



Software Group | Enterprise Networking Solutions

# z/OS Communications Server Integrated Intrusion Detection Services

### **SHARE Session 15516**

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z/OS Communications Server

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### **Integrated Intrusion Detection Services**

z/OS Communications Server provides an integrated Intrusion Detection Services (IDS) for TCP/IP. This session will describe the Communications Server IDS and how it can be used to detect intrusion attempts against z/OS.

This session will cover the following topics

- IDS Overview
- Intrusion events detected by z/OS IDS
- IDS Actions
  - ► Recording Actions
  - ➤ Defensive Actions
- IDS Reports
- Automation for IDS
- Working with IDS policy

### **The Intrusion Threat**

#### What is an intrusion?


- ► Information Gathering
  - Network and system topology
  - -Data location and contents
- ► Eavesdropping / Impersonation / Theft
  - -On the network / on the server
  - -Base for further attacks on others
    - ✓ Amplifiers
    - √ Robot or zombie
- ➤ Denial of Service
  - -Attack on availability
    - ✓ <u>Single Packet attacks</u> exploits system or application vulnerability
    - ✓ <u>Multi-Packet attacks</u> floods systems to exclude useful work

#### Attacks can be deliberate or unintentional


- ➤ Deliberate: malicious intent from outside or internal bots
- ► Unintentional: various forms of errors on network nodes

#### Attacks can occur from Internet or intranet

- ► <u>Firewalls</u> can provide some level of protection from Internet
- ► Perimeter Security Strategy alone may not be sufficient.
  - -Considerations:
    - ✓ Access permitted from Internet
    - ✓ Trust of intranet



### **Intrusion Detection Services Overview**



#### z/OS in-context IDS broadens overall intrusion detection coverage:

- Ability to evaluate inbound encrypted data IDS applied after IPSec decryption on the target system
- Avoids overhead of per packet evaluation against table of known attacks IDS policy checked after attack detected
- Detects statistical anomalies real-time target system has stateful data / internal threshholds that are generally unavailable to external IDSs
- Policy can control prevention methods on the target, such as connection limiting and packet discard

#### **Events detected**

- Scans
- Attacks Against Stack
- Flooding (both TCP and UDP)

#### **Defensive methods**

- Packet discard
- Limit connections
- Reset connections

#### Reporting

- Logging,
- Event messages to local console,
- IDS packet trace
- Notifications to Tivoli NetView


#### **IDS Policy**

 Samples provided with Configuration Assistant for z/OS Communications Server

Integrated Intrusion Detection Services under policy control to identify, alert, and document suspicious activity

### **Policy Model Overview**

### **Basic Policy Objects**



Policy objects relationship: IF condition THEN action

Policies consist of several related objects

- Policy Rule is main object and refers to:
  - ► Policy Condition
    - Defines IDS conditions which must be met to execute the Policy action
  - ► Policy Action
    - Defines IDS actions to be performed when Policy Condition is met

# z/OS Communications Server Security

# Intrusion Events Types Detected

- SCAN
- ATTACK
- TRAFFIC REGULATION

### **Intrusion Event Types Supported**

- Scan detection and reporting
  - ► Intent of scanning is to map the target of the attack
    - Subnet structure, addresses, masks, addresses in-use, system type, op-sys, application ports available, release levels
- Attack detection, reporting, and prevention
  - ► Intent is to crash or hang the system
    - -Single or multiple packet
- Traffic regulation for TCP connections and UDP receive queues
  - ➤ Could be intended to flood system OR could be an unexpected peak in valid requests

### Scanning... the prelude to the attack

- z/OS IDS definition of a scanner
  - ➤ Source host that accesses <u>multiple unique resources</u> (ports or interfaces) over a specified time period
    - Installation can specify via policy number of unique events (Threshold) and scan time period (Interval)
- Categories of scan detection supported
  - ► Fast scan
    - Many resources rapidly accessed in a short time period (less than 5 minutes)
      - ✓ usually less than five minutes, program driven
  - ► Slow scans
    - Different resources intermittantly accessed over a longer time period (many hours)
      - ✓ scanner trying to avoid detection
- Scan event types supported
  - ► ICMP, ICMPv6 scans
  - ► TCP port scans
  - ► UDP port scans

### **Scan Policy Overview**

### Scan policy provides the ability to:

- Obtain notification and documentation of scanning activity
  - ➤ Notify the installation of a detected scan via console message or syslogd message
  - ► Trace potential scan packets
- Control the parameters that define a scan:
  - ➤ The time interval
  - ► The threshold number of scan events
- Reduce level of false positives
  - ► Exclude well known "legitimate scanners" via exclusion list
    - e.g. network management
  - ➤ Specify a scan sensitivity level
    - by port for UDP and TCP
    - highest priority rule for ICMP, ICMPv6

# Scan Event Counting and Scan Sensitivity

- Each scan event is internally classified as normal, suspicious or very suspicious
  - ► Socket state, ICMP, ICMPv6 type affect this classification
    - Scan instance event classification by event type included in IP Configuration Guide.
- Scan sensitivity determines whether a scan event is "countable"

Sensitivity (from policy)	Normal Event	Possibly Suspicious Event	Very Suspicious Event
Low			Count
Medium		Count	Count
High	Count	Count	Count

- Countable scan events count against an origin source IP address
  - ➤ Total number of countable events for all scan event types is compared to policy thresholds
    - If threshold exceeded for a single IP address, policy-directed notification and documentation is triggered

### **Attacks Against The TCP/IP Stack**

The system already silently defends itself from many attacks against the TCP/IP stack.

■ IDS adds capability to control recording of intrusion events and to provide supporting documentation.

■ IDS adds controls to detect and disable uncommon or unused features which could be used in an attack.

### **Attack Categories**

#### Malformed packet events

➤ Detects IPv4 and IPv6 packets with incorrect or partial header information

#### Inbound fragment restrictions

- ➤ Detects fragmentation in first 88 bytes of an IPv4 datagram
  - -z/OS V2R1 changes the fragmentation attack probe to no longer consider fragment length as a criteria. Checks will be based purely on whether overlays occur and whether they change the packet content.

#### ■ IPv4 and IPv6 protocol restrictions

- ➤ Detects use of IP protocols you are not using that could be misused
- ► Called "next header restrictions" for IPv6

#### ■ IPv4 and IPv6 option restrictions

- ➤ Detects use of IP options you are not using that could be misused
- ➤ Can restrict both destination and hop-by-hop options for IPv6

#### ■ ICMP, ICMPv6 redirect restrictions

➤ Detects receipt of ICMP redirect to modify routing tables.

#### UDP perpetual echo

➤ Detects traffic between IPv4 and IPv6 UDP applications that unconditionally respond to every datagram received

#### Outbound RAW socket restrictions

➤ Detects z/OS IPv4 or IPv6 RAW socket application crafting invalid outbound packets

#### ■ Flood Events

- ➤ Detects flood of SYN packets from "spoofed" IPv4 or IPv6 sources
- ➤ Detects high percentage of packet discards on a physical IPv4 or IPv6 interface

#### Data hiding

➤ Detects attempts to pass hidden data in packet header and extension fields

#### ■ TCP queue size

➤ Detects queue size constraints for individual connections

#### Global TCP stall

➤ Detects cases where large number and percentage of TCP connections are stalled

#### ■ Enterprise Extender-specific attacks

► 4 different attack types (more on this later)

### **Attack Policy Overview**

### Attack policy provides the ability to:

- Control attack detection for one or more attack categories independently
- Generate notification and documentation of attacks
  - ➤ Notify the installation of a detected attack via console message or syslogd message
  - ➤ Trace potential attack packets
- Generate attack statistics on time interval basis
  - ➤ Normal or Exception
- Control defensive action when attack is detected

### **Interface Flood Detection**

- Packet discard rate by physical interface is tracked to determine if there is a potential attack
  - ► A high percentage of discarded packets on a physical interface may indicate the interface is under attack.
- Notification and traces provided when a possible interface flood condition is occurring (according to the discard threshold value).
- Provides information to help determine the potential cause of the interface flood
  - ➤ Narrows flood condition to a local interface so you can
    - Vary the interface offline
      - ✓ This action not controlled with IDS policy
    - Start tracing flood back to source
  - ➤ Source MAC address of the "prior hop" (for OSA QDIO and LCS devices)
  - ➤ Source IP address from the outer IPSec header if the packet had been received as IPsec tunnel mode.
    - Source IP address could be a gateway or firewall
      - ✓ Could allow source tracking closer to the source than "prior hop"

### **Interface Flood Detection Process**

- Policy related to interface flood detection
  - ► Specified on Attack Flood policy
  - ► 2 actions attributes provided
    - IfcFloodMinDiscard (default 1000)
    - IfcFloodPercentage (default 10)
- For each interface, counts are kept for
  - ► The number of inbound packets that arrived over the physical interface
  - ► The number of these packets that are discarded
- When the specified number of discards (IfcFloodMinDiscard) is hit:
  - ► If the discards occurred within **one minute** or less:
    - the discard rate is calculated for the interval:
    - If the discard rate equals or exceeds the specified threshold, an interface flood condition exists
  - ► If discards occurred during period longer than 1 minute, not a flood condition
- Once an interface flood is detected, this data is collected and evaluated for the interface at 1 minute intervals. The interface flood is considered ended if
  - ► The discards for a subsequent interval fall below the minimum discard value OR
  - ► Discard rate for the interval is less than or equal to 1/2 of the specified threshold

# **Interface Flooding Example**

■ Assume the IDS flood policy specifies:


► IfcFloodMinDiscard: 2000 ► IfcFloodPercentage:10%


■ Consider the following sequence for interface X:

time interval	inbound cnt	discard cnt	discard rate	notes
> 1 min	13,000	2000	N/A	took longer than a minute to see the minimum discard count, so not a flood and discard rate not calculated.
< 1 min	30,000	2000	6.6%	not a flood, rate <10%
< 1 min	20,000	2000	10%	interface flood start detected. Run 1 minute timer until flood end detected.
+1 min	40,000	3000	7.5%	flood condition still exists, reset 1 minute timer.
+1 min	50,000	2500	5%	Interface flood end detected. Discard rate <= half of policy specified rate.

# **Data Hiding Protection**

- The structure of protocol headers afford the opportunity embed "hidden data" in packets (at the source host / in the network)
- The Data Hiding attack type can detect such hidden data
- Two forms of data hiding protection can be independently enabled: Exploitation of ICMP and ICMPv6 error mesages Exploitation of IPv4 and IPv6 option pad






### **TCP Queue Size Protection**

TCP queue size protection can be controlled with IDS policy...


- Protects TCP queues that become constrained
  - ► Send, receive and out-of-order queues
  - ► Mark data "page eligible" after 60 seconds, or after 30 seconds if limit exceeded
- IDS configuration provides
  - ➤ Configurable queue size and configurable action of reset connection
  - ► IDS logging and statistics
  - ► No IDS tracing for this attack type
- Exclusion list can limit reporting or reset of constrained send queue
  - ► Can be a legitimate condition, for example, a printer running out of paper
  - ➤ Data on send queue is still marked "page eligible"
- Evaluated on a per-connection basis



### **Global TCP Stall Protection**

- Global TCP Stall Protection protects against DoS attack where a large number of TCP connections are created and forced to stall, thereby consuming lots of TCP/IP resources
- A single connection is considered stalled when either...
  - ► TCP send window size is abnormally small
  - ► TCP send queue is full and data is not being retransmitted
- .Global TCP stall condition is entered when...
  - ► At least 1000 TCP connections are active AND
  - ► At least 50% of those TCP connections are in a stalled state
- IDS reporting options (except IDS tracing) available
  - ➤ Two levels of logging basic and detailed
  - ► Be careful with detailed syslogd logging can generate 500+ messages per global stall detection
- Defensive action of "reset connection" may be configured
  - ➤ Resets all stalled connections when a global TCP stall condition is detected





# Comparing TCP queue size and TCP global stall attack types

TCP Queue Size Attack	Global TCP Stall Attack
Monitors individual connection's send queue for old or excessive data.	Monitors individual connection's send queue to detect stall condition.
No awareness of TCP/IP stack's overall state.	Aware of stack's overall state keeps count of stalled TCP send queues.
Attack detected based on individual send queue's state.	Attack detected based on overall state of stack large number of stalled connections.
Attack detected after at least 30 or 60 seconds.	Attack detection not based on time - can be detected much more quickly than 30 seconds.
Able to detect when a one or a few connections are stalled.	Triggered only when a large number of connections stall.

### **EE Attack Types**

#### ■ Four attack types:

#### ► EE Malformed Packet

- Validates general form of LDLC packets
- Discard and notify actions available

#### ► EE LDLC Check


- Ensure LDLC control packets flow on EE signaling port
- Discard and notify actions available

#### **►** EE Port Check

- Ensure source port matches destination port on inbound packets
- Discard and notify actions available

#### ➤ EE XID Flood


- Raises flood condition if too many unique XID timeouts arrive within a one minute interval (flood threshold is configurable)
- Condition ends when number of XID timeouts fall below threshold
- Notify actions available
- Exclusion list can be configured for each attack type
  - Some EE implementations observed to use ephemeral ports may be exclusion candidates for LDLC, Port checks
- Usual IDS reporting options available (exception: no IDS trace for EE XID flood)



EE is based on UDP

EE Port	SNA Trans Priority
12000	Signaling
12001	Network
12002	High
12003	Medium
12004	Low


Uses 5 pre-defined ports



### Traffic Regulation for TCP

- Allows control over number of inbound connections from a single host
  - ► Can be specified for specific application ports
    - Especially useful for forking applications
  - ► Independent policies for multiple applications on the same port
    - e.g. telnetd and TN3270
- Connection limit expressed as
  - ► Port limit for all connecting hosts AND
  - ► Individual limit for a single connecting host
- Fair share algorithm
  - ➤ Connection allowed if specified individual limit per single remote IP address does not exceed percent of available connections for the port
    - All remote hosts are allowed at least one connection as long as port limit has not been exceeded
      - ✓ QoS connection limit used as override for concentrator sources (web proxy server)

# TCP connection regulation algorithm



If a new connection request is received and A=0, the request is rejected.

If a new connection request is received and A>0 and the request is from a source that already has connections with this port number (in this example: IP@x), then:

If X+1 < CP\*A then
Allow the new connection
Else
Deny the new connection

Purpose: If close to the connection limit, then a given source IP address will be allowed a lower number of the in-use connections.

### Regulation algorithm example

Source IP address X attempts its fifth connection
---

Allowed

			7		
Total Allowed	Connections	Available	CP=10%	CP=20%	CP=30%
100	20	80	8	16	24
100	40	60	6	12	18
100	60	40	4	(A) 8 /	12
100	80	20	2	4 (B)	6
100	90	10	1	2	3

- A If we currently have 40 connections available (A=40) and a controlling percentage (CP) of 20%, when source IP address X tries to establish its fifth connection, it will be allowed (40 \* 20% = 8, so 5 connections is within the acceptable range).
- B If we have 20 connections available (A) and CP is again 20%, when source IP address X tries to establish its fifth connection, it will be rejected (20 \* 20% = 4, so 5 would exceed the allowable number of connections).

### **Traffic Regulation for UDP**

- Allows control over length of inbound receive queues for UDP applications
  - ➤ Specified on a per-port basis
  - ➤ Can be applied to ports of your choosing
- Before TR for UDP, UDP queue limit control was requested globally for all queues
  - ► UDPQueueLimit ON | OFF in TCP/IP Profile
- If neither TR UDP or UDPQueueLimit is used, a stalled application or a flood against a single UDP port could consume all available buffer storage
  - ► TR UDP supercedes UDPQueueLimit specification
- TR UDP queue limit expressed as abstract queue length
  - ► SHORT or VERY SHORT
    - For applications that tend to receive data faster than they can process it
  - ► LONG or VERY LONG
    - Useful for fast or high priority applications with bursty arrival rates

# z/OS Communications Server Security

### **IDS Actions**

- Recording actions
- Defensive actions

### **Recording Actions**

- Recording options controlled by IDS policy action specification
- Possible options
  - ► Event logging
    - Syslogd
      - ✓ Number of events per <u>attack subtype</u> recorded in a five minute interval can be limited (for most attack subtypes)
    - Local Console
      - Recording suppression provided if quantity of IDS console messages reach policy-specified thresholds
  - ➤ Statistics
    - Syslogd
      - ✓ Normal and Exception conditions
  - ► IDS packet trace
    - Activated after attack detected
      - ✓ Number of packets traced for multipacket events are limited
      - ✓ Amount of data trace is configurable (header, full, byte count)
    - Not available for all attack types
- All IDS events recorded in syslog and console messages, and packet trace records have <u>probeid</u> and <u>correlator</u>
  - ► Probeid identifies the point at which the event detected
  - ➤ Correlator allows association of corresponding syslog and packet trace records

### **Defensive Actions by Event Type**


- Attack Events
  - ➤ Packet discard
    - Certain attack events always result in packet discard and are <u>not</u> controlled by IDS policy action
      - ✓ malformed packets
      - √ flood (synflood discard)
    - Most attack types controlled by IDS policy action
      - ✓ ICMP redirect restrictions
      - ✓ IPv4 and IPv6 option restrictions
      - ✓ IPv4 and IPv6 protocol restrictions
      - ✓ IP fragment
      - ✓ outbound raw restrictions
      - ✓ perpetual echo
      - √ data hiding
      - ✓ EE malformed, LDLC and port checks
  - ➤ Reset connection
    - ✓ TCP queue size
    - √ Global TCP stall
  - ► No defensive action defined
    - √ flood (interface flood detection)

- Scan Events
  - ➤ No defensive action defined

- Traffic Regulation Events
  - ► Controlled by IDS policy action
    - -TCP Connection limiting
    - UDP Packet discard

### **IDS** and Defensive Filtering

- The Defense Manager component allows authorized users to dynamically install time-limited, defensive filters:
  - ► A local security administrator can install filters based on information received about a pending threat
  - ► Enables filter installation through automation based on analysis of current attack conditions
- Defensive filtering is an extension to IDS capabilities
  - ► Adds additional defensive actions to protect against attacks



- Requires minimal IP Security configuration to enable IP packet filtering function
  - ► Uses ipsec command to control and display defensive filters
- Defense Manager
  - ► Manages installed defensive filters in the TCP/IP stack
  - ► Maintains record of defensive filters on DASD for availability in case of DM restart or stack start/restart
- Defensive filter scope may be:
  - ► Global all stacks on the LPAR where DM runs
  - ► Local apply to a specific stack
- Defensive filter are installed "in-front" of configured/default filters

# z/OS Communications Server Security

Intrusion Detection Reports for Analysis

### **IDS Log Reports**

trmdstat command produces reports based on IDS data recorded in syslog

- Types of reports generated for logged events
  - ► Overall summary reports
    - -IDS
  - ► Event type <u>summary</u> reports
    - For Attack, Flood, Scan, TCP and UDP TR information
  - ► Event type <u>detail</u> reports
    - For Attack, Flood, Scan, TCP and UDP TR information
- Types of reports generated for statistics events
  - ➤ Details reports
    - Attack, Flood, TCP and UDP TR reports

### **Tivoli Support for IDS Events**

- Tivoli NetView provides local z/OS management support for IDS
- NetView provides ability to trap IDS messages from the system console or syslog and take predefined actions based on IDS event type such as:
  - ➤ Route IDS messages to designated NetView consoles
  - ► email notifications to security admistrator
  - ► Run trmdstat and attach output to email
  - ► Issue pre-defined comands

# z/OS Communications Server Security

# Working with IDS Policy

- Controlling, displaying, and validating policy
- Defining IDS policy
- IDS policy configuration with Configuration Assistant for z/OS
   Communications Server example

# **Controlling Active IDS Policy**

- Configurable policy deletion controls in Policy Agent configuration file
  - ➤ TcpImage statement
    - FLUSH | NOFLUSH {PURGE | NOPURGE}
  - ► FLUSH and NOFLUSH take effect at Policy Agent initialization
    - FLUSH specifies that any active policy should be deleted
    - -NOFLUSH specifies that active policy should not be deleted
  - ► PURGE and NOPURGE take effect at Policy Agent termination
    - PURGE specifies that any active policy should be deleted
    - NOPURGE specifies that active policy should not be deleted

### Refresh Policy

- At Interval (1800-second default) specified on TcpImage statement
- With MODIFY PAGENT command (REFRESH option)
- When Policy Agent configuration file (HFS only) is updated (refresh is automatic)

# **Displaying IDS Policy**

- pasearch command
  - ➤ Displays IDS policy read by Policy Agent
- netstat command
  - ➤ Displays installed IDS policy in TCP/IP stack
  - ➤ Displays statistics by policy category

✓ Tip:


Restrict access to IDS policy displays using SAF SERVAUTH resources:

- ► EZB.PAGENT.sysname.tcpname.IDS
- ► EZB.NETSTAT.sysname.tcpname.IDS

### **Steps for Validating IDS Policy**

- 1. Initially configure policy for reporting actions only (no defensive actions)
- 2. Invoke PAGENT and TRMD
- Issue PASEARCH and verify that the correct policy is installed
- 4. Keep policy in force for a trial period
- 5. Issue IDS netstat to view active IDS policy and statistics
- Run TRMDSTAT reports to verify syslog messages for intrusion events
- 7. Adjust the policy as required
- 8. Add defensive actions

## Configuration Assistant for z/OS Communications Server




- GUI-based approach to configuring:
  - **≻IDS**
  - ► AT-TLS
  - ► IPSec and IP filtering
  - ► QoS
  - ► Policy-based Routing
- Focus on high level concepts vs. low level file syntax
- Available through z/OSMF-based web interface
  - ➤ Standalone Windows application
    - -Not supported after z/OS V1R13
- Builds and maintains
  - ► Policy files
  - ► Related configuration files
  - ► JCL procedures and RACF directives
- Supports import of existing policy files


## IDS Policy Configuration Steps with the Configuration Assistant

- 1. Configure IDS policies
  - a. Examine IDS defaults and base policy on defaults
  - b. Copy IDS defaults into a new IDS requirements map
  - c. Make changes to new requirements map as needed
- 2. Create system image and TCP/IP stack image
- 3. Associate new requirements map with TCP/IP stack
- 4. Transfer IDS policy to z/OS
- 5. Perform policy infrastructure and application setup tasks


## Configuration Assistant for z/OS Communications Server




# Start a new IDS configuration - create a new backing store




### **Create IDS policy objects** select the IDS policy perspective



### **Traffic Descriptors**



### **Evalute IDS\_Default requirements map**



#### IDS\_Default provided as default requirement map

- Display details of the requirement map
- Evaluate whether they meet your requirements


## Details view of IDS\_Default requirements map (1 of 4)

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equirement Map: IDS_Defau						
equirement Map: 105_belau	It TOM Complied, I	stancion Detection	Comisso Ctostos Cot			
	it - IBM Supplied: II	ntrusion Detection	Services Starter Set			
ttack Protection Summary						
nabled Attack Protection	Rule Name	Actions	Reports	Time Condition	Default Report Settings	
ata Hiding Attack <sup>1</sup>	DataHiding	Report Events	Use Default Report Settings	None		
Pv6 Outbound Raw Attack <sup>1</sup>	IPv6OutboundRaw	Report Events	Use Default Report Settings	None		
Pv6 Destination Options Attack <sup>1</sup>	IPv6DestinationOptions	Report Events	Use Default Report Settings	None		
Pv6 Hop-by-Hop Options Attack		Report Events	Use Default Report Settings			
Pv6 Next Header Attack <sup>1</sup>	IPv6NextHeader	Report Events	Use Default Report Settings		Console Parameters:	
CP Queue Size Attack <sup>1</sup>	TcpQueueSize	7	Use Default Report Settings		No No	
lobal TCP Stall Attack <sup>1</sup>			Use Default Report Settings		SYSLOG Parameters:	
lood Attack			Use Default Report Settings		SYSLOG: Yes	
erpetual Echo Attack			Use Default Report Settings		SYSLOG Level: 4 - Warning	
Pv4 Protocols Attack	IPv4Protocol		Use Default Report Settings		Statistics Parameters:	
Pv4 Options Attack	IPv4Option	Report Events	Use Default Report Settings		Statistics: Yes	
CMP Redirect Attack			Use Default Report Settings		Statistics Interval: 60 Minutes	
alformed Packet Attack		-	Use Default Report Settings		Report Stat if no events: Yes	
Pv4 Outbound Raw Attack			Use Default Report Settings		Trace Parameters:	
P Fragment Attack	Fragmentation		Use Default Report Settings		No	
E Malformed Packet Attack <sup>1</sup>		Report Events	Use Default Report Settings			
E LDLC Check Attack <sup>1</sup>	EELDLCCheck	Report Events	Use Default Report Settings	None		
E Port Check Attack <sup>1</sup>	EEPortCheck	Report Events	Use Default Report Settings	None		
E XID Flood Attack <sup>1</sup>	EEXIDFlood	Report Events	Use Default Report Settings	None		
L AID I IOUU ALLGEK		- aport Evente	222 Deliant Report Dettings			

## Details view of IDS\_Default requirements map (2 of 4)


Configuration Assista										
iew Details	nt (Home) >	IDS ▶ View Details								
new Details										
	B									
Attack Protection	n Details									
nabled Attack Prot	ection: Data	a Hiding Attack - DataH	iding					ı		
Enabled Options				Reports		Time Condition	Action			
Checking of IP option		Enabled rithin ICMP error message	ası Enablad	Use Default Report	Settings	None	Report Events			
snecking of embedd	eu packets wi	Ithin ICMF error message	es. Lilableu							
he attack is not avai	lable for V1R	12 stacks. The requireme	ent map is co	onfigured with this	attack, bu	it if the stack is	mapped to a V	1R12 stack	, the attack will be i	gnored.
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nahlad Attack Prof	ection: IDv6	Outbound Raw Attack	- IDv6Outh	ooundRaw						
Starting Protocol End				ndition Action						
16	3				ī					
8 57			100 L. 00000							
9 88		Use Default Report Settin	igs None	Report Ever	ts					
0 255	i									
v6DestinationOpt	tions	Destination Options A								
tarting Option Endir	g Option Rep	ports								
	54		Time Condit	ion Action						
3			Time Condit	ion Action						
139 193	Use	e Default Report Settings		Report Events						
139 193 195 200	Use									
139 193 195 200	Use									
193 195 200 202 255			None	Report Events	attack, bu	ut if the stack is	mapped to a V	/1R12 stack	, the attack will be :	gnored.
193 195 200 202 255		e Default Report Settings	None	Report Events	attack, bu	ut if the stack is	mapped to a V	/1R12 stack	, the attack will be i	gnored.
.39 193 .95 200 .02 255 the attack is not avail	ilable for V1R	Default Report Settings	None ent map is co	Report Events	attack, bu	ut if the stack is	mapped to a V	/1R12 stack	, the attack will be i	gnored.
193   193   195   200   255   202   255   201	ilable for V1R	e Default Report Settings 12 stacks. The requirement 5 Hop-by-Hop Options A	None ent map is co	Report Events onfigured with this 6HopByHop	attack, bu	ut if the stack is	mapped to a V	/1R12 stack	, the attack will be i	gnored.
193 200 202 255 200 anabled Attack Protestarting Option Endir	ilable for V1R	e Default Report Settings 12 stacks. The requirement 5 Hop-by-Hop Options A	None ent map is co Attack - IPv	Report Events onfigured with this 6HopByHop	attack, bu	ut if the stack is	mapped to a V	/1R12 stack	, the attack will be i	gnored.
193 193 200 202 255 he attack is not avail nabled Attack Protestarting Option Endir 2 3	ilable for V1R	e Default Report Settings 12 stacks. The requirement 5 Hop-by-Hop Options A	None ent map is co Attack - IPv	Report Events onfigured with this 6HopByHop	attack, bu	ut if the stack is	mapped to a V	/1R12 stack	, the attack will be i	gnored.
139 193 195 200 202 255 The attack is not availabled Attack Protestarting Option Endir	ilable for V1R:	e Default Report Settings 12 stacks. The requirement 5 Hop-by-Hop Options A	None ent map is co Attack - IPV Time Condit	Report Events onfigured with this 6HopByHop	attack, bu	ut if the stack is	mapped to a V	/1R12 stack	, the attack will be i	gnored.
139 193 195 200 202 255 The attack is not availabled Attack Protestarting Option Endire 2 3 3 137 139 193 195 200	ilable for V1R:	Default Report Settings 12 stacks. The requirement Hop-by-Hop Options A	None ent map is co Attack - IPV Time Condit	Report Events onfigured with this 6HopByHop ion Action	attack, bu	It if the stack is	mapped to a V	/1R12 stack	, the attack will be i	gnored.
139 193 195 200 202 255 The attack is not availabled Attack Protestarting Option Endirection   3 3 137 139 193	ilable for V1R:	Default Report Settings 12 stacks. The requirement Hop-by-Hop Options A	None ent map is co Attack - IPV Time Condit	Report Events onfigured with this 6HopByHop ion Action	attack, bu	ut if the stack is	mapped to a V	/1R12 stack	, the attack will be i	gnored.

## Details view of IDS\_Default requirements map (3 of 4)




### Details view of IDS\_Default requirements map (4 of 4)

(... several intervening pages)




### **Use IDS\_Default as a starting point**




#### Using IDS\_Default as a base

- Copy IDS\_Default
- Create new requirements map using copied IDS\_Default as a base


### Name new requirements map




### Modify copied default requirements map




### Attack protection enabled by default




### **Customize report settings**




#### **Enable scan policy**



#### Modify global scan settings




### Enable traffic regulation protection



#### No traffic regulation defaults

- Policy selections are system dependant
- System capacity a consideration in setting maximum limits


### **Define TCP TR policy for FTP**




#### Set details for TR




### Traffic regulation enabled




## IDS\_policy\_demo requirements map now created




#### Create system image




#### **Create TCP/IP stack**




Associate TCP/IP stack with requirements map




### **Install configuration files**




Show the configuration file to be installed




# Set up to install configuration files on target z/OS system



## Perform application setup tasks - All workflows view



# Perform application setup tasks - Specific workflow view



## z/OS Communications Server Security

Features Summary

### **IDS Features Summary**

#### IDS events detected include:

- Scan detection
- Attack detection
- ➤ Traffic Regulation
  - ... for both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic

#### ■ IDS recording options

- Event logging to syslogd or console
- Statistics to syslogd
- ► IDS packet trace after attack detected for offline analysis

#### Reports and event handling

- trmdstat produces reports from IDS syslogd records
  - Summary and detailed
- ► IDS event handling by Tivoli NetView

#### Defensive filtering

- Installed through ipsec command
- Manually (by human being) or through automation (via external security event manager)

#### For more information ...

URL	Content				
http://www.twitter.com/IBM_Commserver	IBM Communications Server Twitter Feed				
http://www.facebook.com/IBMCommserver facebook	IBM Communications Server Facebook Fan Page				
http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/	IBM System z in general				
http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/hardware/networking/	IBM Mainframe System z networking				
http://www.ibm.com/software/network/commserver/	IBM Software Communications Server products				
http://www.ibm.com/software/network/commserver/zos/	IBM z/OS Communications Server				
http://www.ibm.com/software/network/commserver/z_lin/	IBM Communications Server for Linux on System z				
http://www.ibm.com/software/network/ccl/	IBM Communication Controller for Linux on System z				
http://www.ibm.com/software/network/commserver/library/	IBM Communications Server library				
http://www.redbooks.ibm.com	ITSO Redbooks				
http://www.ibm.com/software/network/commserver/zos/support/	IBM z/OS Communications Server technical Support – including TechNotes from service				
http://www.ibm.com/support/techdocs/atsmastr.nsf/Web/TechDocs	Technical support documentation from Washington Systems Center (techdocs, flashes, presentations, white papers, etc.)				
http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfcsearch.html	Request For Comments (RFC)				
http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/os/zos/bkserv/	IBM z/OS Internet library – PDF files of all z/OS manuals including Communications Server				