

RACF Advanced Configuration and Auditing on z/VM

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
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
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Agenda

- Generic Resources
- Directory Passwords
- DIRMAINT
- Customizing
- Error Recovery
- Auditing
- Reporting



RACF Advanced Configuration and Auditing on z/VM

Generic Resources

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Introduction to Generic resources

▪ Single resources are defined to RACF

- For minidisks – a specific virtual address owned by a user
- For a virtual lan – a specific vswitch and vlan
- ▶ In RACF terms – a “discrete profile”

▪ RACF also supports generic resources

- ▶ A lot like wildcard matching of file names
- ▶ More restrictive definitions and discrete profiles have priority

Example:

- ▶ Only allow the OPERATOR user id to log on to a local terminal
 - Allow any user to log on to any terminal and also local terminals
 - RDEFINE TERMINAL * UACC(READ)
 - RDEFINE TERMINAL LOGN* UACC(READ)
 - Only allow the OPERATOR to log on to local terminals by not allowing it to log on to “all terminals”
 - PERMIT * CLASS(TERMINAL) ID(OPERATOR) ACCESS(NONE)



Generic resources

- Enabled via RACF options (SETROPTS command)
 - ▶ **GENCMD**(classes)
 - Allows generic profiles to be specified in commands
 - You can create generic profiles before making them active
 - ▶ **GENERIC**(classes)
 - Activates generic profile checking for specified classes
 - Also allows generic profiles in commands

- Not enabled on any classes by default
 - ▶ Due to extra searching, and not part of old RACF systems

- This can make managing your system easier!
 - ▶ Fewer resources to define and manage
 - ▶ Some resources only need controls for the exceptions



Candidates for Generic Resources

VMRDR (spooling)

- ▶ To send a file to another user, you must be permitted in RACF to “update” their reader
 - i.e. SPOOL PUN TO user, SPOOL PRT TO user, TRANSFER TO user, CLOSE TO user
 - Without permission, the command fails
 - A security policy may not require this control for most users

- ▶ Use a single generic resource instead of a definition per user
 - The default permission is “update”, which allows access
 - **RAC RDEFINE VMRDR * UACC(UPDATE)**
- ▶ If there are exceptions -- create specific resources for control

- ▶ Example: Protect the reader of OPERATOR
 - Define the resource with no default access allowed
 - **RAC RDEFINE VMRDR OPERATOR UACC(NONE)**
 - Allow an authorized user to send files
 - **RAC PERMIT OPERATOR CLASS(VMRDR) ID(PERFSVM) ACCESS(UPDATE)**



Generic Resources, continued

VMBATCH (set alternate user) – How to use with FTPSERVE

- ▶ Allows FTPSERVE to access your resources on your behalf – e.g. when you “log in” via an FTP client
 - Instead of giving FTPSERVE explicit permission to your resources
- ▶ FTPSERVE uses Diag D4 to ask CP to set its alternate user to your user id
 - If FTPSERVE has permission from RACF to your VMBATCH resource, CP allows it to be set
 - Now FTPSERVE can access any resource you have permission for
- ▶ Define a generic resource for VMBATCH
 - The default permission is no access
 - **RAC RDEFINE VMBATCH * UACC(NONE)**
 - Allow the FTP server to be an alternate user to any id
 - **RAC PERMIT * CL(VMBATCH) ID(FTPSERVE) ACCESS(CONTROL)**
- ▶ Exceptions for critical users such as MAINT can be defined
 - A discrete permission (PERMIT) overrides a generic permission or universal access (UACC)
 - An access permission of NONE overrides any higher permission
 - **RAC RDEFINE VMBATCH MAINT UACC(NONE)**
 - **RAC PERMIT MAINT CLASS(VMBATCH) ID(FTPSERVE) ACCESS(NONE)**

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Generic Resources, continued

VMCMD – XAUTOLOG

- ▶ The XAUTOLOG command has a class G version
 - Without RACF – target user must have XAUTOLOG in its directory entry authorizing the class G user.
 - With RACF – User must have READ permission to the VMCMD resource XAUTOLOG.userid

- ▶ What if an unauthorized user issues XAUTOLOG and the resource is not defined?

XAUTOLOG TCPIP

RPIMGR055E COMMAND XAUTOLOG.TCPIP NOT DEFINED TO RACF

HCPLGA6050E Your userid is not authorized to automatically logon userid TCPIP

- ▶ The command fails, but the message from RACF could be confusing
- ▶ I recommend defining a generic “backstop” resource
 - **RAC RDEFINE VMCMD XAUTOLOG.** UACC(NONE)**

Now the user would see this instead:


XAUTOLOG TCPIP

RPIMGR056E YOU ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE XAUTOLOG.TCPIP

HCPLGA6050E Your userid is not authorized to automatically logon userid TCPIP


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Directory and DIRMAINT



Special Directory Passwords


- Some directory passwords have special meanings to CP
 - **NOLOG** Act like the userid doesn't exist (no logon or spooling)
 - **NOPASS** Allow logon without a password
 - **AUTOONLY** Do not allow direct logon, only XAUTOLOG
 - **LBYONLY** Only allow LOGON BY, or XAUTOLOG

- With RACF active, things change a little
 - **NOLOG**
 - Works as before
 - **NOPASS**
 - Allows logon without password if user is not revoked in RACF
 - **AUTOONLY**
 - Works as before – direct logon is not allowed
 - The password or pass phrase should be removed from the user in RACF
 - This gives the user the “protected” attribute
 - **LBYONLY**
 - Ignored, now controlled by a profile in the SURROGAT class



DIRMAINT with RACF

- Adding a new user
 - Defines user to RACF (ADDUSER)
 - Defines resources (RDEFINE)
 - RACF command arguments are customizable
- Changes to users
 - Same change is reflected to RACF – even password changes
- Setting it up
 - ▶ Configuration file supplied with DIRMAINT: CONFIGRC SAMPDVH
 - ▶ Rename and use it as supplied or customize it as needed.
 - DIRMAINT reads all CONFIG* DATADVH files that it finds
 - ▶ DIRMAINT will require:
 - Read access to resource DIAG088 in the VMCMD class
 - RACF SPECIAL authority
 - ▶ APAR notes:
 - Install APARs VM65494 and VM65526 (Included in new 1501 service level)
 - Watch APAR VM65565 (no PTF yet)
 - Changes exits for RACF and correctly handles user written exits
 - Change to correctly process SUBCONFIGs and command options




RACF Advanced Configuration and Auditing on z/VM

Customizing RACF

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Customizing the RACF – CP interface

- 7 “stub” CP modules used for the ESM interface
 - HCPRPD, HCPRPF, HCPRPG, HCPRPI, HCPRPW, and HCPRWA
 - z/VM 6.2 added HCPRPP
 - ESM replaces these with its own code


- HCPRWA has the most common customization
 - High Level Assembler is required to make changes before z/VM 6.2.
 - If this is a problem – call the support center for assistance
 - For z/VM 6.2+, Assembler F can be used to apply the customization
 - This assembler is included with CMS and supported by the service tools

- 4 macros in HCPRWA you can customize
 - RACSERV
 - GLBLDISK
 - SYSSEC
 - ICHNGMAX



Customizing HCPRWA


- **RACSERV** macro
 - Defines the name of a RACF service machine
 - Maximum of 10 can be defined
 - Default defines user ids RACFVM and RACMAINT
 - Specialized RACF servers could be created
 - Such as servicing SFS requests only and not used for CP
- **GLBLDISK** macro
 - Defines a table of public read only minidisks
 - No auditing or authorization checking done for read only access
 - Avoids a call from CP to RACF
 - Performance benefit for frequently linked public disks
- **ICHNGMAX** macro
 - Defines the maximum number of GIDs for POSIX
 - Only matters if you use OpenExtensions with RACF



Customizing HCPRWA, continued

- **SYSSEC** macro
 - ▶ Defines the relationship between RACF's response to an access request and the final disposition of that request by z/VM.
 - ▶ Choices:
 - Allow – Tell CP to allow the access
 - Defer – Process the request as if RACF was not active (“Defer to CP”)
 - Fail – Tell CP to not allow access
 - ▶ Only classes VMMDISK, VMRDR, VMNODE, VMCMD, and VMLAN
 - No choices on the response for other classes


RACF Response to z/VM	Choices (default is underlined)
Authorized (PERMIT)	<u>Allow</u> or Defer
Access not authorized (FAIL)	Defer or <u>Fail</u>
Not authorized, WARNING	<u>Defer</u> or Fail
Resource not defined to RACF	Allow, <u>Defer</u> , or Fail



The SYSSEC macro

- Using the WARNING response with Defer to CP
 - ▶ Can help the transition to RACF
 - things work as they did before, but you also get messages
 - ▶ Controlled by the resource profile
 - WARNING option on the RDEFINE or RALTER command
 - Remove setting with RALTER ... NOWARNING
 - ▶ Access attempt is always written to the audit log
 - ▶ Also use NOTIFY to collect failed access attempts

- Response for resources undefined to RACF
 - ▶ In other words – no RDEFINE has been done
 - ▶ Defer to CP is necessary when setting up RACF
 - ▶ Not a good idea on a fully secured system
 - Requests for something undefined should fail!




Changing HCPRWA and SYSSEC

- Create a more secure system – what about this setup?

RACF Response to z/VM	Setting
Authorized (PERMIT)	Allow
Access not authorized (FAIL)	Fail
Not authorized, WARNING	Fail
Resource not defined to RACF	Fail

- IBM supplies a pre-built optional HCPRWA with these settings
 - ▶ Part of the recommended configuration defined in the z/VM Secure Configuration Guide
 - ▶ Called HCPRWAC
 - ▶ See Appendix C of the Guide for how to build your system with it
 - ▶ Do not change to this until RACF is configured!




RACF messages


- This is an additional setting on the SYSSEC macro
- Defines if a RACF message shows for an authorization failure
 - Along with the normal messages from CP
- Example

```
CP LINK MAINT 191 291 RR  
RPIMGR032E YOU ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO LINK TO MAINT.191  
HCPLNM298E MAINT 0191 not linked; request denied
```

- If DISKM=NO is specified, the RPI message is not displayed
- Can only be specified for certain RACF classes
 - VMMDISK, VMRDR, VMNODE, VMCMD, and VMLAN
- Default setting is Yes for all classes



RACF Advanced Configuration and Auditing on z/VM Problems?



Error Recovery

- Built-in redundancy
 - ▶ 2 database disks
 - ▶ 2 sets of code disks
 - ▶ 2 servers (RACFVM for production, RACMAINT for test)

- 2 database disks (primary and backup)
 - ▶ Updated in parallel
 - ▶ Use the RVARY command to switch to the backup
 - Then you must repair the primary

- Please note!
 - ▶ The default location of both database disks is the same volume!
 - ▶ I suggest you move one of them to another system volume.
 - ▶ SSI cluster setup requires you to move each database to its own disk.

- There is also a utility to back up the database



RACMAINT user

- **RACMAINT** exists to test updated (serviced or modified) RACF code
 - ▶ SERVICE process loads updated code to alternate disks (“test” disks)
 - Code to 6VMRAC30 505 instead of RACFVM 305
 - Common code to 6VMRAC30 29E instead of MAINT 19E
 - CST to 6VMRAC30 590 instead of RACFVM 490
 - ▶ RACMAINT always uses the alternate disks
 - ▶ RACF test procedure (as stated in the program directory):
 - IPL CP using parameter disk 2
 - On z/VM 6.2/6.3, this is extent 1 on the 6x0RL1 volume
 - Specify the NOAUTOLOG start option
 - XAUTOLOG RACMAINT
 - RACMAINT will start AUTOLOG2
 - ▶ Note: RACROUTE calls may fail when RACMAINT is running
 - RACF SERVMACH file on Y disk still points to RACFVM



RACMAINT in the service process

- After testing - put the serviced RACF code into production
 - ▶ Done by PUT2PROD, like all other z/VM components
 - RACFVM must be down and RACMAINT running for this process
 - If you did not reIPL your system, then on OPERATOR:
 - FORCE RACFVM
 - XAUTOLOG RACMAINT
 - ▶ After PUT2PROD – the same code is on both sets of disks
 - So, RACMAINT can be used if RACFVM has problems
- Perform a normal IPL of your system after PUT2PROD




Error Recovery – RACFabend

- **What happens if RACFVM dies?**


- Only the active system operator can XAUTOLOG RACFVM or RACMAINT
 - ▶ Any other use of XAUTOLOG is denied
 - ▶ The active system operator can be discovered with **CP QUERY SYSOPER**

- Only an operator, RACFVM, and RACMAINT can log on
 - ▶ ***Using the password in the CP directory!!!***
 - ▶ Make sure you know these and that they are not trivial!
 - ▶ An “operator” is the primary system operator or an alternate operator id, as defined in SYSTEM CONFIG
 - ▶ To start RACF if you logon directly to the RACFVM id:
 - **CP IPL 490**
 - **RACSTART**



RACF Advanced Configuration and Auditing on z/VM

Auditing



Auditing in RACF

- Many different things can be audited
 - Access to resources
 - RACF commands
 - CP commands and z/VM events
 - Actions performed by security administrators
 - Changes to profiles
 - Attempt to use unauthorized commands
 - and more..

- Separation of duties
 - All auditing settings and functions have separate controls
 - User must have attribute AUDITOR to change settings

- Audit log
 - RACF audit data are called SMF records
 - **S**ystem **M**anagement **F**acility




What should you Audit?

- Look at your company security policy
 - Find out what records must be kept and how long to keep them
 - What data will you need if a security problem occurs?

- Settings to audit the actions of privileged users
 - **SAUDIT** Log all commands issued by SPECIAL users
 - **OPERAUDIT** Log any accesses made by OPERATIONS users
 - **CMDVIOL** Log all command violations (unauthorized usage)

- Settings to audit access attempts by class
 - Keywords ALWAYS, NEVER, SUCCESSES, FAILURES
 - Example: **SETROPTS LOGOPTIONS(ALWAYS(SURROGAT))**
 - Always log all attempts to use shared user ids

- Audit changes to profiles in a class
 - Example: **SETROPTS AUDIT(VMMDISK)**




Auditing specific users

- Enable UAUDIT in the user's profile (NOUAUDIT to turn off)
 - **ALTUSER BRUCE UAUDIT**

- The following events are logged:
 - All RACF commands issued by the user
 - All additions, changes, or deletions that the user makes to RACF profiles
 - All attempts that the user makes to access RACF protected resources

- Useful for special situations and users
 - Security sensitive user or application
 - Suspect user (system misuse or exceeding authority)



Auditing CP commands and VM events

- A system event profile defines what to audit.
 - ▶ The profile is defined in the VMXEVENT class
- Many things you can select to audit or not:
 - ▶ All CP commands (182)
 - By privilege level if the command has multiple privileges
 - Example: PURGE has Class A, B, C, D, E, and G versions
 - Also all SET (168) and QUERY (377) subcommands
 - ▶ All Diagnose instructions (87)
 - ▶ 19 other special events
 - Communication (IUCV and APPC)
 - Spool files (create, open, delete, print)
 - Maintenance CCWs, Restricted segments, VLAN sniffer mode
 - Commands in the directory
 - SCIF activity
 - Restricted segments
 - Operations (attach, dedicate, give) of real devices
- No VM commands or events are audited by default




Auditing CP commands and VM events

- An event profile also defines RACF control of CP events
 - e.g. CP commands such as LINK, diagnoses, and others

- An AUDITOR can only change the audit controls
- A SPECIAL (only) user cannot change audit controls
 - Suggestion:
 - The SPECIAL user creates the profile and creates the CP controls
 - Gives ALTER permission for the profile to the auditor
 - The auditor creates the audit controls.

- Event profiles can have any name
 - More than one can exist in the database
 - Normally only one is active for the system
 - It is possible to have 1 of each kind (control and audit) active at the same time – but this is not recommended.
 - A profile must be “refreshed” if it is changed



Setup auditing – example

- Example – changing an existing profile named EVENTS1

```
RACF
RALTER VMXEVENT EVENTS1 ADDMEM(DIAG03C/AUDIT DIAG084/AUDIT)
RALTER VMXEVENT EVENTS1 ADDMEM(DISPLAY.C/AUDIT STORE.C/AUDIT)
RALTER VMXEVENT EVENTS1 ADDMEM(SEND.C/AUDIT SET.PASSWORD/AUDIT)
RALTER VMXEVENT EVENTS1 ADDMEM(SET.SECUSER.C/AUDIT)
RALTER VMXEVENT EVENTS1 ADDMEM(SET.SYSOPER/AUDIT LINK/AUDIT)
SETEVENT REFRESH EVENTS1
END
```

To see what the settings are:

- **RAC SETEVENT LIST**
 - List the settings that are active on the system
- **RAC RLIST VMXEVENT EVENTS1**
 - List the settings in this profile




Auditing specific users (the sequel)

- Create an event profile that applies only to one user
 - Named `USERSEL.userid`, in the `VMXEVENT` class
 - Completely overrides system profile for that user
 - So – don't just specify the difference, specify everything
 - Both CP control settings and audit settings

- You can audit more or less things than the system profile

- Examples
 - Don't audit frequently used functions in trusted machines
 - Do more auditing for an untrusted machine
 - Test changes to proposed system wide audit settings
 - Use **SETEVENT REFRESH** to enable
 - Use **SETEVENT RESET** to disable




The RACFSMF user id

- Purpose is to **archive** the audit data (SMF records)
 - RACFVM actually writes the audit log, not RACFSMF
 - RACFSMF is normally logged off
 - An IDENTITY user – runs on every member of a cluster

- How often should you archive the data?
 - **Option 1:** On a regular schedule
 - Select daily or either weekly or monthly on a certain day
 - Defined in the PROFILE EXEC on RACFSMF 191
 - Use automation software to xautolog RACFSMF daily
 - It requests RACFVM to switch log disks
 - Then, it archives the data on the (now) inactive log disk

 - **Option 2:** Automatically when one log disk is full
 - RACFVM automatically switches to the other disk
 - RACFSMF is started by RACFVM
 - It archives the data on the (now) inactive log disk




Which log option to choose?

- I recommend a regular schedule (option 1)

- RACFSMF started daily on each member
 - ▶ Processes log daily, weekly, or monthly
 - Depending on your choice in PROFILE EXEC
 - Sample code is SMFPROF EXEC on RACFVM 305
 - ▶ No surprises due to errors or revoked id
 - ▶ You must pass the RACF server id as console input data
 - CP XAUTOLOG RACFSMF #RACFVM

- RACFSMF sends messages to the operator
 - ▶ Both informational and error messages


- Ensures the inactive log disk is empty
 - ▶ Available for RACFVM if active log disk fills up



Managing the audit log disks

- File **SMF CONTROL** on RACFVM 191
 - Lists the primary and backup audit disks, and which is current
 - RACFVM updates the file when it switches audit disks
 - RACFSMF also reads it so that only the inactive disk is archived


- Note: Be careful if you make changes to this file
 - It is Fixed 100 format – not all of it is visible on an 80 character wide screen
 - Data is dependent on the columns
 - Do not insert or delete any characters – overwrite only



Fields in SMF CONTROL

- Fields in **SMF CONTROL** you can modify
 - ▶ CLOSE nnn
 - The number of audit records buffered before they are written to the SMF file.
 - You can specify 000-999; the default value is 001.
 - Increase this if you create a lot of audit records.

 - ▶ SEVER NO|YES
 - Default setting is NO
 - do not stop RACFVM even if both SMF log disks are full
 - SEVER YES ensures that no auditable events occur that could not be logged
 - i.e. it there will be no “gaps” in your security log
 - Make sure your automatic log processing is in place before changing this to YES!
 - You may also want to apply VM65493
 - » This prevents RACF from initializing when no audit disks are available.



Archived audit data (SMF records)

- Managed by the RACFSMF user id

- Most current archive on RACFSMF 191 as SMF DATA

- Latest and older archived logs on RACFSMF 192
 - ▶ Location could be changed in PROFILE EXEC
 - ▶ Named SMFnnnnn DATA, where “nnnnn” is the Julian date
 - The filetype could be DATA0001, DATA0002, etc.

- 192 disk free space checked by RACFSMF
 - ▶ Can be tailored in PROFILE EXEC
 - ▶ Message issued if disk is too full (80% full is the default)
 - ▶ Your responsibility to process logs and clean up this disk



Forcing RACF to switch log disks

- What if you want to process current audit data?

- Tell RACFVM to switch to the other log disk
 - ▶ CP SMSG RACFVM SMF SWITCH
 - Must be an authorized id in the CSTCONS table
 - See RACF Security Server System Programmer's Guide
 - By default, only OPERATOR and RACFSMF allowed
 - The new log disk must be empty or the switch is not performed
 - ▶ RACF autologs RACFSMF after the switch

- RACFSMF will find logs on both disks
 - ▶ It will automatically archive the inactive one


- You may now process the archived audit data



RACMAINT and SMF logs

- Remember, RACMAINT uses the same disks as RACFVM
 - ▶ Same primary and backup database disks
 - ▶ Same primary and alternate SMF log disks
 - ▶ However – RACMAINT has its own 191 disk
 - Which means a different SMF CONTROL file

- What if RACMAINT is running and not RACFVM?
 - ▶ Hopefully this only occurs for short periods
 - ▶ Automatic procedures that start RACFSMF would need to specify RACMAINT as the RACF server
 - Otherwise, log switching cannot occur




RACMAINT and RACFSMF

- **SMF CONTROL** on the RACMAINT 191 disk
 - It may specify a different current log disk than RACFVM!
 - This can create log files on both log disks

- What if RACFSMF runs and finds logs on both disks?
 - RACFSMF archives the inactive one without a log switch

- Better solution:
 - Copy SMF CONTROL from RACFVM 191 to RACMAINT 191
 - Then switch to RACMAINT
 - This could be automated in the PROFILE EXEC on RACMAINT




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


The Data Security Monitor (DSMON)

- A way to verify that the security mechanisms actually in effect are the ones intended


- DSMON reports on the status of your security environment
 - Runs while RACF is active
 - Must be run by the auditor

- Selecting reports in a control file
 - SYSTEM System report (processor id, RACF level)
 - RACGRP Group hierarchy report
 - RACCDT Class descriptor table
 - RACEXT RACF exits
 - RACGAC RACF global access table
 - RACUSR User attributes and user summary
 - RACDST Data sets report (RACF database)



Running DSMON

- Runs using CST like RACFVMM
 - Must link to RACFVMM 490 and IPL 490 first
 - Other requirements – see the documentation
 - Chapter 4 of *RACF Security Server Auditor's Guide*
- RACDSMON EXEC invokes the DSMON program
 - Requires Read access to the RACF database
 - The EXEC prompts for all input it needs
 - Uses temporary disk space for its processing
- Create Report selection file
 - Named ICHDSM00 SYSIN
 - Uses an existing one if it exists
- Output is sent to your virtual printer
 - Each report selection is part of the output file



DSMON output

RACF DATA SECURITY MONITOR DATE: 04/01/10 TIME: 14:26:21 PAGE: 2

USERID	SPECIAL	OPERATIONS	AUDITOR	REVOKE
BLDSEG		SYSTEM		
DIRMAINT	SYSTEM			
IBMUSER				SYSTEM
MAINT	SYSTEM	SYSTEM	SYSTEM	
RACAUDIT			SYSTEM	
RACFADM	SYSTEM			


RACF DATA SECURITY MONITOR DATE: 04/01/10 TIME: 14:26:21 PAGE: 4

CLASS NAME	STATUS	AUDITING	STATISTICS	DEFAULT UACC	OPERATIONS ALLOWED
RVARSMBR	INACTIVE	NO	NO	NONE	NO
RACFVARS	INACTIVE	NO	NO	NONE	NO
SECLABEL	INACTIVE	NO	NO	NONE	NO
VMMDISK	ACTIVE	YES	NO	NONE	YES
VMRDR	ACTIVE	NO	NO	NONE	YES
VMCMD	ACTIVE	YES	NO	NONE	YES
VMNODE	INACTIVE	NO	NO	NONE	YES
VMBATCH	ACTIVE	NO	NO	NONE	YES

RACF DATA SECURITY MONITOR DATE: 04/01/10 TIME: 14:26:21 PAGE: 10


LEVEL	GROUP (OWNER)
1	SYS1 (RACFADM)
2	\$LINUX





Database Unload Utility


- Creates a sequential file from the RACF database
 - It has a side effect of validating profile data in the database
- Not really a “report”, but can input to other processes
 - Upload to a database
 - Write your own utilities
 - Records are labeled with a number
 - Group profiles are 01xx, User profiles are 02xx, Resource profiles are 05xx, etc.
- Unloads all profiles in the database
 - But does not unload every field of every profile
- RACFDBU EXEC runs the IRRDBU00 utility on z/VM
 - Requires a specific setup
 - Read the documentation!
 - Chapter 18 of *RACF Security Server Security Administrator’s Guide*
 - ▶ Runs using CST (490 disk), not CMS (190 disk)



Processing archived SMF data

- RACF SMF Data Unload Utility (RACFADU)
 - ▶ Creates a sequential file from the audit data
 - ▶ 2 output formats
 - XML format
 - Table (SQL/DS database input format)

- Merge with z/OS data
 - ▶ Use the SMFCONV utility to reformat to the z/OS format
 - ▶ Send the output file to z/OS




The RACF Report Writer

- Lists information contained in the SMF records
 - Data about successful accesses and warnings
 - Find out attempts to access critical resources
 - Details of user and group activity
 - Summaries of system and resource usage

- It is supported on z/VM
 - Ignore the warning in the documentation that it is not the IBM recommended method

- Output is sent to your virtual printer

- Requires disk space for sort/work area
 - Either your A disk or a temporary disk




Using the Report Writer

- Report options go in RACFRW CONTROL file
 - Example: Produce a listing of all unsuccessful logons and all successful SETROPTS commands

```
RACFRW
SELECT VIOLATIONS
EVENT LOGON
SELECT SUCCESSES
EVENT SETROPTS
LIST
END
```

- Use SELECT and EVENT subcommands to select records
- There are 2 output selections
 - LIST – List all selected records
 - SUMMARY – Output a summary of the selected records




Running the Report Writer

- Access the disk with the SMF DATA file to process
 - ▶ Otherwise RACRPORT attempts to access the inactive SMF log disk -- which is probably empty
 - ▶ The most current SMF archive is on RACFSMF 191
 - VMLINK is the easy way to link it:
 - EXEC VMLINK RACFSMF 191 < * C-X > (NONAMES
 - Disk modes A, B, and Z are used by RACRPORT

- Invoke RACRPORT
 - ▶ It will ask you about space for a work file
 - ▶ The A disk or a temporary disk can be used

- The output print file is sent to your reader



Running the Report Writer

```


vmlink racfsmf 191 <* c-x> (nonames
DMSVML2060I RACFSMF 191 linked as 0121 file mode C
Ready;
racrport
DMSACP723I B (305) R/O
The RACF Report Writer requires Disk Space for a Sort work file.
You may wish to use Tdisk for this function.

Note: If Tdisk is not used, the Sort work file will be written on the A disk.

Do you wish to use Tdisk for the Sort work file?

Please enter YES or NO
no
ENTER RACFRW COMMAND, OR "END"
RACFRW
SELECT VIOLATIONS
EVENT LOGON
SELECT SUCCESSES
EVENT SETROPTS
LIST
END
ICH64003I LISTING REPORT COMPLETE.
RDR FILE xxxx SENT FROM xxxxxxxxxx PRT
ENTER RACFRW COMMAND, OR "END"
END
Ready;

```



References

- **VM home page**
 - <http://www.vm.ibm.com>
- **IBM Security zSecure Suite**
 - <http://www.ibm.com/software/security/products/zsecure>
- **z/VM Security and Integrity Resources**
 - <http://www.vm.ibm.com/security>
- **z/VM Statement of Integrity**
 - <http://www.vm.ibm.com/security/zvminteg.html>
- **VM documentation center**
 - <http://pic.dhe.ibm.com/infocenter/zvm/v6r3/index.jsp>



The End

Thank you for listening!

Session 16478

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