







S







Channel Authentication Records

- Set rules to control how inbound connections are treated
 - Inbound Clients
 - Inbound QMgr to QMgr channels
 - Other rogue connections causing FDCs
- Rules can be set to
 - Allow a connection
 - Allow a connection and assign an MCAUSER
 - Block a connection
 - Ban privileged access
 - Provide multiple positive or negative SSL Peer Name matching
- Rules can use any of the following identifying characteristics of the inbound connection
 - IP Address
 - SSL/TLS Subject's Distinguished Name
 - Client asserted user ID
 - Remote queue manager name

Complete your sessions evaluation online at SHARE.org/BostonEval

Channel Authentication Records – Notes

Ν	 Channel Authentication records allow you to define rules about how inbound connections into the queue manager should be treated. Inbound connections might be client channels or queue manager to queue manager channels. These rules can specify whether connections are allowed or blocked. If the connection in
0	 question is allowed, the rules can provide a user ID that the channel should run with or indicate that the user ID provided by the channel (flowed from the client or defined on the channel definition) is to be used. These rules can therefore be used to
	 Set up appropriate identities for channels to use when they run against the queue manager
–	 Block unwanted connections
I	 Ban privileged users
E	Which users are considered privileged users is slightly different depending on which platform you are running your queue manager on. There is a special value "MQADMIN" which has been defined to mean "any user that would be privileged on this platform". This special value can be used in the rules that check against the final user ID to be used by the channel – TYPE(USERLIST) rules – to ban any connection that is about to run as a privileged user. This catches any blank user IDs flowed from clients for example.
S	SHARE
Com	hete your sessions evaluation online at SHARE org/RostonEval





Channel Access Blocking Points





Channel Access Blocking Points – Notes

Ν	 In this picture we illustrate that there are a number of points that an inbound connection must get through in order to actually make use of an MQ queue. First, we remind you that your IP firewall is included in this set of blocking points and should not be forgotten, and is not superseded by this feature in MQ.
0	 One point of note, the inbound connections can be from any version of MQ. There is no requirement that the clients or remote queue managers also be on WebSphere MQ V7.1 to be blocked or mapped by these rules.
Т	
Е	
S	plete your sessions evaluation online at SHARE.org/BostonEval



Block Point: MQ Listener

- List of IP address patterns
- One single list
- NOT A REPLACEMENT FOR AN IP FIREWALL
 - Temporary blocking
 - Blocking until IP firewall updated
 - Shouldn't be many entries in the list
- · Blocked before any data read from the socket
 - i.e. before SSL Handshake
 - Before channel name is known
- Avoiding DoS attack
 - Really the place of the IP firewall
 - · Simplistic 'hold' of inbound connection to avoid reconnect busy loop
- Network Pingers if blocked don't raise an alert

 Immediate close of socket with no data not considered a threat Complete your sessions evaluation online at SHARE.org/BostonEval

Channel Access Blocking Points – Notes

Ν	 Second, there is a list of IP addresses that the listener configuration will have access to. If any of these IP addresses attempts to start an inbound channel connection, the listener will bounce the connection prior to starting a channel instance to process any data, for example SSL Handshake, that might need to be read before knowing what the channel name is. If the gueue manager is not running it will still have access to the configuration and it will still block
0	 the specified IP addresses. THIS IS NOT A REPLACEMENT FOR AN IP FIREWALL! However, it does provide a way for an MQ Administrator to implement temporary blocking until the IP firewall updated, or for a short period of time making it not worthwhile to update the IP firewall. The intention is that there shouldn't be many entries in the list. A Denial of Service (DoS) attack on the listener; whilst really the place of the firewall to deal with world mean high CPUL in the listener if it had to deal with a represented expression from a service.
Т	inbound connection. This and the fact that we would like to quietly ignore network pingers if they don't send any data and only raise blocking events on them if they do send data, means that the listener will hold any sockets that come from blocked IP address open for a period of time prior to closing the socket, rather than immediately rejecting it. This will stall the repetitiveness of the attack and protect the listener process allowing it some time to process real requests, and additionally give the network pingers time to close the socket before we do allowing us to detect we don't need to emit an event for that case. By default this time will be
E	 30 seconds. Thirdly we come to the rules that work on specific channels. You can set up rules to match against all of the identifying characteristics of an inbound channel (see next notes page). These rules can either indicate that a channel matching the rule should be blocked; should be allowed and assigned a provided user ID to use when it runs; or allowed and the user ID provided by the channel is to be used.
3	SHARE

SET CHLAUTH(*) TYPE(BLOCKADDR) ADDRLIST('9.20.*', '192.168.2.10')





SHARE





Mapping Point: MQ Channel

- Duplets of identifying attributes mapped to MCAUSER
- Identifying attributes are Channel Name and
 - SSL Peer Name pattern (most specific)
 Precedence defined for partial patterns
 - Remote queue manager name pattern (MCA channels)
 - Client asserted user ID (MQI channels)
 - No pattern matching on this
 - IP address pattern (least specific)
- Mapping done before calling security exit
- Parameter to indicate where user ID is taken from
 - Provided on command
 - Flowed or defined on channel as today
 - Combine this with BLOCKUSER list

	IUUKU	u			
Complete you	r sessions	evaluation	online	at SHARE.org/	BostonEval

Order	DN Substring	Name
1	CN=	Common name
2	T=	Title
3	OU=	Organizational unit
4	O=	Organization
5	L=	Locality
6	ST=, SP=, S=	State or province name
7	C=	Country

Order	Identity mechanism	Notes
0	Channel Name	
1	SSL Distinguished Name	
2=	Client asserted User ID	Clearly several different user IDs can be running on the same IP address.
2=	Queue Manager Name	Clearly several different queue managers can be running on the same IP address
4	IP address	



Channel Access Blocking Points – Notes

IP Address

	 Rules can be made to be used should a connection arrive from the specified IP address.
NI	If the client asserted a banned user ID, but its IP address is in this list to map it to another user ID it will be deemed to have
IN	asserted the mapped user ID and not the banned one, so the problem of an older Java client sending up blank can be fixed
	by mapping and it doesn't have to end up banned. In other words mapping happens before the blocked list of user IDs is
	checked. If you have a port forwarder, DMZ session break, or any other setup which will change the IP address presented to
	the queue manager, then mapping IP addresses is not necessarily suitable for your use.
	I he patterns that can be used to specify IP addresses are described later. Additionally, we will find the most specific rule in
	order to do the mapping, so an additional pattern is allowed in this configuration – that is a single asterisk which means
$\mathbf{\cap}$	match everything'.
U	SSUILS DN
	 Rules can be made to be used should a connection arrive from the specified DN.
	 If the client asserted a banned user ID, but its DN is in this list to map it to another user ID it will be deemed to have asserted
	The mapped user ID and not the banned one in the same way as described above.
	 Divs can be provided with pattern matching in the same way as the SSLPEER attribute that already exists. That defines the base of the provided with pattern the "ON" of a ID addresses we will find the metric provided the defines the provided the second second second second second second second sec
	this requires us to define a procedence order of substrings, we will find the most specific duplet in order to do the mapping,
—	not requires us to define a precedence of define single in the DN in order to decide which to use it we have two DN
	Parterns that both matchine full DN. An example will follow.
	Remote guede manager Anne
	 There is also nattern matching on guere manager names although it is here name much simpler patterns than IP
	addresses or SSL Peer Names
	Client asserted User ID
	Rules can be made should a connection arrive asserting the specified user ID. It is often likely that the client asserted user
–	ID is not even defined on the server system, so this can be used to map it to an MCAUSER user ID which of course will be a
	server side defined user ID.
	If the client asserted a banned user ID, but that user ID is in this to map it to another user ID it will be deemed to have
	asserted the mapped user ID and not the banned one in the same way as the other mappings.
	There is a list of user IDs which, if any of them are asserted, will cause the channel to end. The checking against this list of
	blocked user IDs runs after all things that can set the MCAUSER have completed, including security exits and the
	MCAUSER mapping feature we just spoke of. *MQADMIN is a recognition that we logically want to ban the 'mqm' user if you
C	like. However, this is actually a differing set of user IDs dependant on platform, so we will discover at run-time whether we
3	nave a privileged user, and it "MQADMIN is blocked, then privileged users are blocked.
-	, a in Pactor
Com	Diete your sessions evaluation online at SHARE.org/BostonEval

Blocked



Channel Authentication Records – Configuration





Channel Authentication – Configuration – Notes





• in Boston

Restricting the Mappings

- Restrict where an SSL Certificate can be used from
 - Specific IP address
- Restrict where a queue manager or client user ID can come from
 - Specific IP address



SET CHLAUTH(*) TYPE(SSLPEERMAP) SSLPEER('L="Hursley"') MCAUSER(HURUSER) ADDRESS('9.20.*')

SET CHLAUTH(*) TYPE(QMGRMAP) QMNAME(CLUSQM*) MCAUSER(CLUSUSR) ADDRESS('9.30.*')

Complete your sessions evaluation online at SHARE.org/BostonEval



When mapping from an SSL certificate DN, you may also want to ensure that certificate is being used from the correct IP address, mitigating what might happen Ν if a certificate is stolen. When mapping from a queue manager name, you may also want to ensure that the queue manager is running on the correct IP address to ensure it is not a rogue \mathbf{O} queue manager with the same name as one in your cluster for example. We could imagine using the remote queue manager name or the client user ID as a restrictor on an SSL Peer rule, however feedback from EAP did not suggest anyone needed it so it was not implemented. For the most part, attributes within Т the X509 DN will contain the same information for most practical uses. For example CN=<Queue Manager Name>. E S



SSL DN Precedence Mapping Example





SSL DN Precedence Mapping Example – Notes





IP Address Pattern Matching

- Single Address
- Wildcard at the end
- Wildcard in the middle
- Ranges
- IPV4 or IPV6
- IPV6 wildcarded
- IPV4 will also block IPV6 and vice versa
 Complete your sessions evaluation online at SHARE.org/BostonEval

- 9.20.4.6
- 9.20.*
- 9.20.*.6
- 9.20.4.1-10
- 3ffe:1900:4545:3:200: f8ff:fe21:67cf
- 3ffe:1900:4545:3:200:*
- 0:0:0:0:0:0:ffff:192.1.56.10



IP Address Pattern Matching – Notes

The IP addresses can be specified as single addresses, e.g. 9.20.4.6 or as patterns, e.g. 9.20.* which would of course also match the former. There patterns Ν can also be generic in the middle, not just at the end, e.g. 9.20.*.6; and can provide ranges (rather akin to how you might configure a firewall) e.g. 9.20.4.1-20. These patterns of course will also understand IPV6 address, so as another example one might provide 3ffe:1900:4545:3:200:f8ff:fe21:67cf or \mathbf{O} 3ffe:1900:4545:3:200:* which would also match the specific address. We must also understand that 0:0:0:0:0:0:ffff:192.1.56.10 is the same as 192.1.56.10 so that the correct refusals are made when IPV6 and IPV4 are both in use. Т Hostnames cannot be specified in this list – only IP addresses. Firewalls only seem to operate in IP addresses too and this is so similar in nature to a firewall. Also, hostnames can be different/unknown depending on what end of the channel you are at, after all it is only essential for the initiating end to even be able to resolve E the hostname. S



HARE in Boston

How should I use this?





Here is an example of how we expect this to be used. • Our business requires that "We must make sure our system is completely locked Ν down". So we start off with a rule that blocks everyone. Therefore anyone that doesn't match a more specific rule will not be allowed in. • Our business requires that "Our Business Partners must all connect using SSL, so \mathbf{O} we will map their access from the certificate DNs". So we have some rules that map specific DNs of our Business Partners to specific user IDs. Previously you might have done this by having separate channel definitions for each BP, now if you wish they can come into the same receiver definition. Т • Our business requires that "Our Administrators connect in using MQ Explorer, but don't use SSL. We will map their access by IP Address". So we have a rule that gives them all a single administrative access user ID based on a range of IP addresses. E • Our business requires that "Our internal cluster doesn't use SSL, but we must ensure only the correct queue managers can connect into the cluster". So we have a rule that gives access to the correctly named queue managers but only if they come from a recognised IP address. S Complete your sessions evaluation online at SHARE.org/BostonEval



Precedence Mapping Example

CHLAUTH(SYSTEM.ADMIN.SVRCONN) TYPE(ADDRESSMAP)		JKUSEK)
ADDRESS('9.180.165.163') MCAUSER(MORAG)	Order	Identity mechanism
	0	Channel Name
CHLAUTH(SYSTEM.*)	1	SSL Distinguished Name
TYPE(USERMAP)	2	Client asserted User ID
CLNTUSER('mhughson') MCAUSER(HUGHSON)	3	IP address
CHLAUTH(*) TYPE(SSLPEERMAP) SSLPEER('O="IBM UK"') MCAUSER(UKUSER)		
CHLAUTH(*) TYPE(ADDRESSMAP) ADDRESS('9.*') MCAUSER(IBMUSER) UID: mhug IP: 9.180	ChI: APPL1.SVRCONN DN: CN=Morag Hughson.O=IBM UK UID: mhughson IP: 9.180.165.163	



Precedence Mapping Example - Notes

N	 Here is an example to show what happens if a specific inbound channel could match a number of rules. First we recall that we earlier defined a most specific to least specific precedence matching rule for these identity attributes too. We show a basic version of that table here with just the relevant attributes for an inbound client channel. So the question is, if an inbound client channel came into this queue manager with the identifying attributes shown, which MCAUSER would it end up using?
0	 Imagine an inbound connection coming in over channel SYSTEM.ADMIN.SVRCONN with a certificate with SSL Distinguished Name of "CN=Morag Hughson, O=IBM UK", a client side user ID of "mhughson" and a source IP address of "9.180.165.163". This would match the first rule shown and provide MCAUSER of MORAG.
Т	 Now imagine the same details, but coming in over channel SYSTEM.DEF.SVRCONN. This would match the second rule shown and provide MCAUSER of HUGHSON. Finally imagine the same details, but coming in over channel APP1.SVRCONN. This would match the third rule shown and provide MCAUSER of UKUSER.
E	 When displaying many rules the output of the display command will list them in precedence matching order to help in remembering these precedences.
	 Since we recognise that this is a possible usability problem, we have also got a special flavour of the DISPLAY command where you can input the exact details of a likely inbound connection and be told what MCAUSER will be used should such a channel connect.
S	plete your sessions evaluation online at SHARE.org/BostonEval



What happens if...?





What happens if ...? - Notes

Here is an example of the special matching version of the DISPLAY command to show exactly what would happen should a channel matching these identifying attributes, connect into the system. This should serve as a useful testing tool, service aid, and validation tool, although we would of course recommend not creating such complicated rules that you need it in the first place!
 T
 E
 S



HARE

Warning mode

ALTER QMGR CHLEV(ENABLED)

SET CHLAUTH(SYSTEM.*) TYPE(ADDRESSMAP) ADDRESS('9.20*') USERSRC(NOACCESS) WARN(YES) SET CHLAUTH(SYSTEM.*) TYPE(ADDRESSMAP) ADDRESS('9.*') MCAUSER(HUGHSON) SET CHLAUTH(SYSTEM.*) TYPE(ADDRESSMAP) ADDRESS(*) USERSRC(NOACCESS) WARN(NO)



Warning Mode - Notes

If the first record that matches an inbound channel's details is a blocking type of record and has the WARN field set to YES, the channel will cut an error and an Ν event message to show that it would have matched that record, and then will look for the next matching record that does not have WARN set to YES to discover exactly what credentials it is going to use to run with. If the second record it finds is \mathbf{O} also a blocking type of record, then another error and event message will be written and the channel will end. Т E S ARE In Boston



Out of the Box

- We supply these rules out-of-the-box.
 - For all channels, ban the assertion of privileged users by inbound channels.
 - For all SYSTEM channels except SYSTEM.ADMIN.SVRCONN (the MQ Explorer GUI channel), ban anyone from using them.

SET CHLAUTH(*) TYPE(BLOCKUSER) USERLIST(*MQADMIN)

SET CHLAUTH(SYSTEM.*) TYPE(ADDRESSMAP) ADDRESS(*) USERSRC(NOACCESS)

SET CHLAUTH(SYSTEM.ADMIN.SVRCONN) TYPE(ADDRESSMAP) ADDRESS(*) **USERSRC(CHANNEL)**

- Difficult to supply any default rules regarding IP addresses and SSL Peer Names since they are very installation specific.
- Enabling Switch ALTER QMGR CHLAUTH(ENABLED|DISABLED) different for Migrated or New Queue Manager SHARE In Boston

Complete your sessions evaluation online at SHARE.org/BostonEval

Out of the Box - Notes

Out of the box we supply some rules. The first is a rule which bans privileged users and blank users from being asserted Ν by connecting inbound channels. This rule may break some channels, but it will secure many more channels than it breaks so we believe it to be a worthwhile outof-the-box position. \mathbf{O} The second rules secures the use of SYSTEM channels by disallowing any address from connecting. This stops hackers from connecting in to the SYSTEM.DEF.RECEIVER for example. It also locks down the SYSTEM.DEF.SVRCONN which will hit lots of people initially! Т The third rule allows the SYSTEM.ADMIN.SVRCONN but it will still be affected by the first rule if you try to use a privileged user ID, so some work must be done to provide a user ID that has access to do what is needed. There is a queue manager switch which determines whether CHLAUTH rules are E acted upon (it does not stop the commands from be used though). This switch is ENABLED for new queue managers, and DISABLED for migrated queue managers. S ARE in Boston





Events

- Command events (as normal)
- Configuration events (as normal)





Events - Notes

N	 These commands will generate command events and configuration events (assuming that these events are enabled by the existing CMDEV and CONFIGEV switches).
0	 There are some new events to record whenever an inbound connection attempt is blocked. Controlled by the current CHLEV switch (and considered to be an EXCEPTION) this new event message will be issued to the SYSTEM.ADMIN.CHANNEL.EVENT queue when a channel or listener blocks an attempt to connect.
Т	 attempt to connect. The reason qualifier of the event message can be MQRQ_CHANNEL_BLOCKED_ADDRESS Channel was blocked due to its IP address being in the list to be refused.
E	 MQRQ_CHANNEL_BLOCKED_USERID Channel was blocked due to its asserted (or mapped) user ID being in the list to be refused. MQRQ_CHANNEL_BLOCKED_NOACCESS Channel was blocked due to its identity (e.g. IP address or SSL Peer name) being mapped to a rule that says it is to be blocked.
S	plete your sessions evaluation online at SHARE.org/BostonEval



ARE

in Boston

Channel Authentication Records - Recap

- Set rules to control how inbound connections are treated
 - Inbound Clients
 - Inbound QMgr to QMgr channels
 - Other rogue connections causing FDCs
- Rules can be set to
 - Allow a connection
 - Allow a connection and assign an MCAUSER
 - Block a connection
 - Ban privileged access
 - Provide multiple positive or negative SSL Peer Name matching
- Rules can use any of the following identifying characteristics of the inbound connection
 - IP Address
 - SSL/TLS Subject's Distinguished Name
 - Client asserted user ID
 - Remote queue manager name

Complete your sessions evaluation online at SHARE.org/BostonEval

Recap

Ν

 \mathbf{O}

Т

E

S

 We saw this page at the beginning, but we will use it again as a summary. We have learned today how to use this new feature in WebSphere MQ V7.1 to control how our inbound connections will behave.





in Boston

Additional Resources

- MQ Information Center
 - <u>http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/wmqv7/v7r1/topic/com.ibm</u> .mq.doc/zs14190_.htm
- developerWorks blog posts



- <u>https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/community/blogs/aimsupport</u> /entry/blocked_by_chlauth_why
- <u>https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/community/blogs/aimsupport</u> /entry/websphere_mg_chlauth_the_back_stop_rule
- <u>https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/community/blogs/aimsupport</u> /entry/blocking_ip_addresses_with_chlauth_which_type_to_use
- <u>https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/community/blogs/aimsupport</u> /entry/chlauth_allow_some_privileged_admins

Complete your sessions evaluation online at SHARE.org/BostonEval

Additional Resources

	You can read more about CHLAUTH in the MQ Information Center.
N	 This page also provides links to a number of blog posts that I have written about CHLAUTH.
0	
Т	
E	
C	
Com	plete your sessions evaluation online at SHARE.org/BostonEval