

IBM Americas, ATS, Washington Systems Center

Intro To Crypto On System z Share 12687 San Francisco, CA February, 2013

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Agenda – Intro to Crypto

- Some background
 - –Laws & Regulations
 - Crypto Standards
- Crypto Functions
- Crypto Hardware
- Master Keys
- ICSF
- Linux



Laws and Regs

- Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
- California Senate Bill 1386
- Gramm-Leach Bliley Act (GLBA)
- Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX)
- Payment Card Industry Standards (PCI)



Cryptographic Standards

- CCA (Common Cryptographic Architecture)
- PKCS (Public-Key Cryptography Standards)
- INTEL CDS (Common Data Security Architecture)
- OCSF (Open Cryptographic Services)
- ANSI (American National Standards Association)
- ISO (International Organization for Standardization)
- FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standards)




Crypto Functions

- Data Confidentiality
- Symmetric DES/TDES, AES
- Asymmetric RSA, Diffie-Hellman,
 ECC
- Data Integrity
- Modification Detection
- Message Authentication
- Non-repudiation
- Financial Functions
- Key Security & Integrity





Data Confidentiality - DES/TDES



Encrypted

Key



Data Confidentiality - AES

Rijndael Algorithm

- Block Cipher (16-byte blocks)
- -128-, 192, 256-bit Key Length
- –Multiple Rounds
- Four Steps per Round (Byte Substitution, Shift Row, Mix Column, Add Round Key)





Image from http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/



Public Key Architecture - PKA

Asymmetric Keys

- -RSA, Rivest Shamir and Adleman
- -Diffie-Hellman
- -Elliptic Curve (ECC)







Decipher Key



RSA Public Key Cryptography

Generate 2 prime numbers

(each over 100 digits long)

- Multiply primes to get modulus, N
- Select odd number, E, that will be the second part of the public key
- Public Key (N E) →

Compute second part of private key, D

$$(P-1) \times (Q-1) \times (E-1)$$

Add 1 to result

Divide by E to get D

Private Key (N D) →

$$P = 7$$
 $Q = 17$

$$N = 7 \times 17 = 119$$

$$E = 5$$

1195

$$(7-1) \times (17-1) \times (5-1) = 384$$

$$384 + 1 = 385$$

$$D = 385/5 = 77$$

119 77









Encipher Message 'SELL'

• P = 7; Q = 17; N = 119; E = 5; D = 77

Public Key (N E) → 119 5

Private Key (N D) → 119 77

Convert characters to numeric

19 5 12 12

Raise that character value to power E

Divide that by first part of Public Key to get the Modulus

2476099 MOD 119 = 66

$$e_{PublicKey}(S) => 66$$

Ciphertext

66 31 3 3





Decipher Message '66 31 3 3'

• P = 7; Q = 17; N = 119; E = 5; D = 77

Public Key (N E) → 119 5

Private Key (N D) → 119 77

Raise ciphertext to power D 66**77 = 1273160.....

Divide result by first half of private key to get the modulus

1273160.... MOD 119 = 19

Convert numeric back to character
 19 5 12 12

 $d_{PrivateKey}(66) => "S"$

Plaintext
 19 5 12 12 or C'S E L L'






Why Symmetric and Asymmetric Keys?

Symmetric

- -plus less resource intensive
- -minus requires key to be shared securely

Asymmetric











Hash and Key Lengths

- Why do we care about lengths a of keys and hashes?
 - The longer a key the lower the probability to guess the right key
 - The longer a hash the lower the probability to guess a matching text for a given hash
 - Key and hash sizes that are considered secure change over time
- Crypto Cryptography is not security, it is only low probability!? But "Low" is "VERY LOW"!
- Examples of sizes:


MegaMillions (March, 2012) @ \$640Million	1 In 176,000,000
DES: 256 different keys	1 in 72,057,594,037,927,936
AES-128: 2 ¹²⁸ different keys	38 digits
number of atoms in the earth	about 1.33*10 ⁵⁰
number of atoms in our solar system	about 1.2*10 ⁵⁷
AES-192: 2 ¹⁹² different keys	58 digits
AES-256/SHA-256: 2 ²⁵⁶ different keys/hashes	77 digits
number of atoms in the universe	about 10 ⁸²
SHA-512: 2 ⁵¹² different hashes	154 digits

- Key lengths for symmetric keys are not comparable to those of asymmetric keys
- E.g. only a "few" numbers out of 2¹⁰²⁴ 1024-bit numbers are valid keys for RSA



Data Integrity – Modification Detection

Has the message changed?





Hash Example

- SHA1("The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog")
 - = A9F1D770 4CA50AC1 504EA60B 12C7AE2D B054AD18

SHA1("The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy hog")


=24120AD2 C337DE18 24E18BF0 C54F0B4F 98592343





Data Integrity – Message Authentication


Did the message come from who I think it came from?



Hash Algorithm




Data Integrity – Digital Certificates





Financial Services

- PIN Generation
- PIN Verification
- PIN Export/Import





Suite B

Symmetric Encryption

- AES w/key sizes of 128 and 256

Digital Signatures


- ECDSA - Elliptic Curve, Digital Signature Algorithm

Key Agreement

- ECDH - Elliptic Curve, Diffie Hellman

Message Digest

- SHA-2 (SHA-256 and SHA-384)





Clear Key / Secure Key / Protected Key

- Clear Key key <u>may</u> be in the clear, at least briefly, somewhere in the environment
- Secure Key key value does not exist in the clear outside of the HSM (secure, tamperresistant boundary of the card)
- Protected Key key value does not exist outside of physical hardware, although the hardware may not be tamper-resistant



Protected Key – How it works

- Create a key, with the value 'ABCD' and store it as a secure key in the CKDS (i.e. encrypted under the Master Key, MK)
 - -E_{MK}(x'ABCD') => x'4A!2' written to the CKDS and stored with a label of MYKEY
- Execute CSNBSYE (the clear key API to encrypt data), but pass it the key label of our secure key, MYKEY; and text to be encrypted of 'MY MSG'

```
-CALL CSNBSYE(....,

MYKEY,

'MY MSG ' ....)
```




Protected Key – How it works (cont ...)

- ICSF will read MYKEY from the CKDS and pass the key value x'4A!2' to the CEX3
- Inside the CEX3, recover the original key value and then wrap it using the wrapping key
 - $-D_{MK}(x' 4A!2') => x' ABCD'$
 - $-E_{WK}(x'ABCD') => x'*94E'$
- ICSF will pass the wrapped key value of x'*94E' to the CPACF, along with the message to be encrypted
- In the CPACF, we'll retrieve the wrapping key, WK
 - $-D_{wk}(x'*94E') => x'ABCD'$
 - $-E_{x'ABCD'}$ ('MY MSG') => ciphertext of x'81FF18019717D183'



System z Crypto History



- Cryptographic Coprocessor Facility Supports "Secure key" cryptographic processing
- PCICC Feature Supports "Secure key" cryptographic processing
- PCICA Feature Supports "Clear key" SSL acceleration
- PCIXCC Feature Supports "Secure key" cryptographic processing
- CP Assist for Cryptographic Function allows limited "Clear key" crypto functions from any CP/IFL
 - NOT equivalent to CCF on older machines in function or Crypto Express2 capability
- Crypto Express2 Combines function and performance of PCICA and PCICC
- Crypto Express3 PCle Interface, additional processing capacity with improved RAS
- Crypto Express4S IBM Standard PKCS #EP11



System z Clear Key Crypto Hardware – z9 (EC & BC), z10 (EC (GA3) & BC (GA2)), z196/z114, zEC12

- CP Assist for Crypto Function (CPACF)
 - **-DES (56-, 112-, 168-bit), new chaining options**
 - -AES-128, AES-192, AES-256, new chaining options
 - -SHA-1, SHA-256, *SHA-512 (SHA-2)*
 - -PRNG
 - Protected Key



Single CPACF per CP on zEC12 & z9



TechDoc WP100810 – A Synopsis of System z Crypto Hardware



System z Secure Key Crypto Hardware

- Secure Key DES/TDES (z9)
- Secure Key AES (z9)
- Financial (PIN) Functions (z9)
- Key Generate/Key Management (z9)
- Random Number Generate and Generate Long (z9)
- Protected Key Support (CEX3 on z10)
- SSL Handshakes (z9), ECDSA support (CEX3 on z196)
- EP11 (CEX4S)







Master Keys

•ICSF uses five master keys to protect operational keys

- DES Master Key (DES-MK aka SYM-MK)
 - 128 bit key / 192 bit key
 - Protects DES/TDES (symmetric) application keys
- AES Master Key (AES-MK)



- 256 bit key
- Protects AES (symmetric) application keys
- Asymmetric-keys master key (RSA-MK aka ASYM-MK)
 - 192 bit key
 - Protects RSA (asymmetric) private keys
- Elliptic Curve Master Key (ECC-MK)
 - 256 bit key
 - Protects ECC (asymmetric) private keys
- Enterprise PKCS #11 Master Key (P11-MK)
 - 256 bit key
 - Protects PKCS #11 keys
- Stored within the secure hardware boundary of the cryptographic coprocessor














Access to the cryptographic services and keys can be controlled by RACF with the CSFSERV and CSFKEYS classes



Trusted Key Entry (TKE) Workstation Components


- Workstation with a 4765 Cryptographic Coprocessor
- TKE 7.2 LIC
- Smart card readers and smart cards
 - Required if using Enterprise PKCS #11 LIC
 - Optional if using IBM CCA LIC


Purpose

- Used to manage multiple Cryptographic Coprocessors and keys on various generations of System z (zEC12, z196, z114 and z10 EC and BC) from a single point of control
 - Support requirements for standards
 - Simplification of tasks

Enhancements


- Support of new hardware or firmware functions
 - Support for Crypto Express4S defined as a CCA coprocessor
 - Required for Crypto Express4S defined as an Enterprise PKCS #11coprocessor
 - New DES operational keys
 - New AES CIPHER key attribute
 - Allow creation of corresponding keys
 - Support 4 smart card readers
- Support requirements for standards
 - Stronger key wrapping







Linux on System z Crypto Stack





References

Cryptography Books

- Bruce Schneier, 'Applied Cryptography Second Edition: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in "C", Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 1997
- Simon Singh, 'The Code Book', Anchor Books, 1999
- Niels Ferguson, Bruce Schneier, 'Practical Cryptography', Wiley Publishing, Inc. 2003

Standards

- <u>www.ietf.org</u> Internet Engineering Task Force
- www.csrc.nist.gov
 Computer Security Resource Center of NIST
- www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs Research site for RSA Security

Free Stuff

- <u>www.scmagazine.com</u>
 SC Magazine
- <u>www.counterpane.com</u>
 Bruce Schneier web site with monthly newsletter



IBM Pubs







ICSF System Programmer's Guide, SA22-7520

z/OS Web Download Site

http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/os/zos/downloads/





IBM Resources (on the web)

- Redbooks <u>www.redbooks.ibm.com</u> 'Crypto'
 - IBM zEnterprise EC12 Technical Introduction, SG24-8050
 - IBM zEnterprise EC12 Technical Guide, SG24-8049
 - IBM zEnterprise 196 Configuration Setup, SG24-7834
 - IBM zEnterprise System Technical Introduction, SG24-7832
 - IBM zEnterprise 196 Technical Guide, SG24-7833
 - IBM zEnteprise 114 Technical Guide, SG24-7954
 - System z Crypto and TKE Update, SG24-7848



- ATS TechDocs Web Site <u>www.ibm.com/support/techdocs</u> (Search All Documents for keyword of 'Crypto')
 - WP100810 A Synopsis of System z Crypto Hardware
 - WP100647 A Clear Key/Secure Key/Protected Key Primer



Linux Secure Key Crypto - Information & Download

- Crypto Cards Hardware Overview http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards/
- PCI-E Cryptographic Coprocessor (CEX3) http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards/pciecc/overview.shtml
- Crypto Product Summary http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards/pcixcc/overproduct.shtml
- CCA Overview http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards/pcixcc/overcca.shtml
- PCI-E Cryptograhpic Coprocessor Library http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards/pciecc/library.shtml
- CCA Library Download http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards/pciecc/ordersoftware.shtml
- Cryptographic Coprocessor Order Information http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards/pciecc/order.shtml
- PCI-E Cryptographic Coprocessor Supporthttp://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards/pciecc/support.shtml
- Cutting Edge Cryptography by Peter Spera, May/June 2007 IBM Systems Magazine http://www.ibmsystemsmag.com/mainframe/mayjune07/features/14233p1.aspx



Questions ...





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