



Medical School: Diagnosing SSL/TLS & AT-TLS Problems in z/OS Communications Server

Session 14869

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Wednesday, March 12, 2014: 8:00 AM-9:00 AM
Gold Key 1/2 (Anaheim Marriott Hotel)
Session Number 14869



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Abstract



- For z/OS Communications Server it is rarely necessary to take an SSL trace for diagnosing problems with SSL/TLS or AT-TLS. A simple look in the SyslogD log or even in the messages on the MVS console can reveal what has gone wrong with the secured connection you are testing. Come to this session to see the easy way to diagnose such encrypted session problems.
- The examples are taken from an AT-TLS implementation with z/OS and Policy Agent. However, the basic SSL/TLS return codes and messages could appear in any implementation that uses zOS System SSL. The reference manuals at the back of this presentation show you how to find the correct manuals for discovering the meanings of these SSL Return Codes.

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
Agenda



- SSL/TLS/AT-TLS Protocol Flow
- Examination of Output from an SSL Trace in z/OS
- Description of Scenario that we are testing
- Error #1: Server cannot find its key ring
- Error #2: Server not authorized to read key ring
- Error #3: Server cannot find its certificate
- Error #4: Server cannot find its certificate or private key
- Error #5: Client configuration specifies a DNS lookup that does not exist
- Error #6: Server Certificate has expired (See Certificate Labs 14867, 14868)
- Summary of Common Problems with SSL/TLS and AT-TLS
- Resources for Diagnosing z/OS SSL/TLS and AT-TLS Errors

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
This page shows the approximate flow of the SSL/TLS negotiation for a secure session; this is called the HANDSHAKE LAYER and is negotiated with the HELLO Exchange. It is followed by the RECORD LAYER, in which the production data is encrypted using the Symmetric Key

SSL/TLS Trace Output in z/OS “MVS3” Server (1)



```

• MVS3 MESSAGE 0000001 13:59:02.912484 SSL_ENTRY
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_secure_socket_init
• Handle 7EB38318
• MVS3 MESSAGE 0000008 13:59:02.912513 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_secure_socket_init
• Establishing secure connection with 192.168.20.91.1034.
• MVS3 MESSAGE 0000008 13:59:02.912535 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_perform_v3_server_handsh
• Performing SSL V3 server handshake with 192.168.20.91.1034.
• MVS3 MESSAGE 0000008 13:59:02.912554 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_read_v3_record
• Calling read routine for 5 bytes
• MVS3 MESSAGE 0000008 13:59:02.912674 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_read_v3_record
• 5 bytes received
• MVS3 MESSAGE 0000008 13:59:02.912697 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_read_v3_record
• Calling read routine for 49 bytes
• MVS3 MESSAGE 0000008 13:59:02.912812 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_read_v3_record
• 49 bytes received
• MVS3 MESSAGE 0000008 13:59:02.912836 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 read_v3_client_hello
• Received CLIENT-HELLO message
• MVS3 DUMP 0000020 13:59:02.912857 SSL_ASCII_DUMP
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 read_v3_client_hello
• CLIENT-HELLO message
• 00000000: 0100002D 03025089 8BF6761E A90F924A "...P...v...J"
• 00000010: 0B909203 45AE6AD5 DC1ECCCF 3AF60746 "...Ej.....F"
• 00000020: 275180D1 DCD00000 0600FF00 0A002F01 "Q...../*"
• 00000030: 00
• MVS3 MESSAGE 0000008 13:59:02.912884 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 read_v3_client_hello
• Creating new session for connection with 192.168.20.91.1034.
    
```



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The GSKSRVR SSL Trace provides complete and very valuable information on what is happening with an SSL or TLS flow. However, if one does not know the protocols, it can be difficult to read. Frequently it is possible to solve an SSL/TLS problem just by turning on AT-TLS tracing in the AT-TLS policy, which provides more understandable messages about what may have gone awry in an encrypted setup or flow. In addition, the MVS console and the RACF messages there also provide meaningful clues. If the “easier messages” from the trace and MVS logs do not yield the information you need to solve a problem, you can look at the messages on the partner side of the connection. And, yes, there are times when you must produce an SSL/TLS GSKSRVR trace in order to examine the contents of the certificates that have been exchanged during the setup of the secured session. Therefore, in this session, we do not discount the value of an SSL Trace. We just point out that without the necessary background, it can simply be a lot easier to solve problems by using other tools that we show you here.

SSL/TLS Trace Output in z/OS (2)



- MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.912908 SSL_INFO
- Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_query_security_level
- Security level 0x00000007
- MVS3 MESSAGE 00000001 13:59:02.912928 SSL_ENTRY
- Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_get_default_label
- Handle 7EC87478
- MVS3 MESSAGE 00000002 13:59:02.912947 SSL_EXIT
- Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_get_default_label
- Exit status 00000000 (0)
- Default label 'FTP Server on MVS1-MVS7'
- MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.912965 SSL_INFO
- Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 edit_ciphers
- **Using server certificate 'FTP Server on MVS1-MVS7'**
- MVS3 MESSAGE 00000001 13:59:02.912983 SSL_ENTRY
- Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_get_certificate_algorithm
- Handle 7EC87478, Label FTP Server on MVS1-MVS7
- MVS3 MESSAGE 00000002 13:59:02.913002 SSL_EXIT
- Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_get_certificate_algorithm
- Exit status 00000000 (0)
- Key 10, Sign 22, Sign key 10
- MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.913021 SSL_INFO
- Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 edit_ciphers
- **SSL V3 cipher specs: 0A2F**
- MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.913040 SSL_INFO
- Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 read_v3_client_hello
- Renegotiation Indication signaled by initial CLIENT-HELLO
- MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.913058 SSL_INFO
- Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 read_v3_client_hello
- **Using TLSV1.1 protocol**
- MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.913075 SSL_INFO
- Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 read_v3_client_hello
- Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 read_v3_client_hello
- **Using V3 cipher specification 0A**

Deciding which Server Certificate to Send to Client

Examining Ciphers available for connection

Determining secure protocol version to use

Determining the Cipher to use

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SSL/TLS Trace Output in z/OS (3)



```
. MVS3 DUMP 00000020 13:59:02.913540 SSL_ASCII_DUMP
. Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_encode_signature
. Encoded signature stream
. 00000000: 30820275 308201DE A030201 02020100 "0..u0....."
. 00000010: 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 05050030 "0...1H.....0"
. 00000020: 3D310B30 09060355 04061302 55533110 "t=1.0...U...US1*"
. 00000030: 300E0603 55040A13 074D5653 31204341 "0...U...MVS1 CA*"
. 00000040: 311C301A 06035504 0313134D 56533143 "1.0...U...MVS1C*"
.
. MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.913580 SSL_INFO
. Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 send_v3_server_messages
. Sent CERTIFICATE message
. MVS3 DUMP 00000020 13:59:02.913600 SSL_ASCII_DUMP
. Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 send_v3_server_messages
. CERTIFICATE message
. 00000000: 0B000523 00052000 02A13082 029D3082 "...#...0..0.."
. 00000010: 0206A003 02010202 0106300D 0692A86 ".....0...*"
. 00000020: 4886F70D 01010505 00303D31 0B300906 "H.....0=1.0.."
. 00000030: 03550406 13025553 3110300E 06035504 "U...US1.0..U.."
. 00000040: 0A13074D 56533120 4341311C 301A0603 "...MVS1 CA1.0.."
. 00000050: 55040313 134D5653 3143412E 4C414253 "U...MVS1CA.LABS*"
.
. MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.913228 SSL_INFO
. Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 send_v3_server_messages
. Sent SERVER-HELLO message
. MVS3 DUMP 00000020 13:59:02.913245 SSL_ASCII_DUMP
. Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 send_v3_server_messages
. SERVER-HELLO message
. 00000000: 0200004D 03025089 8BF6AEF4 5983AEB4 "...M.P...Y..."
. 00000010: 77368513 4676E66A 2AF41E41 5FFC9CFB "w6.Fvj" A..."
. 00000020: 50720BF7 45542000 050022C0 A8145B04 "Pr.ET ...*"
. 00000030: 0A000000 00000000 00000000 00000050 ".....P*"
. 00000040: 898BF600 0000A000 0A000005 FF010001 ".....*"
. 00000050: 00
. MVS3 MESSAGE 00000001 13:59:02.913266 SSL_ENTRY
. Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_get_record_by_label
. Handle 7EC87478 Label FTP Server on MVS1-MVS7
. MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.913329 SSL_INFO
. Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 crypto_des_decrypt
. Clear key DES decryption performed for 640 bytes
```

← Sending Server Certificate Msg. to Client

← Sending Server HELLO with values negotiated

← Decrypting message with Clear Key DES

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SSL/TLS Trace Output in z/OS (4)



```
• MVS3 MESSAGE 00000002 13:59:02.913356 SSL_EXIT
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_get_record_by_label
• Exit status 00000000 (0)
• MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.913374 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_get_local_certificates
• Using subject record 'FTP Server on MVS1-MVS7'
• MVS3 MESSAGE 00000001 13:59:02.913399 SSL_ENTRY
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_get_record_by_id
• Handle 7EC87478, ID 1
• MVS3 MESSAGE 00000002 13:59:02.913433 SSL_EXIT
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_get_record_by_id
• Exit status 00000000 (0)
• .....Label 'MVS1 LABS Certificate Authority'
• MVS3 DUMP 00000020 13:59:02.913540 SSL_ASCII_DUMP
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_encode_signature
• Encoded signature stream
• 00000000: 30820275 308201DE A0030201 02020100 "0..u0....."
• 00000010: 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 05050300 "0..*H.....0"
• 00000020: 3D310B30 09060355 04061302 55533110 "~1.0..U...US1*"
• 00000030: 300E0603 55040A13 074D5653 31204341 "0..U...MVS1 CA*"
• 00000040: 311C301A 06035504 0313134D 56533143 "1.0..U...MVS1C*"
• 00000050: 412E4C41 42532E49 424D2E43 4F4D301E "A.LABS.IBM.COM0.*"
• 00000060: 170D3131 30313031 30353030 30305A17 ".110101050000Z.*"
• 00000070: 0D313630 31303130 34353935 395A303D ".1601010459520="
• 00000080: 310B3009 06035504 06130255 53311030 "1.0..U...US1.0"
• 00000090: 0E060355 040A1307 4D565331 20434131 "...U...MVS1 CA1*"
• 000000A0: 1C301A06 03550403 13134D56 53314341 "0..U...MVS1CA.*"
• 000000B0: 2E4C4142 532E4942 4D2E434F 4D30819F ".LABS.IBM.COM0..*"
• 000000C0: 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 01050003 "0..*H....."
• 000000D0: 818D0030 81890281 8100E446 B461BABA "...0.....F.a.*"
• 000000E0: F83A7564 A577B89F E2023216 7EBA441B "*..udw...2...D.*"
• 000000F0: EF16FD7B 0A77ED87 FD03B239 7C7E8B68 "...{w....9}..h*"
• 00000100: E76345B5 A1375956 39176EEB F54F26B1 ".cE..7YV9.n..O&.*"
• 00000270: E452346C B5DE21F7 0D ".*R4I..I..*"
• MVS3 MESSAGE 00000002 13:59:02.913561 SSL_EXIT
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_encode_signature
• Exit status 00000000 (0)
```

Sending Server Certificate to Client

Sending CA Certificate to Client

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SSL/TLS Trace Output in z/OS (5)



```
• MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.913580 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 send_v3_server_messages
• Sent CERTIFICATE message
• MVS3 DUMP 00000020 13:59:02.913600 SSL_ASCII_DUMP
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 send_v3_server_messages
• CERTIFICATE message
• 00000000: 0B00523 00052000 02A13082 029D3082 *...#...0...0.*
• 00000520: 346CB5DE 21F70D *4L.L.*
• MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.913620 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 send_v3_server_messages
• Sent SERVER-HELLO-DONE message
• MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.913646 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_write_v3_record
• Calling write routine for 1409 bytes
• MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.915106 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 read_v3_client_key_exchange
• Received CLIENT-KEY-EXCHANGE message
• MVS3 DUMP 00000020 13:59:02.915127 SSL_ASCII_DUMP
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 read_v3_client_key_exchange
• CLIENT-KEY-EXCHANGE message
• MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.915150 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 crypto_rsa_private_decrypt
• Using PKCS private key
• MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.915175 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 crypto_rsa_private_decrypt
• RSA modulus is 1024 bits
• MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.918996 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 crypto_rsa_private_decrypt
• Software RSA private key decryption performed
• MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.919089 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_read_v3_record
• Calling read routine for 5 bytes
• MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.919233 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_read_v3_record
• 5 bytes received
• MVS3 MESSAGE 00000008 13:59:02.919257 SSL_INFO
• Job TCPIPT Process 00050022 Thread 00000004 gsk_read_v3_record
• Calling read routine for 1 bytes
```

Sending Server HELLO_DONE to Client

Received Encrypted Symmetric Key from Client

Using Server Private Key (PKCS) to decrypt the Symmetric Key That the client had encrypted with Server Public Key

Record Layer: Encrypted Data Flow

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Formatting SSL Trace Flows; Viewing Certificates




```
Removing TLS handshake header...
----- Found Server Hello -----
Hexadecimal value      Meaning
-----
02                      Server Hello
00004D                 Message length is decimal 77
0302                   TLS 01-1
504E3034...014E8F68    32 byte random structure
20                      SID length is decimal 32. SID on next line:
 02050026C0A8146F04130000000000000000000000000000000504E303400000000
Chosen cipher suite:
000A                   TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
00                      No compression in use.
Extensions found:
0005                   Length of extension field
FF01                   Renegotiation Request
000100                 Initial handshake, no renegotiation

----- Found X.509 Certificate -----
Hexadecimal value      Meaning
-----
0296                   Certificate 1 is decimal 662
0275                   Certificate 2 is decimal 629

Found 2 certificates
```

*“Home Grown” Windows REXX
exec that takes the trace
and interprets it.*

*Certificate Tool in the Windows
Microsoft Management Center*




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This page illustrates a “home-grown” exec that strips out TLS wrappers and line formatting, and then converts the certificate into binary so that the Windows formatter can read it...

Error #1: Server Cannot Find its Key Ring



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FTP.DATA specifies
Server Authentication Only




MVS1

Policy Agent (AT-TLS Policies)

FTP Client on
TCPIPT at 192.168.20.91
(USER301)


TCPIP/Client_RING
•MVS1 LABS Certificate Authority



MVS3


Policy Agent (AT-TLS Policies)

FTP Server on
TCPIPT at 192.168.20.93
Administrator: USER31
OWNER = TCPIP

FTP/Server_RING 
•FTP Server on MVS1-MVS7
•MVS1 LABS Certificate Authority

1. All Key Rings are shared and contain valid and trusted certificates that have not yet expired.
2. Testing between Source and Destination OSA Port addresses:
TCPIPT: 192.168.20.91-97

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Both FTP Servers are sharing the same Key Ring across all MVS Images. The Client Key Ring is also shared across all clients and MVS images.

Error #1: View of Error Messages




RC 202
RC 406
RC 5006

AT-TLS POLICY

```

TTLSCONNECTIONACTION          cAct1
{
  HandshakeRole                Server
  ...
  Trace                         255 <<<raised from 7
}

```




```

EZA1701I >>> AUTH TLS
234 Security environment established - ready for negotiation
FC2838 authServerAttls: Start Handshake
FC2847 authServerAttls: ioctl() failed on SIOCTTLSCCTL - EDC8121I Connection
reset. (errno2=0x74520442)
EZA2897I Authentication negotiation failed

```

AT MVS3 (SERVER):	EZD1287I TTLS Error RC: 202	Environment Master Init
AT MVS3 (SERVER):	EZD1287I TTLS Error RC: 202	Environment Link
AT MVS1 (CLIENT):	EZD1287I TTLS Error RC: 406	Initial Handshake
AT MVS3 (SERVER):	EZD1287I TTLS Error RC: 5006	Initial Handshake


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We raised the trace level in the AT-TLS policy from 7 to 255, but perhaps we did not need to. Perhaps the messages on the MVS console are enough to solve this problem.

The server reset the connection – not the client. In addition, the server reported more errors than the client on the MVS console. We must examine the meaning of all these messages and the return codes.

Where to find SSL/TLS and AT-TLS Return or Error Codes



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Please reference all the materials listed in the appendix of this presentation. For now, these two documents suffice for our problem determination steps, as they contain the meanings of the SSL and AT-TLS return codes.

Error #1: Diagnosis



```
AT MVS3 (SERVER): EZD1287I TTLS Error RC: 202 Environment Master Init
AT MVS1 (CLIENT): EZD1287I TTLS Error RC: 406 Initial Handshake 479
AT MVS3 (SERVER): EZD1287I TTLS Error RC: 5006 Initial Handshake 951
```

•IP MESSAGES, VOL. 2 (SC31-8784-11) for V1R12

EZD1287I: Explanation: Application Transparent Transport Layer Security (AT-TLS) detected an error during the specified AT-TLS event



•IP DIAGNOSIS GUIDE (GC31-8782-11), Chapter 29, AT-TLS Return Codes


RC 202: Environment Init The key ring cannot be opened because the user does not have permission. Ensure that the correct key ring has been specified.

RC 406: 406 Connection Init An I/O error occurred on the socket. This occurs if the TCP socket is closed ..such as when a reset is received

RC 5006: 5006 The connection is using a TTLSEnvironmentAction statement that failed to initialize a System SSL environment.

Pasearch
Output at
MVS3

```
HandshakeRole: Server
TTLSKeyringParms:
Keyring: FTTP/Server_RING
```



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
The error messages and the return codes all point toward a problem at the Server side of the connection. The problem is related to the Handshake. We know that integral to the handshake is the exchange of negotiation parameters and certificates. The RC of 202 points to a problem that indicates that the server may not be able to find its keyring. And, in fact, that is the problem; There is a typo in the AT-TLS policy where the owner of the Key Ring was spelled wrong. The correct spelling is “FTPD” and not “FTPP.” We change the policy and we force System SSL to reinstall the keyring knowledge by raising what is called an INSTANCE Number for AT-TLS.

Error #1: Solution



MVS3
AT-TLS
POLICY

```
TLSKeyringParms                          keyR1
{
    Keyring                                  FTPD_Server_RING <<<<<<<<<<
```



Refresh
Key
Ring

1. Change Policy Instance Number and UPDATE PAGENTT to reinstall changes to Key Ring for FTP Server ("f pagent,update"), or ...
2. Recycle FTP Server to reinstall changes to Key Ring (Disruptive)

MVS1
Client
Connection
Messages

```
234 Security environment established - ready for negotiation
FC2838 authServerAttls: Start Handshake
FC2869 authServerAttls: FIPS140 not enabled
FC2890 authServerAttls: Using TLSv1.1 protocol
FC2904 authServerAttls: SSL cipher: 0A
FU1486 getCtrlConnCertAttls: Request certificate, size 673
EZA2895I Authentication negotiation succeeded
FC1777 setdlevel: entered
FC1938 setpbsz: entered
EZA1701I >>> PBSZ 0
200 Protection buffer size accepted
EZA1701I >>> PROT P
200 Data connection protection set to private
EZA2906I Data connection protection is private
EZA1459I NAME (192.168.20.93:USER301):
```



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We discovered that the key ring for the server was incorrectly specified as belonging to a USERID of FTPP. We corrected this to identify the true owner of this Key Ring (FTPD). When our client establishes a secured FTP connection this time, he is successful. The messages that the client sees due to our setup of the Client FTP.DATA file show that we even recognize the actual cipher and TLS protocol that we are using for the successful negotiation and establishment.

This is an excerpt from the policy where you see we have increased the policy instance number for the server so that any update or refresh of the PAGENT procedure will cause System SSL to refresh the image of the Key Ring that is in memory for the FTP Server to use:


```
TTLSEnvironmentAction      eAct1~FTPTat192.168.20.9n
{
    HandshakeRole           Server
    EnvironmentUserInstance  1 <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< was 0
before <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
    TLSKeyringParmsRef     keyR1
}
```


Error #1: Confirming Information from UNIX SYSLOG Daemon AT-TLS Tracing at Server



MVS3
Pasearch
Output

```
HandshakeRole: Server
TTLSTLSKeyringParms:
Keyring: FTTP/Server_RING
```



MVS3
AT-TLS
TRACE

```
Environment Create ACTIONS: gAct1 eAct1-FTPTat192.168.20.9n
RC: 0 Environment Master Create 00000001
RC: 0 Call GSK_ENVIRONMENT_OPEN - 7EC25118
RC: 0 Set GSK_KEYRING_FILE - FTTP/Server_RING
RC: 0 Set GSK_CLIENT_AUTH_TYPE - FULL
RC: 0 Set GSK_CLIENT_AUTH_ALERT - ON
RC: 0 Set GSK_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE - ANY
RC: 0 Set GSK_SESSION_TYPE - SERVER
RC: 0 Set GSK_PROTOCOL_SSLV2 - OFF
RC: 0 Set GSK_PROTOCOL_SSLV3 - ON
RC: 0 Set GSK_PROTOCOL_TLSV1 - ON
RC: 0 Set GSK_PROTOCOL_TLSV1_1 - ON
RC: 0 Set GSK_TLS_EXTID_TRUNCATED_HMAC - OFF
RC: 0 Set GSK_TLS_EXTID_SERVER_MFL - OFF
RC: 0 Set GSK_TLS_EXTID_CLIENT_MFL - OFF
RC: 0 Set GSK_TLS_EXTID_SNI_SERVER_LABELS - OFF
RC: 0 Set GSK_TLS_EXTID_SNI_CLIENT_SNAMES - OFF
RC: 0 Set GSK_IO_CALLBACK -
RC: 202 Call GSK_ENVIRONMENT_INIT - 7EC25118
RC: 202 Environment Master Init 00000000
```

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We were able to solve the problem without looking at the AT-TLS trace output from Policy Agent and the policy. But we show you that this trace would have also provided valuable information to solve the issue. And... this trace is easier to set up and take, with fewer steps, than the SYSTEM SSL Trace. However, there are times when you must provide a System SSL trace, and so it is wise to learn how to set one of these up. (System SSL trace is not a subject of this presentation.)

Explaining the Solution -- Server Key Ring: Who "Owns" It & How to Find It?

• RACF Key Ring for a Server:

1. ADDUSER FTPD ... or
2. ADDUSER OTHER ...
3. RACDCERT ID(FTPD)
ADDRING(FTPRING) ... or ...
4. RACDCERT ID(**OTHER**)
ADDRING(FTPRING)
5. MYFTP Pointer to Key Ring owned by itself:
 - 'KEYRING FTPRING'
6. MYFTP Pointer to Key Ring owned by "OTHER" USERID:
 - 'KEYRING **OTHER/FTPRING**'

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1) Key Ring for a Server or a Client:

Define a USERID and assign an OMVS (UNIX) Identity to it:

```
ADDUSER FTPD DFLTGRP(OMVSGRP) OMVS(UID(0) HOME('/'))
NOPASSWORD
```

Create a Started Class definition for the Server and associate it with its OMVS Segment (i.e., its USERID or OWNER)

```
RDEFINE STARTED MYFTP*.* STDATA(USER(FTPD))
```

Associate an x.509 Server Certificate with its OMVS Segment OWNER

```
RACDCERT ID(FTPD) GENCERT ...
```

2) PERSONAL Certificate for a Client (Assumption: Client is a human user)

Define a USERID and assign an OMVS (UNIX) Identity to it:

```
ADDUSER USER71 DFLTGRP(OMVSGRP) OMVS(UID(707)
HOME('/u/user71'))
```

...

Associate an x.509 Client Certificate with its OMVS Segment OWNER

```
RACDCERT ID(USER71) GENCERT ...
```

Explaining the Solution -- Client Key Ring: Who "Owns" It & How to Find It?

- RACF Key Ring for a Client:
 - ADDUSER USER301 ... or
 - ADDUSER ADMIN ...
 - RACDCERT ID(USER301) ADDRING(MYRING) ... or ...
 - RACDCERT ID(ADMIN) ADDRING(MYRING)
- USER301 Pointer to Key Ring owned by itself:
 - 'KEYRING MYRING'
- USER301 Pointer to Key Ring owned by "ADMIN" USERID:
 - 'KEYRING ADMIN/MYRING'

NOTE: CA Certificate must reside on Key Ring unless using "virtual key rings." Client Certificate is on real Key Ring only if Client Authentication is implemented.

SHARE
in Anaheim 19

1) Key Ring for a Server or a Client:

Define a USERID and assign an OMVS (UNIX) Identity to it:

```
ADDUSER FTPD DFLTGRP(OMVSGRP) OMVS(UID(0) HOME('/'))
NOPASSWORD
```

Create a Started Class definition for the Server and associate it with its OMVS Segment (i.e., its USERID or OWNER)

```
RDEFINE STARTED MYFTP*.* STDATA(USER(FTPD))
```

Associate an x.509 Server Certificate with its OMVS Segment OWNER

```
RACDCERT ID(FTPD) GENCERT ...
```

2) PERSONAL Certificate for a Client (Assumption: Client is a human user)

Define a USERID and assign an OMVS (UNIX) Identity to it:

```
ADDUSER USER301 DFLTGRP(OMVSGRP) OMVS(UID(707)
HOME('/u/user301'))
```

...

Associate an x.509 Client Certificate with its OMVS Segment OWNER

```
RACDCERT ID(USER301) GENCERT ...
```

ERROR #2: Not Authorized to Read Key Ring



MVS1
RACF
ERROR
MSG.

```
ICH408I USER(USER301 ) GROUP(USER ) NAME(USER301)
IRR.DIGTCERT.LISTRING CL(FACILITY)
INSUFFICIENT ACCESS AUTHORITY
ACCESS INTENT(READ ) ACCESS ALLOWED(NONE )
```

ERROR #2: Solution

•For a Client who does not need to present a client certificate:

- RDEFINE FACILITY IRR.DIGTCERT.LISTRING UACC(NONE)
- PERMIT **IRR.DIGTCERT.LISTRING** CLASS(FACILITY) ID(USER301) **ACCESS(READ)**
- SETROPTS RACLIST(FACILITY) REFRESH

•For a Server or a Client who needs to present a client certificate:

- RDEFINE FACILITY IRR.DIGTCERT.LISTRING UACC(NONE)
- RDEFINE FACILITY IRR.DIGTCERT.LIST UACC(NONE)
- PERMIT **IRR.DIGTCERT.LISTRING** CLASS(FACILITY) ID(XXX) **ACCESS(.....)**
- PERMIT **IRR.DIGTCERT.LIST** CLASS(FACILITY) ID(XXX) **ACCESS(....)**
- SETROPTS RACLIST(FACILITY) REFRESH

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Here you see that the User could not open the key ring to be able to validate the received Server certificate against the client's stored copy of the CA certificate that signed the Server Certificate. The solution was simply to authorize the users of the key rings to open and read the key rings. RACF since V1R8 can also permit users to key rings on a more granular basis than what is depicted here. In our example we are permitting the users globally to read any key ring.

Explaining the Solution: RACF Permissions for Working with Certificates and Key Rings



1. Define **RACDCERT** as an authorized TSO command in **IKJTSOxx**
2. Define **IRR.DIGTCERT.function** resources using RDEFINE RACF command
3. To issue **RACDCERT**, user must have one of the following authorities
 1. The **SPECIAL** attribute
 2. Sufficient authority to **IRR.DIGTCERT.function** resources
4. Permit **IRR.DIGTCERT.function** to users

Access Permission	Description
READ	control certificates for this user only
UPDATE	control certificates for other users too
CONTROL	control special certificates like CERTAUTH (Certificate Authority) certificates

EXAMPLES:

- PERMIT IRR.DIGTCERT.**LISTRING** CLASS(FACILITY) ID(TCPIP) ACCESS(READ)
- PERMIT IRR.DIGTCERT.**LISTRING** CLASS(FACILITY) ID(USER301) ACCESS(READ)
- PERMIT IRR.DIGTCERT.**LIST** CLASS(FACILITY) ID(TCPIP) ACCESS(READ)
- PERMIT IRR.DIGTCERT.**LIST** CLASS(FACILITY) ID(USER301) ACCESS(READ)

A SETROPTS command "refreshes" the controls for the certificate functions
User executing this command requires the SPECIAL attribute

Completa

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
RACF since V1R8 can also permit users to key rings on a more granular basis than what is depicted here. In our example we are permitting the users globally to read any key ring.

Error #3: Server Cannot Find its Certificate



FTP.DATA specifies

Server Authentication Only



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In this scenario, the FTP Server is unable to find the certificate it is supposed to present to the client during Server Authentication. The label of the certificate stored in RACF is "FTP Server on MVS1-MVS7". The Key Ring name remains the same for FTPT server, but something has changed on the ring!

Error #3: View of Error Messages



RC 6

RC 438

234 Security environment established - ready for negotiation

FC2838 authServerAttls: Start Handshake



FC2847 authServerAttls: ioctl() failed on SIOCTTLSCCTL - EDC8121I Connection re set. (errno2=0x77A9733D) <<<<<<<<<<< *Different errno2 from previous example*

EZA2897I Authentication negotiation failed

EZA1534I *** Control connection with 192.168.20.93 dies.

AT MVS3 (SERVER):	EZD1287I TTLS Error RC: 6	Initial Handshake
AT MVS1 (CLIENT):	EZD1287I TTLS Error RC: 438	Initial Handshake

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The FC2847 error with EDC8121I is difficult to diagnose, since these errno2 codes are not easy to find.

We must examine the meaning of all these SSL messages and the return codes. It appears that the remote end of the connection (The server) reset the connection. The server probably does not "like" what it saw when it tried to establish this connection.

Error #3: Diagnosis (1)



•IP MESSAGES, VOL. 2 (SC31-8784-11) for V1R12

EZD1287I: **Explanation:** Application Transparent Transport Layer Security (AT-TLS) detected an error during the specified AT-TLS event

•IP DIAGNOSIS GUIDE (GC31-8782-11), Chapter 29, AT-TLS Return Codes

RC 6 and RC438: **Not documented here!**

•Cryptographic Services SYSTEM SECURE SOCKETS LAYER Programming (SC24-5901-10)

At MVS3 ... RC 6: 6 Key label is not found.

Explanation: The requested key label is not found in the key database, SAF key ring or z/OS PKCS #11 token.

User response: Specify a label that exists in the key database, SAF key ring or z/OS PKCS #11 token.

At MVS1 ... RC 438: 438 Internal error reported by remote partner.

Explanation: The peer application has detected an internal error while performing an SSL operation and has sent an alert to close the secure connection.

User response: Check the error log for the remote application to determine the nature of the processing error.

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The server reset the connection – not the client. RC438 seen at MVS1 confirms this. RC6 at MVS3 indicates a problem with finding the correct key label in the key database or ring. We need to look at the FTP Server's key ring on MVS3.

Error #3: Diagnosis (2)



```
raccert id(FTPD) listing(Server_RING)
Digital ring information for user FTPD:
Ring:
```

```
>Server_RING<
Certificate Label Name          Cert Owner      USAGE          DEFAULT
-----
MVS1 LABS Certificate Authority CERTAUTH        CERTAUTH       NO
```



Where is the FTP Server Certificate? It is not on the server's key ring!

```
MVS3      EZD1286I  TTLS Error GRPID: 00000005 ENVID: 0000000C CONNID: 000007CC
AT-TLS    LOCAL: 192.168.20.93..21 REMOTE: 192.168.20.91..1037 JOBNAME: FTPT1
TRACE     USERID: TCPIP RULE: FTPTat192.168.20.9n~1 RC: 6 Initial Handshake
          00000000 7EC28B98 EZYFT96I TLS handshake failed
```

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We already suspect that there is something wrong with the key ring at MVS3, and so we display it and discover that the FTP Server certificate, which has been requested by the Client to establish secure communications, has been omitted from the appropriate key ring.

The AT-TLS log or trace does not provide us with any more information than we already had; it just confirms that there was a problem with the initial handshake.


We can correct the error as you see with our JCL on the next visual.

Error #3: Solution



Connect FTP
Server Cert to
Key Ring

```
RACDCERT ID(FTPD) CONNECT(ID(FTPD) -  
LABEL("FTP Server on MVS1-MVS7") -  
RING(Server_RING) USAGE(PERSONAL) DEFAULT)  
setropts generic(DIGTCERT) refresh  
setropts raclist(DIGTCERT) refresh  
racdcert ID(FTPD) listring(Server_RING)
```



Digital ring information for user FTPD:

```
Ring:  
>Server_RING<  
-----  
Certificate Label Name      Cert Owner      USAGE      DEFAULT  
-----  
MVS1 LABS Certificate Authority  CERTAUTH      CERTAUTH      NO  
  
FTP Server on MVS1-MVS7      ID(FTPD)      PERSONAL      YES
```

Refresh
Key
Ring

1. Change Policy Instance Number and UPDATE PAGENTT to reinstall changes to Key Ring for FTP Server ("f pagent,update"), or ...
2. Recycle FTP Server to reinstall changes to Key Ring (Disruptive)

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RACDCERT connects the missing certificate to the appropriate Key Ring; when we next display the key ring the certificate is finally there. We then need to refresh the FTP Server's knowledge of a changed key ring and certificate with one of the two steps at the bottom of the page.

On the next visual you will see what needs to be on a key ring. These notes on this page contain the initial introduction to the concepts and the next visual provides more detail.


INTRO: What needs to be on a key ring or associated with a key ring??

A sender's key repository must contain all certificates that represent the full chain of trust for that sender.

A recipient's key repository must contain only the ROOT CA certificate associated with the sender's full chain of trust. However, if there is more than one CA certificate in a chain of trust, it is a good idea to include both the ROOT CA and the SECONDARY CA as well as any other alternate CAs in the recipient's key repository. The inclusion of the full CA chain of trust is not always necessary. It is only necessary to include on the key ring all the CAs in a chain if the sender of the End Entity certificate sends only the End Entity certificate when requested by the partner. If the sender presents the End Entity certificate as well as the chain of more than one CA certificate, then the recipient's key ring only needs the ROOT CA on its key ring. Whether or not a security implementation using certificates includes only the End Entity certificate or the full chain of trust is a platform implementation design option. This explains why it is often safer just to include not just the ROOT CA but also any subordinate CAs as well.

We show you here three examples of key ring configurations when using Server Authentication only for SSL/TLS or AT-TLS. In general, a TRUSTED Certificate or Certificate Chain and the PRIVATE Key of the End-Entity that owns the certificate is required. But whether or not the PRIVATE KEY need be available depends on whether mutual authentication is required or not. You see in the three examples that the client keyring needs no PRIVATE key associated with it if only Server Authentication is in use.

Explaining the Solution: What Must Reside on a Key Ring? (Server Authentication Example Only)



Complete your session evaluation online at: SHARE.org/Anaheim-Eval



Read the INTRO to this concept in the notes on the previous page.

In the first example, you see that we have deployed only a server certificate. In this case, the server's key ring or key repository must have access to the server's private key as well as to its own server certificate.

The Client's key ring needs a copy of the self-signed server certificate in order to validate the certificate that the Server sends to it during SSL/TLS or AT-TLS negotiation.

In the second example, you see that we have deployed a server certificate that has been signed by a CA certificate (CA1). In this case, the server's key ring or key repository must have access to the server's private key as well as to its own server certificate. It must also have access to the CA certificate that has signed the server certificate.

The Client's key ring needs a copy of the ROOT CA certificate that has signed the Server certificate in order to validate the certificate that the Server sends to it during SSL/TLS or AT-TLS negotiation.

In the third example, you see that we have deployed a server certificate that has been signed by a CA certificate (CA2), which itself has been signed by another root CA certificate (CA1). In this case, the server's key ring or key repository must have access to the server's private key as well as to its own server certificate. It also has access to both CA certificates although the inclusion of CA-2 is optional.

The Client's key ring needs a copy of the Server's ROOT CA certificate, but to avoid problems in case the Server does not send the full chain of trust, both CA certificates (Root and Intermediate) that were used to sign the server certificate are included on the keyring.

EXAMPLE:


A local server key ring should contain:

The server certificate for the local End Entity.

The CA certificate that signed the local End Entity certificate.

The CA certificate that signed a remote End Entity certificate, if the negotiation requests Client Authentication.

The CA certificates that may have signed an Intermediate CA certificate that resides on the ring.



In this scenario, the FTP Server is still unable to find the certificate it is supposed to present to the client during Server Authentication. The label of the certificate stored in RACF is "FTP Server on MVS1-MVS7". The Key Ring name remains the same for FTPT server, but something has changed again on the ring!

Error #4: View of Error Messages



RC 428

234 Security environment established - ready for negotiation

FC2838 authServerAttls: Start Handshake



FC2847 authServerAttls: ioctl() failed on SIOCTTLSCCTL - EDC8121I Connection re set. (errno2=0x77A9733D) <<<<<<<<<<< *Different errno2 from previous example*

EZA2897I Authentication negotiation failed

EZA1534I *** Control connection with 192.168.20.93 dies.

AT MVS1 (CLIENT):	EZD1287I TTLS Error RC: 438	Initial Handshake
AT MVS3 (SERVER):	EZD1287I TTLS Error RC: 428	Initial Handshake

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As before, the FC2847 error with EDC8121I is difficult to diagnose, since these errno2 codes are not easy to find.

We must examine the meaning of all these SSL messages and the return codes again. Once again, It appears that the remote end of the connection (the server) reset the connection. The server probably does not "like" what it saw when it tried to establish this connection.

However, now we have a different TTLS Return Code to look at: RC 428.

Error #4: Diagnosis (1)



IP DIAGNOSIS GUIDE (GC31-8782-11), Chapter 29, AT-TLS Return Codes

[RC 428 and RC 438](#): Not documented here!



•*Cryptographic Services SYSTEM SECURE SOCKETS LAYER Programming (SC24-5901-10)*

[At MVS3 ... RC 428](#): 428 Key entry does not contain a private key.

Explanation: The key entry does not contain a private key or the private key is not usable. This error can also occur if the private key is stored in ICSF and ICSF services are not available, ... Certificates that are meant to represent a server or client must be connected to a SAF keyring with a USAGE value of PERSONAL and either be owned by the userid of the application or be SITE certificates.

User response: Ensure that the ICSF started task has been started prior to the application if the private key is stored in ICSF. ... If executing in FIPS mode, ensure that the certificate being used does not have its private key stored in ICSF.



[At MVS1 ... RC 438](#): 438 Internal error reported by remote partner.

Explanation: The peer application has detected an internal error while performing an SSL operation and has sent an alert to close the secure connection.

User response: Check the error log for the remote application to determine the nature of the processing error.

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The server reset the connection – not the client. RC438 seen at MVS1 confirms this. RC428 at MVS3 indicates a problem with finding the correct private key associated with the certificate that is supposed to be owned by the FTPT1 server. What we will discover is that RC of 428 can also mean simply that the certificate has been incorrectly added to the Key Ring – which is why the server cannot find the private key it needs.

Error #4: Diagnosis (2)



Digital certificate information for user FTPD:

Label: FTP Server on MVS1-MVS7

Certificate ID: 2QTG49fExuPXQOKFmaWFm
UCWIUDU5eLnYNTI4uhA

Status: TRUST ←

Start Date: 2012/09/08 00:00:00 ←
End Date: 2015/12/31 23:59:59

Serial Number:
>74<

Issuer's Name:
>CN=MVS1CA.LABS.IBM.COM.O=MVS1
CA.C=US<

(
Subject's Name:
>CN=FTP Server on MVS1-
MVS7.OU=WSC.C=US<

Subject's AltNames:
IP: 192.168.20.0
EMail: FTP at ZOS1
Domain: WSC.IBM.COM

Key Type: RSA ←

Key Size: 1024

Private Key: YES ←

...



This is not an ICSF key - in some ways the error message is misleading. In other ways it is not: The explanation of the return code does point out that there is no PRIVATE key available to the FTP Server. Therefore,

1. we have either connected the correct certificate and its key INCORRECTLY to the key ring, or
2. we have failed to attach a certificate together with its key - possibly because it was exported or imported to us incorrectly! The display above shows that we DO have a private key and so we focus on bullet #1 Above.

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We once again display the FTPD/Server_RING Key Ring to verify that the certificate for the FTP server resides on the correct ring. We also reissue the SETROPTS commands to verify that address space storage has been updated with the correct copy of the key ring. We also re-issue the commands to Policy Agent to have it re-read what is in storage. We test the client again, and obtain the same error.

Then we look at the contents of the Certificate to see if we find anything unusual there – for example, are we actually using ICSF (Crypto-managed) keys when we thought we were not? Are the dates fine -- although this is a long shot, since our error codes are not indicating expired certificates? Is the certificate in TRUST status? What type of Key are we using for the private key? (Not an ICSF key.) Therefore, the error messages indicating that perhaps ICSF was required in order to correct the problem was misleading in our case.

Something else is wrong. What is it?

Error #4: Diagnosis (3)




Digital ring information for user FTPD:

```
Ring:
>Server_RING<
Certificate Label Name          Cert Owner  USAGE      DEFAULT
-----
MVS1 LABS Certificate Authority CERTAUTH    CERTAUTH    NO
FTP Server on MVS1-MVS7        ID(FTPD)   PERSONAL    YES
```

Owner
of FTPT1
Server

```
SDSF DA MVS3      MVS3      PAG 0 CPU 3
COMMAND INPUT ==>
PREFIX=FTP*  DEST=(ALL)  OWNER=*  SYSNAME=
NP  JOBNAME  StepName  ProcStep  JobID  Owner
   FTPCCL1  STEP1      STC15829 TCPIP
   FTPT1    STEP1      STC16246 TCPIP
```



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The ICSF clue was a false lead. We must look for something else that does not look right. And we find it when we look at the key ring and look at the FTPT1 server. There it is: The server is running with an OMVS segment that identifies TCPIP as the owner; but the Certificate has been attached to the RACF key ring indicating something quite different: There, the certificate owner is identified as “FTPD” and not “TCPIP.”

Explaining the Solution: Who Must Own a Personal Certificate and its Key Pair?

PERSONAL Certificate for a Server:

1. ADDUSER FTPD
DFLTGRP(OMVSGRP) OMVS(UID(0)
HOME('/')) NOPASSWORD
2. RDEFINE STARTED MYFTP*.*
STDATA(USER(FTPDP))
3. RACDCERT **ID(FTPDP)** GENCERT ...

PERSONAL Certificate for a Client if using Client Authentication (Assumption: Client is a human user)

1. ADDUSER USER301
DFLTGRP(OMVSGRP)
OMVS(UID(707) HOME('/u/user301'))
...
2. RACDCERT **ID(USER301)** GENCERT

USERID of OMVS Segment MUST OWN THE PERSONAL CERTIFICATE and Key Pair

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The PUBLIC key of the key pair resides in the Personal Certificate; the PRIVATE key of the key pair is associated with the Personal Certificate and its OMVS Segment Owner.

1) PERSONAL Certificate for a Server:

Define a USERID and assign an OMVS (UNIX) Identity to it:

```
ADDUSER FTPD DFLTGRP(OMVSGRP) OMVS(UID(0) HOME('/'))
NOPASSWORD
```

Create a Started Class definition for the Server and associate it with its OMVS Segment (i.e., its USERID or OWNER)

```
RDEFINE STARTED MYFTP*.* STDATA(USER(FTPDP))
```

Associate an x.509 Server Certificate with its OMVS Segment OWNER

```
RACDCERT ID(FTPDP) GENCERT ...
```

2) PERSONAL Certificate for a Client (Assumption: Client is a human user)

Define a USERID and assign an OMVS (UNIX) Identity to it:

```
ADDUSER USER71 DFLTGRP(OMVSGRP) OMVS(UID(707)
HOME('/u/user71'))
```

...

Associate an x.509 Client Certificate with its OMVS Segment OWNER

```
RACDCERT ID(USER71) GENCERT ...
```

Error #4: Solution (1)




Digital ring information for user FTPD:

```
Ring:
>Server_RING<
Certificate Label Name          Cert Owner  USAGE      DEFAULT
-----
MVS1 LABS Certificate Authority CERTAUTH    CERTAUTH    NO
FTP Server on MVS1-MVS7        ID(FTPD)    PERSONAL     YES
```

Owner
of FTPT1
Server

```
SDSF DA MVS3      MVS3      PAG 0 CPU 3
COMMAND INPUT ==>
PREFIX=FTP*  DEST=(ALL)  OWNER=*  SYSNAME=
NP  JOBNAME  StepName  ProcStep  JobID  Owner
   FTPCCL1  STEP1      STC15829 TCPIP
   FTPT1    STEP1      STC16246 TCPIP
```



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The ICSF clue was a false lead. We must look for something else that does not look right. And we find it when we look at the key ring and look at the FTPT1 server. There it is: The server is running with an OMVS segment that identifies TCPIP as the owner; but the Certificate has been attached to the RACF key ring indicating something quite different: There, the certificate owner is identified as “FTPD” and not “TCPIP.”

For the solution we choose to disconnect the certificate from the key ring and then reconnect it while specifying the correct OMVS Segment Userid.

Error #4: Solution (2)



1

```
racdcert remove(id(FTPD) label('FTP Server on MVS1-MVS7')  
ring(Server_RING)) ID(FTPD)
```



2

```
racdcert delete(id(FTPD)label('FTP Server on MVS1-MVS7'))
```

3

```
RACDCERT ID(FTPD) CONNECT(ID(TCPIP) LABEL('FTP Server  
on MVS1-MVS7') RING(Server_RING) USAGE(PERSONAL) DEFAULT)
```



1. Disconnect the certificate from the key ring.
2. CAUTION: Delete the certificate if not being used elsewhere.
 1. Otherwise generate a new certificate and specify the correct OMVS Segment Owner of the started task, FTPT1.
3. Connect new certificate to the keyring.



Or you could instead just choose to associate the started task with the owner of the existing certificate.

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This visual describes the steps you could take to correct the problem.

Error #5a: When the FTP Client Desires DNS Validation



```
;SECURE_HOSTNAME OPTIONAL ; Authentication of hostname in
; the server certificate
; OPTIONAL (D)
; REQUIRED
```

0335304B Certificate not valid for host.

Explanation: A server certificate does not contain the current host name as either the common name (CN) element of the subject name or as a DNS entry for the subject alternate name.

User response: Obtain a new certificate containing the desired host name.

1. Some clients will validate a server certificate
 1. Verify that hostname exists in an application-internal listing or with a Resolver Call
 1. (CN) of Subject Name (Certificate "Subject's Name")
 2. Subject Alternate Name (Certificate "Domain")
 2. Application Coding or Certificate or DNS (Host.Local) must be correct
 1. Change any of these
 1. Depends on how the application handles the feature

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Here you see an example of an option you can set in the FTP Client.

Not all clients avail themselves of this feature to request validation of a server certificate by checking to see if its entries match anything in the Client's DNS or Host.Local file.

You must know your client before you request a certificate ... or you must plan for all cases and use the ALTNAME certificate extensions so that, if necessary, you can update a DNS or a Host Local file with a new entry. This is usually less expensive than buying a new certificate. (If you are creating your own certificates expense or time delays are probably not an issue.)

System SSL will validate the host name against the DNS entry in the subject alternate name extension.

The host name in the certificate can be

- a fully-qualified name (e.g., 'dcesec4.endicott.ibm.com'),
- a domain suffix (e.g., '.endicott.ibm.com') or
- a wildcard name beginning with an asterisk (e.g., '*.endicott.ibm.com').

A case-sensitive comparison is performed between the supplied host name and the host name in the certificate. A fully-qualified name must be the same as the supplied host name. A domain suffix matches any host name with the same suffix but does not match the suffix itself. For example, '*.endicott.ibm.com'


The status code in the example is a Certificate Management Services (CMS) Status Codes as documented in the Cryptographic Services System Secure Sockets Layer Programming manual (SC24-5901-07).

This type of feature allows an application to provide a list of hostnames that AT-TLS will compare against the hostname in the certificate. A return code back to the application indicates whether a match was found or not. Based on that return code, the application can decide whether or not to continue the session. Obviously, though, this approach relies on the application to determine the acceptable hostnames, be it through DNS or any other method.

Error #5b: When the TN3270 Client Desires DNS Validation



Personal Communications
TN3270 Client Emulator:
Security Fields (Server Authentication)



0335304B Certificate not valid for host.

Explanation: A server certificate does not contain the current host name as either the common name (CN) element of the subject name or as a DNS entry for the subject alternate name.

User response: Obtain a new certificate containing the desired host name.

1. Some clients will validate a server certificate
 1. Verify that hostname exists in an application-internal listing or with a Resolver Call
 1. (CN) of Subject Name (Certificate "Subject's Name")
 2. Subject Alternate Name (Certificate "Domain")
 2. Application Coding or Certificate or DNS (Host.Local) must be correct
 1. Change any of these
 1. Depends on how the application handles the feature

Complete your session evaluation online at: SHARE.org/Anaheim-Eval



Here you see an example of an option you can set in the TN3270 Server.

Not all clients avail themselves of this feature to request validation of a server certificate by checking to see if its entries match anything in the Client's DNS or Host.Local file.

You must know your client before you request a certificate ... or you must plan for all cases and use the ALTNAME certificate extensions so that, if necessary, you can update a DNS or a Host Local file with a new entry. This is usually less expensive than buying a new certificate. (If you are creating your own certificates expense or time delays are probably not an issue.)

System SSL will validate the host name against the DNS entry in the subject alternate name extension.

The host name in the certificate can be

- a fully-qualified name (e.g., 'dcesec4.endicott.ibm.com'),
- a domain suffix (e.g., '.endicott.ibm.com') or
- a wildcard name beginning with an asterisk (e.g., '*.endicott.ibm.com').

A case-sensitive comparison is performed between the supplied host name and the host name in the certificate. A fully-qualified name must be the same as the supplied host name. A domain suffix matches any host name with the same suffix but does not match the suffix itself. For example, '*.endicott.ibm.com'

The status code in the example is a Certificate Management Services (CMS) Status Codes as documented in the Cryptographic Services System Secure Sockets Layer Programming manual (SC24-5901-07).

This type of feature allows an application to provide a list of hostnames that AT-TLS will compare against the hostname in the certificate. A return code back to the application indicates whether a match was found or not. Based on that return code, the application can decide whether or not to continue the session. Obviously, though, this approach relies on the application to determine the acceptable hostnames, be it through DNS or any other method.

Error #5: Solution



```
***** Top of Data *****
//ACFTPX31 JOB MSGCLASS=X,NOTIFY=&SYSUID
//ACFTPX31 EXEC PGM=IKJEFT01,DYNAMNBR=30,REGION=4096K
//*****
/*      Create Individual Personal Certificate for FTP Server
//*****
//SYSTSPRT DD SYSOUT=*
//SYSTSIN DD *
RACDCERT ID(TCPIP) GENCERT
      SUBJECTSDN (CN('FTPXSrv31'))
                OU('ACME')
                C('US')
                ALTNAME (IP(10.1.1.13))
                DOMAIN('ACME.LABS.IBM.COM')
                EMAIL('FTPX--@ACME.LABS.IBM.COM')
                NOTBEFORE(DATE(2012-12-31))
                NOTAFTER(DATE(2016-09-22))
                WITHLABEL('FTPXSrv31 CERT')
                SIZE(1024)
                SIGNWITH(CERTAUTH
                Label('ACME31 CACERT'))
setropts raclist(DIGTCERT) refresh
racdcert ID(TCPIP) list(label('FTPXSrv31 CERT'))
/*
***** Bottom of Data *****
```

Best practice: Develop Standards for fields of the x.509 Certificate so that the CN field corresponds to what will be recorded in a DNS or a Local Host file.

1. Change Client Configuration to eliminate the DNS Lookup
2. Add a DNS entry or a Local Host entry or an IPNodes entry that matches what is being validated

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This visual shows you the contents of a certificate and advises your company to establish standards for the fields that comprise the x.509 certificate.

Explaining the Solution: Certificate Contents, Name Lookup Requested by Client



```

***** Top of Data *****
//ACFTPX31 JOB MSGCLASS=X,NOTIFY=&SYSUID
//ACFTPX31 EXEC PGM=IKJEFT01,DYNAMNBR=30,REGION=4096K
//*****
//*      Create Individual Personal Certificate for FTP Ser
//*****
//SYSTSPRT DD SYSOUT=*
//SYSTSIN DD *
RACDCERT ID(TCPIP) GENCERT
  SUBJECTSDN (CN('FTPXSRV31'))
              OU('ACME')
              C('US')
              ALTNAME (IP(10.1.1.13)
                      DOMAIN('ACME.LABS.IBM.COM')
                      EMAIL('FTPX--@ACME.LABS.IBM.COM'))
              NOTBEFORE (DATE(2012-12-31))
              NOTAFTER (DATE(2016-09-22))
              WITHLABEL('FTPXSRV31 CERT')
              SIZE(1024)
              SIGNWITH(CERTAUTH
                      Label('ACME31 CACERT'))
setropts raclist(DIGTCERT) refresh
racdcert ID(TCPIP) list(label('FTPXSRV31 CERT'))
/*
***** Bottom of Data *****

```

BIND 9 Domain Name Server
FTPXSRV31.WAS.IBM.COM. IN A 10.1.1.13

/etc/ipnodes
10.1.1.13 FTPXSRV31

/etc/hosts
10.1.1.13 FTPXSRV31

BEST PRACTICE: Convert to IPNODES File.

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You see in the visual above how there is a DNS entry that matches the name in “CN” portion of the distinguished name on the certificate. In some implementations, it is only necessary that there be a matching name, but the IP address if mentioned in the certificate or if used on the connection request need not correspond to the name. With IPsec, you can still have a DNS or local host matching error, but in cases here the IP address must match the endpoint address of the connection partner.

You may also use a local host file or an ipnodes file if the name lookup with such a file is preferred or is being used. Best Practice is to avoid use of the UNIX /etc/hosts file or the MVS hlq.HOSTS.ADDRINFO and hlq.HOSTS.SITEINFO and use the IPNODES file that is identified in the System Resolver Setup File. Together with the COMMONSEARCH parameter in the RESOLVER SETUP file, the IPNODES file is able to be used for both UNIX and MVS searches as well as for IPv4 and IPv6 searches.

(NOTE: The MVS Versions –ADDRINFO and SITEINFO – are created with the MAKESITE command that is executed against the hlq.HOSTS.LOCAL file.)

Example of HOSTS.LOCAL File entry that will produce the appropriate ADDRINFO and SITEINFO files:

HOST : 10.1.1.13: FTPXSRV31 :::

Error #6: Expired x.509 Certificate and Keys



MVS Console Log at FTP Server LPAR

```
EZD1287I TTLS Error RC: 401 Initial Handshake 036
LOCAL: 192.168.20.113..21
REMOTE: 192.168.20.111..1038
JOBNAME: FTPT1 RULE: FTPT@192.168.20.113 2
USERID: TCPIP GRPID: 00000002 ENVID: 00000009 CONNID: 000000AD
```

RC 401

SYSLOGD Output with AT-TLS Policy Trace Level of 255 at Client LPAR

```
EZD1284I TTLS Flow GRPID: 00000001 ENVID: 00000006 CONNID: 000000CA
RC: 401 Call GSK_SECURE_SOCKET_INIT - 7EB3C318

EZD1283I TTLS Event GRPID: 00000001 ENVID: 00000006 CONNID: 000000CA
RC: 401 Initial Handshake 00000000 7EB9C798

EZD1286I TTLS Error GRPID: 00000001 ENVID: 00000006 CONNID: 000000CA
LOCAL: 192.168.20.111..1038 REMOTE: 192.168.20.113..21 JOBNAME:
USER201 USERID: USER301 RULE: FTPTClient@192.168.20.11n-5
RC: 401 Initial Handshake 00000000 7EB9C798
```

- If you attended this Certificate Lab, you saw the messages above!
 - SHARE San Francisco 12895
 - "Renewing and Rekeying RACF x.509 Digital Certificates"

Complete your session evaluation online at: [SHARE.org/analyst/eval](https://share.org/analyst/eval)

This visual shows you the SSL Return Code that you would see if your certificate cannot be found due to an invalid status of one type or another.

Error #6: Diagnosis



•Cryptographic Services **SYSTEM SECURE SOCKETS LAYER Programming (SC24-5901-10)**

At MVS1 and MVS3 ... RC 401:



401 Certificate is expired or is not valid yet.

Explanation: The current time is either before the Certificate start time or after the Certificate end time.

User response: Obtain a new Certificate if the Certificate is expired or wait until the Certificate becomes valid if it is not valid yet.

```
Digital certificate information for user TCP/IP:
Label: FTPServer31 EXP
Certificate ID: 2QXjw9fJ18bj1+KFmaWFmfLyQMXn10BA
Status: TRUST
Start Date: 2008/10/07 00:00:00 <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
End Date: 2011/10/07 23:59:59 <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
```

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During the handshake the FTP Server sent the client its Certificate and this Certificate is not valid. We display the Certificate on the shared RACF database to determine what the validity dates are and discover that the certificate has expired dates.

Error #6: Solution



To renew the expiration dates of a Certificate, follow these steps:

1. Generate a Certificate Request for the Certificate with the invalid dates (***"RACDCERT GENREQ" command***)
2. Generate a new Certificate, keeping the original old date, but extending the new date by one year. (***"RACDCERT GENCERT" command***)
3. Mark the Certificate as TRUSTED – since the old date will cause it to default to UNTRUSTED. (***"RACDCERT ALTER" command***)

- If you attended this Certificate Lab, you executed these steps to complete the solution.
 - SHARE San Francisco 12895
 - **"Renewing and Rekeying RACF x.509 Digital Certificates"**

Complete your session evaluation online at: SHARE.org/Anaheim-Eval



Here we show you the steps to extend the lifetime of the certificate by changing the expiration date but retaining the original key pair.

Summary of Common SSL/TLS Problems



- Wrong Owner of Key Ring that Certificates reside on
- Wrong Owner of Personal Certificate
- Missing certificate (either a personal or a CA certificate)
 - Or Correct Certificate Label cannot be found or Incorrect designation as Default Certificate
- Expired Certificate
- Signing authority certificate not available to validate a certificate received during negotiation of secured session
- RACF or Certificate Repository mismanaged: Incorrect Permissions granted.
- Exporting CA Certificate Signing Keys / Private Keys without understanding consequence
 - Failing to export or import with the Private key when it is necessary for the protocol (i.e., not understanding certificate formats)
- Hostname Lookup specified
 - Mismatch in the value returned by the Resolver Function
 - Contents of key ring changed during lifetime of AT-TLS connection
- Encryption Algorithm not Supported by Platform software or hardware
- Security technology: SSL may support it, but IPSec does not
- Etc.

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Agenda – Here's what you have heard about



- SSL/TLS/AT-TLS Protocol Flow
- Examination of Output from an SSL Trace in z/OS
- Description of Scenario that we are testing
- Error #1: Server cannot find its key ring
- Error #2: Server not authorized to read key ring
- Error #3: Server cannot find its certificate
- Error #4: Server cannot find its certificate or private key
- Error #5: Client configuration specifies a DNS lookup that does not exist
- Error #6: Server Certificate has expired (See Certificate Lab 12895)
- Summary of Common Problems with SSL/TLS and AT-TLS
- Resources for Diagnosing z/OS SSL/TLS and AT-TLS Errors

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This recaps what you have heard about here. It emphasizes that you need to know a bit about the protocols to be able to perform problem determination, but you may not have to resort to taking a System SSL trace to solve a problem. It could be that simpler diagnostic tools – like logs, messages, and documentation on the meaning of those messages may be enough, as you have seen here.

Resources for Diagnosing z/OS SSL/TLS or AT-TLS Errors



- ***z/OS Cryptographic Services System Secure Sockets Layer Programming (SC24-5901)***
 - *also known as: System SSL Programming Guide*
- ***z/OS Communications Server IP Diagnosis Guide (GC31-8782)***
- ***z/OS Communications Server IP Messages: Vol. 1 (EZA) (SC31-8783)***
- ***z/OS Communications Server IP Messages: Vol. 2 (EZB, EZD) (SC31-8784)***
- ***z/OS Communications Server IP Messages: Vol. 3 (EZY) (SC31-8785)***
- ***z/OS Communications Server IP Messages: Vol. 4 (EZZ, SNM) (SC31-8786)***
- ***z/OS Security Server RACF Security Administrator's Guide (SA22-7683)***
- ***z/OS Security Server RACF Command Language Reference (SA22-7687)***

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Medical School: Diagnosing SSL/TLS & AT-TLS Problems in z/OS Communications Server

Session 14869

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Wednesday, March 12, 2014: 8:00 AM-9:00 AM
Gold Key 1/2 (Anaheim Marriott Hotel)
Session Number 14869



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