



Software Group | Enterprise Networking Solutions

z/OS Communication Server IPSec and IP Packet Filtering

SHARE Session 14866

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z/OS Communications Server

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
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z/OS Communications Server IP security agenda




- Introduction to IP security on z/OS
- IP filtering
- IPSec
- Special topics
- IP security displays and controls
- Configuring and enabling IP Security



z/OS Communications Server IP security

Introduction

z/OS IP security support



- z/OS IP Security is a complete IPsec, IP filtering, and IKE solution and is part of z/OS Communications Server
- Services
 - ▶ Protect the system from the network
 - IP filtering to control which packets can enter the system
 - ▶ Protect against data leakage from the system
 - IP filtering to control which packets can leave the system
 - ▶ Cryptographic protection of data in the network
 - Manual IPsec (statically defined security associations)
 - Dynamic negotiation of IPsec security associations using Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
 - ▶ Filter directed logging of IP Security actions to syslogd

z/OS Communications Server IP security features

■ Supports many configurations

- Supports z/OS in role as endpoint (host) and traffic router (gateway)
- IPSec NAT Traversal support (address translation and port translation)
- IPv4 and IPv6 support

■ Policy-based with z/OS Communications Server Policy Agent

- Configuration Assistant GUI for both new and expert users
- Direct file edit into local configuration file
- Default filters in TCP profile provide basic protection before policy is loaded

■ Cryptographic algorithms

- RSA signature-based authentication
- ECDSA signature-based authentication
- HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-MD5 authentication
- HMAC-SHA-2, AES-XCBC, AES-GMAC authentication
- AES-CBC, 3DES and DES encryption
- AES-GCM (128- and 256-bit) encryption
- Uses cryptographic hardware if available for most algorithms
- FIPS 140 mode

■ zIIP Assisted IPSec

- Moves most IPSec processing from general purpose processors to zIIPs

■ IP Security Monitoring Interface

- IBM Tivoli OMEGAMON XE for Mainframe Networks uses the CommServer NMI interfaces for IP Security


■ Support for latest IPSec RFCs

- RFCs 4301-4305, 4307-4308
- RFCs 4306, 5996 (IKEv2)

■ z/OS CommServer successfully completed USGv6 interoperability testing including the IPSec, IKE, and ESP test suites

- <http://www.iol.unh.edu/services/testing/ipv6/usgv6tested.php>

z/OS Communications Server IP security infrastructure overview



- **TCP/IP stack**
 - IPsec and IP filtering
- **Policy agent**
 - Reads and manages IPsec and IKE policy
- **Configuration Assistant for z/OS Communications Server**
 - Creates policy definitions
- **IKE daemon**
 - Negotiates security associations
- **ipsec command**
 - Displays and controls IP filtering, IPsec, and IKE
- **trmd**
 - Monitors TCP/IP stacks for log messages
- **syslogd**
 - Write log messages to syslogd destinations
- **Network Security Services daemon**
 - Provides certificate services for IKE


z/OS Communications Server IP security

IP filtering

Basics of IP packet filtering


IP packet filtering used to control:

Traffic being routed



- Filter rules defined to match on inbound and outbound packets based on:
 - packet information
 - network attributes
 - time

Access at source / destination host



- Possible actions
 - Permit
 - Deny
 - Permit with manual IPSec
 - Permit with dynamic IPSec
 - Log (in combination with other actions)

Filtering conditions

Criteria	Description
From packet	
Source address	Source IP address in IP header of packet
Destination address	Destination IP address in IP header of packet
Protocol	Protocol in the IP header of packet (TCP, UDP, OSPF, etc.)
Source port	For TCP and UDP, the source port in the transport header of packet
Destination port	For TCP and UDP, the destination port in the transport header of packet
ICMP type and code	For ICMP, type and code in the ICMP header of packet
OSPF type	For OSPF, type located in the OSPF header of packet
IPv6 Mobility type	For traffic with IPv6 mobility headers, MIPv6 type in header of packet.
Fragments Only	Matches fragmented packets only (applicable to routed traffic only)
Network attributes	
Direction	Direction of packet.
Routing	Packet is local if source or destination IP address exists on local host, otherwise it is routed
Link security class	A virtual class that allow you to group interfaces with similar security requirements. Non-VIPA addresses can be assigned a security class. Packets inherit the security class of the interface over which packet is sent/received.
Time condition	
Time, Day, Week, Month	Indicates when filter rule is active

IP security - filter policies

■ IP security's Security Policy Database (SPD)

1. Default IP filter policy


- Intended to allow limited access while IP security filter policy is being loaded
 - Can be reverted to in an "attack" situation
- Defined in the TCP/IP profile
 - Default is to deny all traffic
- Provides basic filtering function
 - Permit rules only - Permit traffic needed for basic services / fix problems with IP security filter policy
 - No IPSec support

2. IP security filter policy


- Intended to be the primary source of filter rules
- Defined in a Policy Agent IPSec configuration file
 - Policy can be generated by the Configuration Assistant for z/OS GUI

■ Implicit filter rules

- Always present, not user-defined
 - Deny all inbound traffic
 - Deny all outbound traffic
- Appended to Default IP filter policy by the TCP/IP stack
- Appended to IP Security filter policy by Pagent
- If neither policies are defined, the implicit rules become the default policy (deny all)




IP filter policy on z/OS - overview



z/OS Communications Server IP security


IPSec

IPSec protocol overview



- Open network layer security protocol defined by IETF
- Provides authentication, integrity, and data privacy
 - IPSec security protocols
 - **Authentication Header (AH)** - provides data authentication / integrity
 - **Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP)** - provides data privacy with optional authentication/integrity
- Implemented at IP layer
 - Requires no application change
 - Secures traffic between any two IP resources
 - Security Associations (SA)
- Management of crypto keys and security associations can be
 - manual
 - automated via key management protocol (**Internet Key Exchange (IKE)**)


IPSec security associations




- IPSec Security Association (SA) defines security services for a defined traffic type
 - Unidirectional logical connection between 2 IPSec hosts
 - Used in pairs for bidirectional traffic
- SA scope of protection can vary
 - Wide - Traffic protection for multiple connections e.g. Protect all traffic between 2 hosts
 - Narrow - Traffic protection for a single connection
- SA endpoints can vary
 - Entire data path can be secured with IPSec
 - Security and connection endpoints are the same - Transport mode
 - Portion of data path considered "untrusted" can be secured with IPSec
 - Security and connection endpoints are different - Tunnel mode

IPSec scenarios and z/OS roles

z/OS as Host (Data Endpoint)



z/OS as Gateway (Routed Traffic)



Legend

Data endpoint




Security endpoint



IPSec encapsulating modes - transport and tunnel mode

Creating an IPSec transport mode packet


- Inserts IPSec headers between original IP header and protected data



Transport mode is typically used between two hosts that establish an IPSec SA end-to-end between them.

Creating an IPSec tunnel mode packet


- Creates a new IP header with an IPSec header
- IPSec header followed by original IP header and protected data




Tunnel mode is used if at least one of the two IPSec SA end-points is a gateway.

Encapsulation mode rules

■ Must use tunnel mode:



■ May use tunnel or transport mode:




IPSec Authentication Header (AH) protocol

AH provides authentication / integrity

- Authenticates entire datagram including IP header (excluding changeable or "mutable" fields)

Authentication algorithms




- If transport mode then "Payload" contains the original transport header and original data
- If tunnel mode then "Payload" contains the original IP header, original transport header, and original data

IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol



ESP provides privacy with optional authentication / integrity

- Authentication coverage does not cover IP header



Encryption algorithms

- Protects IP payload and IPSec ESP trailer
- Null encryption option allows authentication only as AH protocol alternative



- If transport mode then "Payload" contains the original transport header and original data (possibly encrypted)
- If tunnel mode then "Payload" contains original IP header, original transport header, and original data
 - "Payload" can be encrypted

IPSec security associations (SAs)

- **Endpoints must agree on how to protect traffic**

- ▶ Security protocol
 - AH
 - ESP
- ▶ Algorithms to be used by the security protocols
 - Encryption Algorithm
 - Authentication Algorithm
- ▶ Cryptographic keys
- ▶ Encapsulation mode
 - tunnel
 - transport
- ▶ Lifetime/lifetime (for dynamic SAs)

- **This agreement is known as a "security association"**

- **IPSec security associations can be manually configured in the IPSec policy or created dynamically using the IKE protocol**

Manually defined SAs

- **Not commonly used**

- ▶ Do not provide a scalable solution
- ▶ In the long run difficult to manage

- **Defined in a Policy Agent IPSec configuration file**

- ▶ Utilized by filter rules with an action of ipsec
- ▶ SA is defined by a manual VPN action
 - Can be generated by the Configuration Assistant for z/OS GUI

- **Use ipsec command activate/deactivate manual SAs**


- ▶ Can also be automatically activated when policy is installed

- **Definition of SA attributes require mutual agreement between tunnel endpoint administrators**

- ▶ Cryptographic keys and IPSec security protocol parameters must be mutually agreed to between tunnel endpoint administrators
- ▶ Need to decide how to safely exchange keys
- ▶ Need to decide how to refresh keys
 - Manual SAs must be deactivated and activated when refreshing keys
 - Refreshing keys must be coordinated with the remote tunnel endpoint's administrator
- ▶ Remote endpoint may need to reactivate a manual SA if you locally deactivate the SA and then locally activate the SA.

IPSec manual SAs overview

- Define IP filter conditions here (which packets using manual tunnels for encryption)
- Define all encryption info between 2 data endpoints here (Ciphersuite, spi, keys, method (AH/ESP), Mode (Tunnel/Transport), gateways to use, etc.)



Dynamically defined SAs

- **Currently state of the art**
 - Scalable
 - Automatic, non-disruptive refresh of SAs and session keys
- **Initially requires more configuration than a manual SA**
 - In the long run easier to manage
 - Set and forget it
- **Dynamic SAs are negotiated by the IKE daemon**
- **Dynamic IPsec policy defined in a Pagent IPsec configuration file**
 - Can be generated by the Configuration Assistant for z/OS Communications Server GUI
 - Dynamic VPN action identifies "acceptable" SA attributes
 - Utilized by filter rules with an action of IPSEC
- **Authentication methods**
 - Pre-shared key
 - Each host needs to be keyed with key of each potential IKE partner
 - This key is not directly used to encrypt data.
 - Often used during the initial stages of dynamic SA deployment
 - Digital signature (most scalable)
 - Uses x.509 certificates for host-based authentication
 - Each host needs only its own host-based certificate and the certificate of the trusted Certificate Authority that signed the IKE peer's host-based certificate
(Requirements for the CA of the peer certificate can differ with Certificate Trust Chain support)
 - Algorithms
 - RSA Signature
 - Elliptical Curve Digital Signature for IKEv2

The IKE daemon

- **The IKE daemon implements the Internet Key Exchange protocol**
 - ▶ A two phase approach to negotiating dynamic IPsec SAs
 - ▶ Two versions:
 - IKEv1 - Defined in RFC 2409
 - IKEv2 - Defined in RFCs 4306, 5996
- **The IKE daemon obtains its policy from Pagent**
 - ▶ Policy information for negotiating IPsec SAs
 - Dynamic VPN actions
 - ▶ Policy for creating a secure channel used to negotiate IPsec SAs
 - Key Exchange Policy
 - ▶ Policy for ipsec command activation and autoactivation
 - Local Dynamic VPN Policy
- **Utilizes UDP ports 500 and 4500 to communicate with remote security endpoints**
 - ▶ Negotiating SAs
 - ▶ Sending informational messages


Two phases of IKE negotiations

■ Phase 1

- ▶ Creates a secure channel with a remote security endpoint
 - Negotiates an IKE SA
 - Generates cryptographic keys that will be used to protect Phase 2 negotiations and Informational exchanges
 - Authenticates the identity of the parties involved
- ▶ Done infrequently

■ Phase 2

- ▶ Negotiates an IPsec SA with a remote security endpoint
 - Generates cryptographic keys that are used to protect data
 - Authentication keys for use with AH
 - Authentication and/or encryption keys for use with ESP
- ▶ Performed under the protection of an IKE SA
- ▶ Done more frequently than phase 1




Dynamic SA activation methods

Security associations can be activated in one of four ways:

- On-demand activation
 - ▶ Activation attempted when the stack receives an outbound packet requiring the protection of a new dynamic tunnel
- Remote activation
 - ▶ A remote security endpoint initiates the negotiation of a new SA
- Command activation
 - ▶ `ipsec -y activate` command
 - Requires definition of local dynamic VPN policy:
- Autoactivated
 - ▶ Activation attempted when a stack connects to IKED or when IP Security filter policy is reloaded
 - Requires definition of local dynamic VPN policy:

IP Security dynamic SAs overview




z/OS Communications Server IP security

Special Topics

The IPSec NAT traversal problem


- Network Address Translation (NAT) alters addressing information in packet
 - IP addresses in IP headers
 - Addresses in data payload for some protocols
- Some NATs do port translation (NAPT)
 - IP addresses in IP headers
 - Ports in TCP and UDP headers
 - Addresses and ports in data payload for some protocols
- IPSec and NAT / NAPT at original RFC levels were not compatible
 - IPSec SA could not traverse NAT/NAPT device
 - Forced configuration where multiple SAs required to make end-to-end connection
 - Cascaded SAs




The IPSec NAT Traversal Solution

- Later IETF RFCs address this incompatibility for NAT / NATPT alterations in IP and transport headers
 - ▶ RFC 3947 and 3948
 - ▶ Does not address translation of addresses in data payload
 - Application protocol specific solution required (e.g. FTP EPSV support which eliminates use of addresses in data payload)
 - ▶ ESP only
 - AH not allowed
- z/OS NAT traversal support
 - ▶ z/OS Host-to-host
 - transport or tunnel mode
 - ▶ z/OS Host-to-gateway
 - tunnel mode
 - ▶ No z/OS gateway support
 - ▶ NAT / NATPT

Host-to-Host: End-to-End Security Association




Host-to-gateway: Protect segment of data path



VIPA takeover and sysplex distributor support for IPSec traffic - Sysplex Wide Security Associations

Sysplex Wide Security Associations (SWSA) provides sysplex support to IPSec protected traffic with a DVIPA security endpoint



■ SWSA Sysplex Distributor support


- Distributes IPSec-protected workload with connection distribution
 - Consistent filter policies needed across processors in Sysplex

■ SWSA VIPA Takeover support

- IPSec phase 1 & 2 SAs automatically restarted on backup after takeover
 - Phase 1 & 2 info needed for restart saved in Coupling Facility
- No administrative movement of SAs required.
 - Policy filters at backup host must be able to accommodate filter rules and SAs for backup processor

IKEv2

- IKE version 1 (IKEv1) specified by RFCs 2407-2409
- **IKE version 2 (IKEv2) specified by RFCs 4306, 5996**




▪ IKEv2 protocol

- ▶ Supports all of the same configurations as IKEv1
- ▶ Different protocol than IKEv1
 - similar function
 - different messages and flows
 - different terminology
- ▶ More efficient than IKEv1:
 - fewer messages per negotiation
 - new formats allow for smaller messages
- ▶ More robust than IKEv1:
 - Request/response model for all flows
 - Built-in dead peer detection

▪ z/OS IKEv2 implementation

- ▶ Coexists and concurrently supported with IKEv1 in IKED
- ▶ Fully supported by Configuration Assistant for z/OS
- ▶ Requires network security services (NSS) for certificate-based authentication
- ▶ NAT traversal for IPv4
- ▶ System-Wide Security Associations (SWSA)

Network Security Services for IPSec




- NSS is required for IKE advanced certificate support
 - ▶ Certificate Revocation List
 - ▶ Certificate Trust Chain
- NSS is required for ALL IKEv2 certificate services

- **Centralized network security services for a set of z/OS images**
 - ▶ Images can be non-sysplex, intra- or inter-sysplex
- **NSS digital signature services**
 - ▶ Allows central administration of RACF certificates and private keys
 - Sign and verify during runtime IKE negotiations
- **NSS monitoring services**
 - ▶ Allows selection of single focal point as IPSec management hub
 - ipsec command for administrator
 - NMI API for management applications
- **Availability options**
 - ▶ Backup NSS can be specified

IKE Certificate Revocation List Support

A Certificate Revocation List is a list of certificates that have been revoked or are no longer valid.

CRLs are digitally signed by issuing certificate authority




- RFC 4306 requires that when IPSec authenticates a digital signature, it needs to ensure that the certificate presented for authentication is still valid
- IKED controls level of CRL checking done based on configuration in IPSec policy
- IKED requests that NSSD retrieve CRLs using information in the CRLDistributionPoints extension in a certificate
 - HTTP-URLs only
 - Retrieval of CRLs from LDAP servers not supported
- NSSD will pass CRLs to z/OS System SSL services
- System SSL will validate the certificate against the CRL to ensure the certificate has not been revoked

IKE Certificate Trust Chain Support


Eases administrative requirements by reducing the number of subordinate CA certificates needed on IKE keyrings

Given the following certificate hierarchy:




Without IKE Certificate Trust Chain Support

Local keyring must contain cert of CA that signed peer cert



With IKE Certificate Trust Chain Support

IKED and NSSD cooperate to build and validate complete trust chain using keyring and intermediate certs sent by IKE peer



- RFCs 4306 and 4945 require support of trust chains
- Supported for both IKEv1 and IKEv2
- Requires NSSD
- NSSD supports certs on keyring as well as IKEv2 cert retrieval through HTTP

z/OS Communications Server IP security

IP Security Displays and Controls

ipsec command summary - primary command options


Primary Command	Main functions provided
ipsec -f	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Display information about active filter set• Display information about default IP filter rules• Display information about IP Security filter rules• Make the default IP filter rules the active filter set• Make the IP Security filter rules the active filter set
ipsec -m	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Display information about manual tunnels• Activate manual tunnels• Deactivate manual tunnels
ipsec -k	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Display information about IKE tunnels• Deactivate IKE tunnels• Refresh IKE tunnels
ipsec -y	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Display information about dynamic tunnels (stack's view)• Display information about dynamic tunnels (IKED's view)• Activate dynamic tunnels• Deactivate dynamic tunnels• Refresh dynamic tunnels
ipsec -i	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Display interface information
ipsec -t	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Locate matching filter rule
ipsec -o	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Display NAT port translation table information
ipsec -?	Help

See the "IP System Administrator's Commands" for the complete syntax

z/OS Communications Server IP security

Configuring and Enabling IP Security

z/OS Communications Server IP security infrastructure overview



- **TCP/IP stack**
 - IPsec and IP filtering
- **Policy agent**
 - Reads and manages IPsec and IKE policy
- **Configuration Assistant for z/OS Communications Server**
 - Creates policy definitions
- **IKE daemon**
 - Negotiates security associations
- **ipsec command**
 - Displays and controls IP filtering, IPsec, and IKE
- **trmd**
 - Monitors TCP/IP stacks for log messages
- **syslogd**
 - Write log messages to syslogd destinations
- **Network Security Services daemon**
 - Provides certificate services for IKE

Configuration required for IP security

■ z/OS system preparation tasks

- TCP Profile updates to enable IP security, define default filter rules, enable SWSA
- Policy infrastructure applications configuration and JCL procedures
 - IKE daemon (IKED)
 - Policy agent
 - Network Security Services daemon (NSSD)
 - Traffic regulation management daemon (TRMD)
 - Syslog daemon (syslogd)
- SAF access control for:
 - Applications
 - ipsec command
- Integrated Cryptographic Services Facility (ICSF) for hardware encryption
 - Preparation not included with Configuration Assistant

■ IP security policy definition


- For each TCP/IP stack create a policy rule set
 - Policy is composed of conditions and actions

■ SAF keyrings for x.509 certificates

- Certificate Authority certificates and Host certificates

Originally, the Configuration Assistant helped configure the policy definitions. Now it can also help with the z/OS System Preparation Tasks !

Configuration Assistant for z/OS Communications Server



- **GUI-based approach to configuring multiple policy disciplines:**
 - ▶ IDS
 - ▶ AT-TLS
 - ▶ IPsec and IP filtering
 - ▶ QoS
 - ▶ Policy-based Routing
- **Focus on high level concepts vs. low level file syntax**
- **Available through z/OSMF-based web interface (strategic)**
 - ▶ Standalone Windows application
 - Not supported after V1R13
- **Builds and maintains**
 - ▶ Policy files
 - ▶ Related configuration files
 - ▶ JCL procedures and RACF directives
- **Supports import of existing policy files**

Workflows

- z/OS V2R1 provides the **Application Setup Task Checklist** function within the z/OSMF workflows
 - Separate workflows on a policy infrastructure component basis

IBM z/OS Management Facility

- Welcome
- Notifications (3)
- Workflows**
- Configuration
 - Configuration Assistant
- Links
 - z/OSMF Administration
 - z/OSMF Settings
- Refresh

Workflows

Simplifies tasks through guided step-based workflows, and provides administrative functions for assigning workflow responsibilities and tracking progress.

Workflow Name Filter	Description Filter	Version Filter	Vendor Filter	Owner Filter	System Filter	Percent Complete
<input type="checkbox"/> z/OS Communications Server: Setup to run Traffic Regulation Management Daemon (TRMD) - Workflow_0	z/OS Communications Server: Setup to run Traffic Regulation Management Daemon (TRMD)	1.0	IBM	user1	XESDEV.MVS160 (MVS160_001)	0%
<input type="checkbox"/> z/OS Communications Server: Setup for Syslogd - Workflow_0	z/OS Communications Server: Setup for Syslogd	1.0	IBM	user1	XESDEV.MVS160 (MVS160_001)	0%
<input type="checkbox"/> Setting up to run IP Defensive Filters with Defense Manager Daemon (DMD) - Workflow_0	Setting up to run IP Defensive Filters with Defense Manager Daemon (DMD)	1.0	IBM	user1	XESDEV.MVS160 (MVS160_001)	0%
<input type="checkbox"/> Set up to run Network Security Services (NSS) - Workflow_0	Set up to run Network Security Services (NSS)	1.0	IBM	user1	XESDEV.MVS160 (MVS160_001)	0%
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> z/OS Communications Server: IP Security with IKE - Workflow_0	z/OS Communications Server: IP Security with IKE	1.0	IBM	user1	XESDEV.MVS160 (MVS160)	11%
<input type="checkbox"/> z/OS Communications Server: Install Sample Profiles for TCP/IP Components - Workflow_0	z/OS Communications Server: Install Sample Profiles for TCP/IP Components	1.0	IBM	user1	XESDEV.MVS160 (MVS160)	0%
<input type="checkbox"/> z/OS Communications Server: Setup to run Policy Agent - Workflow_0	z/OS Communications Server: Setup to run Policy Agent	1.0	IBM	user1	XESDEV.MVS160 (MVS160)	0%

Next page

Application setup task checklist

■ Application setup task checklist

- Creates a file for each check list with edit capability
- Assign capability to allow approvals and separation of duties

Welcome user1


Welcome x Configuratio... x Workflows x

Workflows ▶ z/OS Communications Server: IP Security with IKE - Workflow_0

z/OS Communications Server: IP Security with IKE - Workflow_0

Description:
z/OS Communications Server: IP Security with IKE

Owner:
user1

Percent complete:
 11%


Steps complete:
1 of 9

Workflow Steps

☒ ☐ Actions ▼

	State Filter	No. Filter	Title Filter	Owner Filter	Skill Category Filter	Assignees Filter
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	✓ Complete	1	■ Define the RACF user ID for the IKE daemon (IKED)	user1	Basic JCL	z/OSMF User
<input type="checkbox"/>	Unassigned	2	■ SAF permissions for IKED to have access to the BPX.DAEMON RACF profile		Basic JCL	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Unassigned	3	■ SAF permissions for IKED to issue console messages		Basic JCL	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Unassigned	4	■ SAF permissions for IKED to access security policies		Basic JCL	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Unassigned	5	■ Sample started procedure for IKE daemon (IKED)		Basic JCL	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Unassigned	6	■ Setup for IKED to have access to PARMLIB		Basic JCL	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Unassigned	7	■ Permit IKED to run as nonswappable		Basic JCL	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Unassigned	8	■ Permit IKED to access certificates		Basic JCL	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Unassigned	9	■ Permit access to the ipsec command		Basic JCL	


Configuration Assistant Policy Definition Model and Steps



1. Create system image and TCP/IP stack image
2. Create one or more Requirement Maps to define desired security for common scenarios (e.g. intranet, branch office, business partner)
 - Create or reuse Security Levels to define security actions
 - Create or reuse Traffic descriptors to define application ports to secure
3. Create one or more Connectivity Rules between Data Endpoints (IP addresses) and associate with a configured Requirement Map
4. If using IPSec, configure Security Endpoints (IKE peers)
5. Optionally, set additional options (e.g. logging, SA activation methods, effective time for Connectivity Rules)

SAF Certificates and Keyrings - peer-to-peer certificate relationships

- Each host needs only its own end-entity certificate and the certificate of the trusted Certificate Authority that signed the peer's end-entity certificate



Certificate Creation and Installation Example Using RACF

```
//CERTADD JOB 1,ALFRED,CLASS=A,MSGCLASS=X,NOTIFY=USER1
//*
//IEFPROC EXEC PGM=IKJEFT01,REGION=4M,DYNAMNBR=10
//SYSTSPRT DD SYSOUT=*                                BATCH TSO SESSION LOG
//SYSTSIN DD *
RACDCERT CERTAUTH GENCERT -
    SUBJECTSDN(CN('ABC CA')) -
    OU('CS Z/OS CA') -
    O('IBM') C('US')) -
    NOTBEFORE(DATE(2007-01-01))-
    NOTAFTER(DATE(2010-12-31)) -
    WITHLABEL('ABC CA')
RACDCERT ID(IKED) GENCERT -
    SUBJECTSDN(CN('ABC IKE Daemon')) -
    OU('CS Z/OS Server') -
    O('IBM') C('US')) -
    NOTBEFORE(DATE(2007-01-01)) -
    NOTAFTER(DATE(2010-12-31)) -
    WITHLABEL('IKE Daemon')
    SIGNWITH(CERTAUTH LABEL('ABC CA'))
RACDCERT CERTAUTH EXPORT(LABEL('ABC CA')) DSN('USER1.ABCCA.B64')
RACDCERT ID(IKED) ADDRING(IKEDKEYRING)
RACDCERT ID(IKED) CONNECT(LABEL('IKE Daemon')) -
    RING(IKEDKEYRING) USAGE(PERSONAL) )
RACDCERT ID(IKED) CONNECT(CERTAUTH LABEL('REMOTE IKE CA')) -
    RING(IKEDKEYRING) USAGE(CERTAUTH) )
RACDCERT ID(IKED) LISTRING(IKEDKEYRING)
/*
```

Create our selfsigned CA certificate by which all our other certificates will be signed.

Create our IKE daemon certificate and sign it with our CA certificate.

Export our CA certificate so that the remote IKE peer can download and install as trusted root in remote key database

Create our IKED keyring

Connect both our IKE daemon certificate and our peer's CA certificate to that keyring (presumes that remote peer's CA certificate has been added to the certificate database).

z/OS Communications Server IP security features

■ Supports many configurations

- Optimized for role as endpoint (host), but also support routed traffic (gateway)
- IPSec NAT Traversal support (address translation and port translation)
- IPv4 and IPv6 support

■ Policy-based with z/OS Communications Server Policy Agent

- Configuration Assistant GUI for both new and expert users
- Direct file edit into local configuration file
- Default filters in TCP profile provide basic protection before policy is loaded

■ Cryptographic algorithms

- RSA signature-based authentication
- ECDSA signature-based authentication
- HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-MD5 authentication
- HMAC-SHA-2, AES-XCBC, AES-GMAC authentication
- AES-CBC, 3DES and DES encryption
- AES-GCM (128- and 256-bit) encryption
- Uses cryptographic hardware if available for most algorithms
- FIPS 140 mode

■ zIIP Assisted IPSec

- Moves most IPSec processing from general purpose processors to zIIPs

■ IP Security Monitoring Interface

- IBM Tivoli OMEGAMON XE for Mainframe Networks uses the CommServer NMI interfaces for IP Security



■ Support for latest IPSec RFCs

- RFCs 4301-4305, 4307-4308
- RFCs 4306, 5996 (IKEv2)

■ z/OS CommServer successfully completed USGv6 interoperability testing including the IPSec, IKE, and ESP test suites

- <http://www.iol.unh.edu/services/testing/ipv6/usgv6tested.php>

For more information ...

URL		Content
http://www.twitter.com/IBM_Commserver		IBM Communications Server Twitter Feed
http://www.facebook.com/IBMCommserver		IBM Communications Server Facebook Fan Page
http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/		IBM System z in general
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http://www.ibm.com/software/network/commserver/zos/support/		IBM z/OS Communications Server technical Support – including TechNotes from service
http://www.ibm.com/support/techdocs/atmastr.nsf/Web/TechDocs		Technical support documentation from Washington Systems Center (techdocs, flashes, presentations, white papers, etc.)
http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfcsearch.html		Request For Comments (RFC)
http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/os/zos/bkserv/		IBM z/OS Internet library – PDF files of all z/OS manuals including Communications Server

Please fill out your session evaluations

- **z/OS Communications Server IPsec and IP Packet Filtering**

- **Session # 14866**

- **QR Code:**

