



Understanding FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard) 140-2 and z/OS System SSL (Secure Socket Layer)

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Session Abstract



This session will give an overview of FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard) 140-2 and z/OS System SSL (Secure Socket Layer). The session will start with an overview of what is FIPS 140-2, what was entailed in getting z/OS System SSL certified at FIPS 140-2 level 1 and how to utilize z/OS System SSL in a FIPS 140-2 manner.



Agenda

Overview of FIPS 140-2

- What is FIPS 140-2
- FIPS 140-2 Requirements
- FIPS 140-2 Security Levels
- FIPS 140-2 Validation Types
- Security Policy
- Validation Process Flow

Using z/OS System SSL in FIPS mode

- Requirements/Configuration
- Application changes
- Enabling AT-TLS for FIPS





What is FIPS 140



- FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard) defines standards and guidelines utilized by the US government and other regulated industries (ie. Financial and health-care)
- **FIPS 140** defines the security requirements for products that contain cryptographic functionality.
 - FIPS 140-1 issued in January 1994
 - FIPS 140-2 issued in May 2001
 - FIPS 140-3 under development draft December 2009



What is FIPS 140-2



- Validations require conforming implementations to be formally validated through the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP).
- NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) and Communications Security Establishment of the Government of Canada (CSEC) jointly operate the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)
- Each product works with accredited **Cryptographic and Security Testing (CST) laboratory**. Product provides required documentation/test platforms and CST Lab evaluates product and builds submission package to be submitted to NIST. Interaction with NIST is done by CST Lab.
 - 20+ accredited labs
 - Worldwide
 - http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/testing_labs/index.html



FIPS 140-2 Terms



- <u>**Cryptographic boundary</u>**: an explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds of a cryptographic module and contains all the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of a cryptographic module.</u>
- <u>**Cryptographic module**</u>: the set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that implements Approved security functions (including cryptographic algorithms and key generation) and is contained within the cryptographic boundary.
- <u>Approved security function</u>: a security function (e.g., cryptographic algorithm, cryptographic key management technique, or authentication technique) that is either
 - a) specified in an Approved standard,
 - b) adopted in an Approved standard and specified either in an appendix of the Approved standard or in a document referenced by the Approved standard, or
 - c) specified in the list of Approved security functions.
- <u>Approved mode of operation</u>: a mode of the cryptographic module that employs only Approved security functions (ie. Triple DES, AES).
- <u>Critical security parameter (CSP)</u>: security-related information (e.g., secret and private cryptographic keys, and authentication data such as passwords and PINs) whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a cryptographic module.



FIPS 140-2 Requirements



• FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Module publication

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf

defines **11** requirements a cryptographic module must meet.

- Annex A: Approved Security Functions for FIPS PUB 140-2
 - Symmetric, asymmetric and message digests
- Annex B: Approved Protection Profiles for FIPS PUB 140-2
 - Common Criteria
- Annex C: Approved Random Number Generation for FIPS 140-2
- Annex D: Approved Key establishment Techniques for FIPS 140-2
 RSA, ECDSA etc



FIPS 140-2 Security Levels



Within the FIPS 140-2 standard 4 security levels are defined.

- Lowest Security Level 1
 - Security Level 2
 - Security Level 3
- Highest Security Level 4



FIPS 140-2 Requirements



1	Cryptographic module specification	 Specifications of cryptographic module including information about what is included in the cryptographic module boundary (hardware, software, firmware). Approved cryptographic algorithms and modes. Statement of module security policy. Detailed information about the software/hardware/firmware levels
2	Cryptographic module ports and interfaces	Data and control information that flows in and out of the module and how it must be presented
3	Roles, services and authentication	 Role Type–user, officer, maintenance (users of the cryptographic module) and how it is enforced Services, operations, or functions that can be performed Show Status, Perform Self-Tests, Perform Approved Security Function - at least one is required
4	Finite state model	 high-level module states and how control transitions from one state to another



FIPS 140-2 Requirements cont'd



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		detection/response; tamper resistance			
6	Operational environment	•Management of the software, firmware, and/or hardware components required for the module to operate			
		•Operating system manages system software and firmware as well as processes and threads.			
		•How module is utilized – APIs, proper installation and configuration of components			
7	Cryptographic key management	•Key management mechanisms: random number and key generation, key establishment, key distribution, key entry/output, key storage, and key zeroization.			
		Plaintext or encrypted keys			
8	EMI/EMC	•Federal Communications Commission requirement against hardware components of the cryptographic boundary			

FIPS 140-2 Requirements cont'd



9	Self-test	 Tests to ensure module is functioning properly Power-up tests: cryptographic algorithm tests, software/firmware integrity tests, critical functions tests. On-demand tests Conditional tests: pair-wise consistency test, continuous random number generation test
10	Design assurance	Documentation which supports that the module has been well designed and implemented
11	Mitigation of other attacks	Specification of mitigation of attacks for which no testable requirements are currently available.



How do the Requirements map to FIPS 140-2 security levels (example)



	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	
Specifications	Specifications of cryptographic module and module boundary. Approved cryptographic algorithms and modes. Statement of module security policy. Description of all hardware, software, and firmware.				
Ports & Interfaces	Specifications for all interfaces and input/output ports.		Logical or physical separation of ports used for unprotected security parameters.		
Authentication and access control	Logical separation of required and optional roles.	ical separation Role-based or Identity-based operator authenticatio equired and identity-based operator authentication onal roles. operator authentication.		ator authentication.	
Key Management	Keys established using manual methods may be entered or output in cleartext form.		Keys established using manual methods must be entered and output either encrypted or using split knowledge procedures.		
Physical Security	Production grade equipment.	Locks or tamper evidence.	Tamper detection and response.	Tamper detection and response envelope.	



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Algorithm Validation Requirement



- Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program is the validation testing for FIPS approved and NIST recommended cryptographic algorithms and components of algorithms.
- Prerequisite to the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)
- Algorithms
 - Symmetric Algorithms Triple DES, AES etc
 - Asymmetric Algorithms RSA, DSA, ECDSA etc
 - SHS
 - HMAC
 - RNG
 - etc
- CAVP tool provided to accredited labs. Labs generate test vectors, Vendors execute algorithms using test vectors and labs validate results
- http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/index.html
- Website contains information about the algorithms and sample test vectors
- Validation List <u>http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/validation.html</u>



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Types of Validations



Software

Provides products the ability to certify software algorithm implementations

Hybrid

 Provides products the ability to certify a mixture of software and hardware algorithm implementation.

Hardware

 Provides products the ability to certify pure hardware algorithm implementations (ie. Cryptographic cards)



What is the Cryptographic Security Policy?



- The Cryptographic Security Policy is a formal document that describes how the product meets the 11 security requirements of the FIPS 140-2 standard and how to operate the cryptographic module in FIPS 140-2 manner.
- Submitted to NIST with evaluation package and posted to NIST website once validation has been completed.
 - <u>http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm</u>







What is System SSL



- An element of the z/OS base Cryptographic Services element that provides:
 - A certificate management utility, gskkyman, for managing certificates within a key database file as well as a suite of APIs to allow application writers the ability to write their own certificate management programs.
 - Applications a mechanism (suite of C/C++ POSIX callable application programming interfaces (APIS)) for applications to securely communicate over an open communications network using SSL/TLS protocol
 - Although not part of the SSL protocol support, System SSL also contains a suite of APIs that allows for applications to build/read PKCS#7 messages.



System SSL Evaluated Releases



- z/OS V1R10 FIPS 140-2 Certificate #1389 (8/12/2010)
- z/OS V1R11 FIPS 140-2 Certificate #1492 (2/4/2011)
- z/OS V1R12 FIPS 140-2 Certificate #1600 (9/8/2011)
- z/OS V1R13 FIPS 140-2 Certificate #1692 (3/12/2012)

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm



z/OS V1R13 System SSL Evaluation



ilidated 140-1 and 140-2 Crypto +				
csrc.nist.gov/groups/s1M/cmvp/docu	ments/140-1/140val-all.ntm			
St visited Getting Started 🔊 Latest Hea	adiines 📋 Read Message - stny.rr 📋 IBM Business I	ransform	IBM Internal Hei	Carci: We IBM Standard Software 🔷 Join World Community
 IBM® Corporation 2455 South Road Poughkeepsie, NY 12601 USA William F Penny TEL: 845-435-3010 CST Lab: NVLAP 200658-0 	IBM® z/OS® Version 1 Release 13 System SSL Cryptographic Module (Hardware Version: FC3863 w/System Driver Level 86E, and optional CEX3A and CEX3C [CEX3A and CEX3C are separately configured versions of 4765-001 (P/N 45D6048)]; Software Version: System SSL level HCPT3D0/JCPT3D1 w/ APAR OA36775, RACF level HRF7780 and ICSF level HCR7780 w/ APAR OA36882; Firmware Version: 4765-001 (e1ced7a0)) (When operated in FIPS mode) Validated to FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Consolidated Validation Certificate	Software- Hybrid	03/12/2012	Overall Level: 1 -Cryptographic Module Specification: Level 3 -Operational Environment: Tested as meeting Level 1 with IBM® zEnterprise (TM) 196 (z196) with CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 [Base GPC, and optional Crypto Express3 Card (Coprocessor (CEX3C)); Crypto Express3 Card (Accelerator (CEX3A)) and Crypto Express3 Cards (Coprocessor (CEX3C) and Accelerator (CEX3A))] [IBM® zEnterprise (TM) (z196) with CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 includes FC3863 w/System Driver Level 86E and z/OS® V1R13] (single-user mode) -FIPS-approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #1713, #1864 and #1865), Triple-DES (Certs. #1103, #1210 and #1211), DSA (Certs. #582 and #583); RSA (Certs. #944, #945, #946, #947 and #948); SHS (Certs. #1497, #1639 and #1640); HMAC (Certs. #1110 and #1111); RNG (Certs. #977 and #978) -Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 80 and 150 bits of encryption strength); DES; RC2; ArcFour; MD5; MD2; HMAC-MD5; ECDSA (non-compliant) Multi-chip standalone "System SSL is a set of generic services provided in z/OS to protect TCP/IP communications using the SSL/TLS protocol. System SSL is exploited by many SSL enabled servers and clients



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z/OS V1R13 System SSL Evaluation



The National Institute of Standards and Technology of the United States of America	The Communications Security Establishment of the Government of Canada			
Consolidated	Certificate No. 0015			
The National Institute of Standards and Technology, as the United Sta Communications Security Establishment Canada, as the Canadian F FIPS 140-2 testing results of the cryptographic modules listed below i Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. FIPS 140-2 specifies the s utilized within a security system protecting Sensitive Information (Unit telecommunications systems (including voice systems).	ates FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Validation Authority; and the IPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Validation Authority; hereby validate the in accordance with the Derived Test Requirements for FIPS 140-2, Security ecurity requirements that are to be satisfied by a cryptographic module and States) or Protected Information (Canada) within computer and			
Products which use a cryptographic module identified below may be labeled as complying with the requirements of FIPS 140-2 so long as the product, throughout its life-cycle, continues to use the validated version of the cryptographic module as specified in this consolidated certificate. The validation report contains additional details concerning test results. No reliability test has been performed and no warranty of the products by both agencies is either expressed or implied.				
FIPS 140-2 provides four increasing, qualitative levels of security: Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, and Level 4. These levels are intended to cover the wide range and potential applications and environments in which cryptographic modules may be employed. The security requirements cover eleven areas related to the secure design and implementation of a cryptographic module.				
The scope of conformance achieved by the cryptographic modules as Program website. The website listing is the official list of validated cry assigned certificate number. Associated with each certificate number module type, date of initial validation and applicable revisions, Overal and other algorithms, vendor contact information, a vendor provided which performed the testing.	s tested are identified and listed on the Cryptographic Module Validation ptographic modules. Each validation entry corresponds to a uniquely is the module name(s), module versioning information, applicable caveats, I Level, individual Levels if different than the Overall Level, FIPS-approved description and the accredited Cryptographic Module Testing laboratory			
Signed on behalf of the Boyerment of the United States	Signed on behalf of the Government of Canada			
Signature:	Signature:			
Dated: 13 April 2012	Dated: 3 april 2012			
Chief, Computer Security Division National Institute of Standards and Technology	Director, Architecture and Technology Assurance Communications Security Establishment Canada			
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Page 1 of 3	4/3/2012			

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z/OS V1R13 System SSL AES Validation

Advanced Encryption Standard Alg	orithm Validation List - Mozilla Firefox: IBM Edi	tion			
<u>File Edit View History Bookmarks To</u>	ols <u>H</u> elp				
NIST.gov - Computer Security \times NIST.gov -	dvanced Encryption Standard × +				
Csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/do	cuments/aes/aesval.html		☆ ▼ C .	🚼 🗝 Google 🛛 🔎	
🔎 Most Visited 🗍 Getting Started 🔊 Latest	Headlines 🗍 Read Message - stny.rr 🗍 IBM Business Tr	ansform 🏧 IBM Internal Help	Home 🚾 I	BM Standard Software	»
1865IBM Corporation 2455 South Road Poughkeepsie, New York 12601-5400 USA-William Penny TEL: 845-435-3010 -Alyson Comer TEL: 607-429-4309	IBM z/OS® Cryptographic Services System SSL - 64-bit Version OA36775	IBM zEnterprise 196 w/ IBM z/OS® V1.13	11/9/2011	CBC (e/d; 128, 256); "z/OS® System SSL provides a rich set of C based applcation programming interfaces that allow applications to protect data using the SSL/TLS protocols and through PKCS#7 cryptographic messages. z/OS System SSL also enables applications to create and manage X.509 V3 certificates and keys within key database files and PKCS#11 tokens."	
1864IBM Corporation 2455 South Road Poughkeepsie, New York 12601-5400 USA-William Penny TEL: 845-435-3010 -Alyson Comer TEL: 607-429-4309	IBM z/OS® Cryptographic Services System SSL - 31-bit Version OA36775 Part # 5694-A01	IBM zEnterprise 196 w/ IBM z/OS® V1.13	11/9/2011	CBC (e/d; 128, 256); "z/OS® System SSL provides a rich set of C based applcation programming interfaces that allow applications to protect data using the SSL/TLS protocols and through PKCS#7 cryptographic messages. z/OS System SSL also enables applications to create and manage X.509 V3 certificates and keys within key database files and"	

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Technology - Connections - Results

Using System SSL z/OS V1R13 in FIPS mode



- System SSL was certified at Level 1
- System SSL was certified as Hybrid. Hybrid allows System SSL to utilize the symmetric/hashing algorithms available through the CPACF crypto instructions within the processor, RSA encryption within the CryptoExpress 3 cards and its own software algorithms
- Cryptographic Boundary
 - Platforms
 - CSTL Lab evaluated
 - IBM zEnterprise[™] 196 (z196) with CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 (Base GPC)
 - Crypto Express3 card (coprocessor, accelerator)
 - Vendor Affirmed
 - IBM System z10® Enterprise Class (z10 EC) with CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 (Base GPC)
 - Crypto Express3 card (coprocessor, accelerator)
 - Operating System
 - z/OS Version 1 Release 13



Using System SSL z/OS V1R13 in FIPS mode

- Cryptographic Module
 - gskkyman, System SSL DLLs, System SSL Started task
 - CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions (CPACF)
 - ICSF "pipe" to cryptographic card
 - Crypto Express3 card
 - RACF Program Signature Verification Module (IRRPVERS)



Algorithms and Key Sizes



	Non-FIPS		FIPS	
Algorithm	Key Size	Hardware	Key Size	Hardware*
RC2	40 and 128			
RC4	40 and 128			
DES	56	Х		
Triple DES	168	Х	168	Х
AES-CBC	128 and 256	Х	128 and 256	Х
AES-GCM	128 and 256	Х	128 and 256	Х
RSA	512-4096	Х	1024-4096	Х
DSA	512-1024		1024	
DH	512-2048		2048	
ECDSA – non-compliant	160-521	Х	192-521	Х
MD2, MD5				
SHA-1		Х		Х
SHA-2 (224/256/384/512)		Х		Х

* FIPS mode supports only Clear Keys

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SSL/TLS Protocols



- TLS V1.0, TLS V1.1 and TLS V1.2 (V1R13 only) protocols are supported in FIPS mode.
- SSL V2 and SSL V3 are not supported and are ignored if specified.
- Ciphers limited to algorithms supported in FIPS mode.
 - Triple DES
 - AES



System SSL Module Integrity Test



- FIPS validation requires cryptographic module to perform an integrity test to ensure software modules within the cryptographic boundary have not been modified since they were built.
- System SSL uses RACF's program (code) signing support which entails the use of digital signatures.
- Signature verification provides a method to ensure the System SSL modules remain unchanged from the time they were built, installed onto the system, and loaded into storage to be used by a FIPS enabled System SSL application.



Program (Code) Signing for integrity



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enhoalany - Connections - Recult

System SSL Cryptographic Module Configuration - Module Verification



Modules that form the System SSL FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module are digitally signed using an IBM key during the build process

GSKCMS31	GSKSSL	GSKKYMAN	IRRPVERS
GSKCMS64	GSKSSL64	GSKSRVR	
GSKC31F	GSKS31F	GSKSRBWT	
GSKC64F	GSKS64F	GSKSRBRD	

- Encryption key used to sign the System SSL modules is an RSA private key that belongs to an x.509 certificate signed by the STG Code Signing CA certificate. The STG Code Signing CA certificate is shipped as a default CERTAUTH certificate in the RACF database under the label 'STG Code Signing CA'.
- RACF profiles must be defined to enable the validation of the module signature (added during the IBM module build process) when loaded by the system.





- Detailed steps to enable module signature validation are documented in the publication "Cryptographic Services System Secure Sockets Layer Programming", in the chapter "System SSL and FIPS 140-2".
- Configuration Step highlights:
 - 1. A signature verification SAF key ring needs to exist containing the root CA used to sign the System SSL signing certificate used during the SSL build process.
 - Userid/CODE.SIGNATURE.VERIFICATION.KEYRING The userid can be any valid RACF userid
 - Root CA is shipped NOTRUSTed and needs to be made TRUSTed
 - 2. Facility class profile IRR.PROGRAM.SIGNATURE.VERIFICATION profile needs to exist and the APPLDATA field needs to contain the name of the signature verification key ring.





- 3. Activate PROGRAM control
- 4. Create the PROGRAM class profile that protects the program verification module IRRPVERS and specify its signature verification options.
- 5. Activate program signature verification by running the IRRVERLD program which loads and verifies the program verification module IRRPVERS.
- 6. Create the PROGRAM class profiles to indicate the System SSL modules must be signed.
- 7. Refresh PROGRAM control





- Create code signing key ring and connect STG code signing CA certificate
 - RACDCERT CERTAUTH LIST(LABEL('STG Code Signing CA'))
 - RACDCERT CERTAUTH ALTER (LABEL('STG Code Signing CA')) TRUST
 - RACDCERT ID(RACFADM) ADDRING(CODE.SIGNATURE.VERIFICATION.KEYRING)
 - RACDCERT ID(RACFADM) CONNECT(RING(CODE.SIGNATURE.VERIFICATION.KEYRING) CERTAUTH LABEL('STG Code Signing CA') USAGE(CERTAUTH))
- Create facility profile to active code signing capabilities
 - RDEFINE FACILITY IRR.PROGRAM.SIGNATURE.VERIFICATION APPLDATA('RACFADM/CODE.SIGNATURE.VERIFICATION.KEYRING')
- Activate changes and enable PROGRAM control
 - SETROPTS RACLIST(FACILITY) REFRESH
 - SETROPTS RACLIST(DIGTCERT, DIGTRING) REFRESH
 - SETROPTS WHEN(PROGRAM)
- Activate signature verification support
 - RDEFINE PROGRAM IRRPVERS ADDMEM('SYS1.SIEALNKE'//NOPADCHK) UACC(READ) SIGVER(SIGREQUIRED(YES) FAILLOAD(ANYBAD) SIGAUDIT(ANYBAD))
 - SETROPTS WHEN(PROGRAM) REFRESH
 - Execute IRRVERLD job





- RDEFINE PROGRAM <u>GSKSSL</u> ADDMEM('SYS1.SIEALNKE'//NOPADCHK) UACC(READ) SIGVER(SIGREQUIRED(YES) FAILLOAD(ANYBAD) SIGAUDIT(ANYBAD))
- RDEFINE PROGRAM GSKSSL64 ADDMEM('SYS1.SIEALNKE'//NOPADCHK) UACC(READ) SIGVER(SIGREQUIRED(YES) FAILLOAD(ANYBAD) SIGAUDIT(ANYBAD))
- RDEFINE PROGRAM GSKS31F ADDMEM('SYS1.SIEALNKE'//NOPADCHK) UACC(READ) SIGVER(SIGREQUIRED(YES) FAILLOAD(ANYBAD) SIGAUDIT(ANYBAD))
- RDEFINE PROGRAM GSKS64F ADDMEM('SYS1.SIEALNKE'//NOPADCHK) UACC(READ) SIGVER(SIGREQUIRED(YES) FAILLOAD(ANYBAD) SIGAUDIT(ANYBAD))
- RDEFINE PROGRAM <u>GSKCMS31</u> ADDMEM('SYS1.SIEALNKE'//NOPADCHK) UACC(READ) SIGVER(SIGREQUIRED(YES) FAILLOAD(ANYBAD) SIGAUDIT(ANYBAD))
- RDEFINE PROGRAM <u>GSKCMS64</u> ADDMEM('SYS1.SIEALNKE'//NOPADCHK) UACC(READ) SIGVER(SIGREQUIRED(YES) FAILLOAD(ANYBAD) SIGAUDIT(ANYBAD))
- RDEFINE PROGRAM <u>GSKC31F</u> ADDMEM('SYS1.SIEALNKE'//NOPADCHK) UACC(READ) SIGVER(SIGREQUIRED(YES) FAILLOAD(ANYBAD) SIGAUDIT(ANYBAD))
- RDEFINE PROGRAM <u>GSKC64F</u> ADDMEM('SYS1.SIEALNKE'//NOPADCHK) UACC(READ) SIGVER(SIGREQUIRED(YES) FAILLOAD(ANYBAD) SIGAUDIT(ANYBAD))
- RDEFINE PROGRAM GSKSRVR ADDMEM('SYS1.SIEALNKE'//NOPADCHK) UACC(READ) SIGVER(SIGREQUIRED(YES) FAILLOAD(ANYBAD) SIGAUDIT(ANYBAD))
- RDEFINE PROGRAM GSKKYMAN ADDMEM('SYS1.SIEALNKE'//NOPADCHK) UACC(READ) SIGVER(SIGREQUIRED(YES) FAILLOAD(ANYBAD) SIGAUDIT(ANYBAD))
- RDEFINE PROGRAM GSKSRBRD ADDMEM('SYS1.SIEALNKE'//NOPADCHK) UACC(READ) SIGVER(SIGREQUIRED(YES) FAILLOAD(ANYBAD) SIGAUDIT(ANYBAD))
- RDEFINE PROGRAM <u>GSKSRBWT</u> ADDMEM('SYS1.SIEALNKE'//NOPADCHK) UACC(READ) SIGVER(SIGREQUIRED(YES) FAILLOAD(ANYBAD) SIGAUDIT(ANYBAD))
- SETROPTS WHEN(PROGRAM) REFRESH



Using System SSL z/OS V1R13 in FIPS mode

- System SSL has the capability to execute securely in a mode that has been designed to meet the NIST FIPS 140-2 criteria.
- Executes in either 'FIPS mode' or 'non-FIPS mode'.
- By default runs in 'non-FIPS' mode.



Certificates and Certificate Stores



Supported Certificate Stores

- SAF Key Rings
- PKCS #11 Tokens
- Key Database Files created through gskkyman

Key database files

- must be recreated through gskkyman specifying FIPS mode
- Will only contain certificates valid for FIPS mode (FIPS databases can also be used in non-FIPS mode but not vice versa)

• SAF Key rings and PKCS #11 tokens

- contain certificates with keys sizes or algorithms that are not supported in FIPS mode as long as those certificates are never used while executing in FIPS mode.
- if an attempt to use a certificate with unsupported key size or algorithms is made, then the process will fail.
- corrective action is to either add/replace certificates with key sizes and algorithms that are valid in FIPS mode



Create FIPS key database file



Database Menu

1 - Create new key database

- 2 Open key database
- 3 Change database password
- 4 Change database record length
- 5 Delete database
- 6 Create key parameter file
- 7 Display certificate file (Binary or Base64 ASN.1 DER)
- 11 Create new token
- 12 Delete token
- 13 Manage token
- 14 Manage token from list of tokens

Enter option number: 1

Enter key database name (press ENTER to return to menu): /home/server/key.kdb Enter database password (press ENTER to return to menu): password Re-enter database password: password Enter password expiration in days (press ENTER for no expiration): enter Enter database record length (press ENTER to use 5000): enter

Enter 1 for FIPS mode database or 0 to continue: 1

Key database /home/server/key.kdb created.



Application Changes



- To enable your application to execute in the mode designed to meet FIPS 140-2, API gsk_fips_state_set needs to be called.
 - gsk_status gsk_fips_state_set (GSK_FIPS_STATE_ENUM_VALUE enumValue)
 - **GSK_FIPS_STATE_ON** Sets state to FIPS mode
 - **GSK_FIPS_STATE_OFF** Sets state to non-FIPS mode.
- In order to set GSK_FIPS_STATE_ON, this function must be executed **prior** to all other SSL API functions with the exception of gsk_get_cms_vector, gsk_get_ssl_vector and gsk_fips_state_query.
- Notes:
 - Applications cannot switch from non-FIPS to FIPS mode.
 - Applications can switch from FIPS to non-FIPS mode.







- To determine the active FIPS mode,
 - gsk_status gsk_fips_state_query (GSK_FIPS_STATE_ENUM_VALUE_enumValue)
 - GSK_FIPS_STATE_NOSET mode not set
 - **GSK_FIPS_STATE_ON** FIPS mode enabled
 - **GSK_FIPS_STATE_OFF** Non-FIPS mode enabled
- To execute self-tests on-demand
 - gsk_status gsk_perform_kat()





Application Changes cont'd

Handling severe cryptographic failures

- When executing in FIPS mode and a severe cryptographic problem is encountered, the application should be terminated and restarted.
- If execution continues, all APIs will fail except for:
 - gsk_get_cms_vector
 - gsk_get_ssl_vector
 - gsk_fips_state_query
 - gsk_query_crypto_level
 - gsk_strerror
- Severe cryptographic return codes are:
 - CMSERR_BAD_RNG_OUTPUT Failure during random number generation
 - GSK_ERR_RNG, GSK_ERROR_RNG Failure during random number generation
 - CMSERR_FIPS_KEY_PAIR_CONSISTENCY Failure when generating either a RSA or DSA key pair
 - CMSERR_KATPW_FAILED Failure was encountered by the gsk_perform_kat API when performing known answer tests against the System SSL cryptographic algorithms.



Enabling AT-TLS Security Policy for FIPS



- Application Transparent Transport Layer Security (AT-TLS) consolidates TLS implementation in one location, reducing or eliminating application development overhead, maintenance, and parameter specification. AT-TLS is based on z/OS System SSL, and transparently implements these protocols in the TCP layer of the stack
- Attributes of the TLS connections are defined by a security policy.
- To set FIPS mode within a security policy
 - TTLSGroupAction Parameters:
 - TTLSGroupAdvancedParms
 - FIPS140 Off (default)
 - FIPS140 On



How did System SSL meet FIPS 140-2 **Level 1 Requirements**



2013

Cryptographic module specification	Security Policy states cryptographic boundary, platforms, approved security functions and modes
Cryptographic module ports and interfaces	System SSL external publication describes all interfaces to the cryptographic module; Security Policy lists APIs
Roles, services and authentication	Supports logical separation of roles, all supported approved security functions in Security Policy, authentication through z/OS operating system login process
Finite state model	Internal document provided to CST Lab
Physical security	Production grade components
Operational environment	Security Policy describes operational environment; APIs gsk_fips_state_set, gsk_fips_state_query, gsk_perform_kat etc.
Cryptographic Key Mgmt	Keys can flow into and out of cryptographic module in the clear, all CSPs zeroed out when no longer used, using approved RNG, key generation and key exchange security functions
EMI/EMC	FCC A and B ratings
Self-test	Power up, Continuous, Pair-wise consistency and Integrity tests
Design assurance	Appropriate Design documents to CST lab
Mitigation of other attacks	

When is validation needed?



- My application or product contains 1 or more cryptographic algorithm implementations?
 - 1. Validation is required if any of the cryptographic algorithms are for a FIPS approved algorithm. Non-approved algorithms cannot be validated and must not be utilized when running in FIPS compliant mode
 - 2. All algorithm implementations are for FIPS non-approved algorithms. Validation is not possible
- My application or product utilizes crypto provided by an approved cryptographic module.
 - 1. No special validation needs to be done. Application is consider compliant as long as the application is using the cryptographic module according to the module's Security Policy



Review

• Overview of FIPS 140-2

- What is FIPS 140-2
- FIPS 140-2 Requirements
- FIPS 140-2 Security Levels
- FIPS 140-2 Validation Types
- Security Policy
- Validation Process Flow

• Using z/OS System SSL in FIPS mode

- Requirements/Configuration
- Application changes
- Enabling AT-TLS for FIPS









 FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf

 Validated FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Modules: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm

Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
 http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/index.html

- Validated Algorithms: <u>http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/validation.html</u>
- Testing Laboratories: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/testing_labs/index.html
- Cryptographic Server Manual Cryptographic Services System Secure Sockets Layer Programming



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