CHANGE *logonid* DEPT(*dept*)
 - TSS:
TSS ADDTO(*acid*) PROFILE(*profilename*)

Passwords

- Changing a Password
 - RACF:
ALTUSER *userid* PASSWORD(*newpwd*)
 - ACF2:
SET LID
CHANGE *logonid* PASSWORD(*newpwd*)
 - TSS:
TSS REPLACE(*acid*) PASSWORD(*newpwd*)

Displaying User Security Settings

- Listing a user's information
 - RACF:
LISTUSER *userid*
 - ACF2:
SET LID
LIST *logonid*
 - TSS:
TSS LIST(*acid*)

Mainframe Security Basics

- Modes
 - Initial Installation
 - Implementation
 - Locked-down
- RACF:
 - SETROPTS PROTECTALL (FAILURES | WARNING) | NOPROTECTALL (datasets only)
- ACF2:
 - MODE=(QUIET | LOG | WARN | ABORT | RULE)
- TSS:
 - MODE(DORM | WARN | IMPL | FAIL)

Admin Authority

- RACF:
 - SPECIAL, AUDITOR, OPERATIONS Attributes; scoped using group-versions
 - CLAUTH, Access and Profile Ownership
- ACF2:
 - ACCOUNT, SECURITY, LEADER, CONSULT, USER
 - Scoped by SCPLIST field defined in logonid record
- TSS:
 - ACID types: User, DCA, VCA, ZCA, LSCA, SCA


Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.

Sir Winston Churchill (1874 - 1965)

Where to Find Out More

- CA ACF2 Cookbook, CA Top Secret Cookbook and related manuals
 - Available on-line at support.ca.com
- IBM RACF Manuals and Red Books
 - Available on-line at ibm.com

Questions / Discussion



Complete your session evaluations online at www.SHARE.org/Orlando-Eval