



Software Group | Enterprise Networking Solutions

# z/OS Communication Server **IPSec and IP Packet Filtering**

**SHARE Session 10714** 

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March 12, 2012

z/OS Communications Server

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# z/OS Communications Server IP security agenda



- Introduction to IP security on z/OS
- IP filtering
- IPSec
- Special topics
- IP security displays and controls
- Configuring and enabling IP Security






# z/OS Communications Server IP security

Introduction



z/OS IP security support



 z/OS IP Security is a complete IPSec, IP filtering, and IKE solution and is part of z/OS Communications Server

#### Services

- ► Protect the system from the network
  - -IP filtering to control which packets can enter the system
- ► Protect against data leakage from the system
  - -IP filtering to control which packets can leave the system
- ➤ Cryptographic protection of data in the network
  - Manual IPSec (statically defined security associations)
  - -Dynamic negotiation of IPSec security associations using Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
- ► Filter directed logging of IP Security actions to syslogd



# z/OS Communications Server IP security features

#### Supports many configurations

- ► Optimized for role as endpoint (host), but also support routed traffic (gateway)
- ► IPSec NAT Traversal support (address translation and port translation)
- ► IPv4 and IPv6 support

#### Policy-based

- ► Configuration Assistant GUI for both new and expert users
- ► Direct file edit into local configuration file

#### Default filters in TCP profile provide basic protection before policy is loaded

#### Cryptographic algorithms

- ► RSA signature-based authentication
- ► ECDSA signature-based authentication
- ► HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-MD5 authentication
- ► HMAC-SHA-2, AES-XCBC, AES-GMAC authentication
- ➤ AES-CBC, 3DES and DES encryption
- ► AES-GCM (128- and 256-bit) encryption
- ► Uses cryptographic hardware if available for most algorithms
- ► FIPS 140 mode

#### zIIP Assisted IPSec

Moves most IPSec processing from general purpose processors to zIIPs

#### ■ IP Security Monitoring Interface

► IBM Tivoli OMEGAMON XE for Mainframe Networks uses the CommServer NMI interfaces for IP Security

#### Support for latest IPSec RFCs


- ► RFCs 4301-4305, 4307-4308
- ➤ RFCs 4306, 5996 (IKEv2)

# ■ z/OS CommServer V1R12 successfully completed USGv6 interoperability testing including the IPSec, IKE, and ESP test suites

http://www.iol.unh.edu/services/testing/ipv6/usgv6tested.php



### z/OS Communications Server IP security infrastructure overview



- TCP/IP stack
  - IPSec and IP filtering
- Policy agent
  - Reads and manages IPSec and IKE policy
- Configuration Assistant for z/OS Communications Server
  - ➤ Creates policy definitions
- IKE daemon
  - ➤ Negotiates security associations

- ipsec command
  - Displays and controls IP filtering, IPSec, and IKE
- trmd
  - Monitors TCP/IP stacks for log messages
- syslogd
  - Write log messages to syslogd destinations
- Network Security Services daemon
  - Provides certificate services for IKE



# z/OS Communications Server IP security


IP filtering



# Basics of IP packet filtering


### IP packet filtering used to control:

### **Traffic being routed**



- Filter rules defined to match on inbound and outbound packets based on:
  - ► packet information
  - ► network attributes
  - ►time

#### Access at source / destination host




- Possible actions
  - ➤ Permit
  - **►** Deny
  - ► Permit with manual IPSec
  - ► Permit with dynamic IPSec
  - ► Log (in combination with other actions)



# IP filtering processing overview

- 1. Inbound or outbound IP packet arrives
- 2. Consult set of filter rules in a filter rule table Security Policy Database (SPD)
  - ► Rules have conditions and actions
- 3. Apply action of matching rule to packet
  - ➤ Deny
  - ➤ Permit
  - ► Permit with additional processing applied




- Filter rules are searched in the order they were configured
- Each rule is inspected, from top to bottom, for a match
- If a match is found, the search ends and the action is performed



# IP security - filter policies

- IP security's Security Policy Database (SPD)
  - 1. Default IP filter policy
    - Intended to allow limited access while IP security filter policy is being loaded
      - Can be reverted to in an "attack" situation
    - Defined in the TCP/IP profile
      - Default is to deny all traffic
    - Provides basic filtering function
      - Permit rules only Permit traffic needed for basic services / fix problems with IP security filter policy
      - No IPSec support
  - 2. IP security filter policy
    - Intended to be the primary source of filter rules
    - Defined in a Policy Agent IPSec configuration file
      - Policy can be generated by the Configuration Assistant for z/OS GUI
- Implicit filter rules
  - Always present, not user-defined
    - Deny all inbound traffic
    - Deny all outbound traffic
  - Appended to Default IP filter policy by the TCP/IP stack
  - Appended to IP Security filter policy by Pagent
  - If neither policies are defined, the implicit rules become the default policy (deny all)



Filter rule 1

Filter rule 2

Filter

search order

rule


Filter rule 3

• • • • •

Implicit filter rule:
Deny everything!!!



### IP filter policy on z/OS - overview





Criteria	Description			
From packet				
Source address	Source IP address in IP header of packet			
Destination address	Destination IP address in IP header of packet			
Protocol	Protocol in the IP header of packet (TCP, UDP, OSPF, etc.)			
Source port	For TCP and UDP, the source port in the transport header of packet			
Destination port	For TCP and UDP, the destination port in the transport header of packet			
ICMP type and code	For ICMP, type and code in the ICMP header of packet			
OSPF type	For OSPF, type located in the OSPF header of packet			
IPv6 Mobility type	For traffic with IPv6 mobility headers, MIPv6 type in header of packet.			
Fragments Only	Matches fragmented packets only (applicable to routed traffic only)			
Network attributes				
Direction	Direction of packet.			
Routing	Packet is local if source or destination IP address exists on local host, otherwise it is routed			
Link security class	A virtual class that allow you to group interfaces with similar security requirements. Non-VIPA addresses can be assigned a security class. Packets inherit the security class of the interface over which packet is sent/received.			
Time condition				
Time, Day, Week, Month	Indicates when filter rule is active			




# z/OS Communications Server IP security

**IPSec** 




### IPSec protocol overview



- Open network layer security protocol defined by IETF
- Provides authentication, integrity, and data privacy
  - ► IPSec security protocols
    - Authentication Header (AH) provides data authentication / integrity
    - Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP) provides data privacy with optional authentication/integrity
- Implemented at IP layer
  - ► Requires no application change
  - ➤ Secures traffic between any two IP resources
    - Security Associations (SA)
- Management of crypto keys and security associations can be
  - ► manual
  - ➤ automated via key management protocol (Internet Key Exchange (IKE))



# IPSec security associations





- IPSec Security Association (SA) defines security services for a defined traffic type
  - ► Unidirectional logical connection between 2 IPSec hosts
  - ► Used in pairs for bidirectional traffic
- SA scope of protection can vary
  - ► Wide Traffic protection for multiple connections e.g. Protect all traffic between 2 hosts
  - ► Narrow Traffic protection for a single connection
- SA endpoints can vary
  - ► Entire data path can be secured with IPSec
    - Security and connection endpoints are the same <u>Transport mode</u>
  - ► Portion of data path considered "untrusted" can be secured with IPSec
    - Security and connection endpoints are different <u>Tunnel mode</u>




### IPSec scenarios and z/OS roles


# z/OS as Host (Data Endpoint)






### z/OS as Gateway (Routed Traffic)










# IPSec encapsulating modes - transport and tunnel mode

### Creating an IPSec transport mode packet


 Inserts IPSec headers between original IP header and protected data



Transport mode is typically used between two hosts that establish an IPSec SA end-to-end between them.

### Creating an IPSec tunnel mode packet

- Creates a new IP header with an IPSec header
- IPSec header followed by original IP header and protected data




Tunnel mode is used if at least one of the two IPSec SA end-points is a gateway.




# Encapsulation mode rules

#### • Must use tunnel mode:




### ■ May use tunnel or transport mode:








## IPSec Authentication Header (AH) protocol



- If transport mode then "Payload" contains the original transport header and original data
- If tunnel mode then "Payload" contains the original IP header, original transport header, and original data



# IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol



- If transport mode then "Payload" contains the original transport header and original data (possibly encrypted)
- If tunnel mode then "Payload" contains original IP header, original transport header, and original data ► "Payload" can be encrypted



# IPSec security associations (SAs)

- Endpoints must agree on how to protect traffic
  - ► Security protocol
    - -AH
    - -ESP
  - ► Algorithms to be used by the security protocols
    - Encryption Algorithm
    - Authentication Algorithm
  - ► Cryptographic keys
  - ► Encapsulation mode
    - -tunnel
    - -transport
  - ► Lifetime/lifesize (for dynamic SAs)
- This agreement is known as a "security association"
- IPSec security associations can be manually configured in the IPSec policy or created dynamically using the IKE protocol



### Manually defined SAs

### Not commonly used

- ► Do not provide a scalable solution
- ► In the long run difficult to manage

### Defined in a Policy Agent IPSec configuration file

- ► Utilized by filter rules with an action of ipsec
- ► SA is defined by a manual VPN action
  - Can be generated by the Configuration Assistant for z/OS GUI

### Use ipsec command activate/deactivate manual SAs

► Can also be automatically activated when policy is installed


### Definition of SA attributes require mutual agreement between tunnel endpoint administrators

- ► Cryptographic keys and IPSec security protocol parameters must be mutually agreed to between tunnel endpoint administrators
- ► Need to decide how to safely exchange keys
- ► Need to decide how to refresh keys
  - Manual SAs must be deactivated and activated when refreshing keys
  - Refreshing keys must be coordinated with the remote tunnel endpoint's administrator
- ► Remote endpoint may need to reactivate a manual SA if you locally deactivate the SA and then locally activate the SA.



### IPSec manual SAs overview

- Define IP filter conditions here (which packets using manual tunnels for encryption)
- Define all encryption info between 2 data endpoints here (Ciphersuite, spi, keys, method (AH/ESP), Mode (Tunnel/Transport), gateways to use, etc.





### Dynamically defined SAs

- Currently state of the art
  - ► Scalable
  - ► Automatic, non-disruptive refresh of SAs and session keys
- Initially requires more configuration than a manual SA
  - ► In the long run easier to manage
    - Set and forget it
- Dynamic SAs are negotiated by the IKE daemon
- Dynamic IPSec policy defined in a Pagent IPSec configuration file
  - ► Can be generated by the Configuration Assistant for z/OS Communications Server GUI
  - ➤ Dynamic VPN action identifies "acceptable" SA attributes
    - Utilized by filter rules with an action of IPSEC
- Authentication methods
  - ► Pre-shared key
    - Each host needs to be keyed with key of each potential IKE partner
      - This key is not directly used to encrypt data.
    - Often used during the initial stages of dynamic SA deployment
  - ➤ Digital signature (most scalable)
    - Uses x.509 certificates for host-based authentication
      - Each host needs only its own host-based certificate and the certificate of the trusted Certificate Authority that signed the IKE peer's host-based certificate (Requirements for the CA of the peer certificate can differ with V1R12 Certficate Trust Chain support)
    - Algorithms
      - RSA Signature
      - Elliptical Curve Digital Signature for IKEv2 (V1R12)



### The IKE daemon

### ■ The IKE daemon implements the Internet Key Exchange protocol

- ► A two phase approach to negotiating dynamic IPSec SAs
- ► Two versions:
  - IKEv1 Defined in RFC 2409
  - -IKEv2 Defined in RFCs 4306, 5996 (z/OS V1R12)

### ■ The IKE daemon obtains its policy from Pagent

- ► Policy information for negotiating IPSec SAs
  - Dynamic VPN actions
- ► Policy for creating a secure channel used to negotiate IPSec SAs
  - -Key Exchange Policy
- ► Policy for ipsec command activation and autoactivation
  - -Local Dynamic VPN Policy

### ■ Utilizes UDP ports 500 and 4500 to communicate with remote security endpoints

- ► Negotiating SAs
- ► Sending informational messages




# Two phases of IKE negotiations

#### ■ Phase 1

- ► Creates a secure channel with a remote security endpoint
  - Negotiates an IKE SA
    - Generates cryptographic keys that will be used to protect Phase 2 negotiations and Informational exchanges
    - Authenticates the identity of the parties involved
- ➤ Done infrequently

#### ■ Phase 2

- ➤ Negotiates an IPSec SA with a remote security endpoint
  - Generates cryptographic keys that are used to protect data
    - Authentication keys for use with AH
    - Authentication and/or encryption keys for use with ESP
- ► Performed under the protection of an IKE SA
- ➤ Done more frequently than phase 1






# Dynamic SA activation methods

Security associations can be activated in one of four ways:

- On-demand activation
  - ➤ Activation attempted when the stack receives an outbound packet requiring the protection of a new dynamic tunnel
- Remote activation
  - ► A remote security endpoint initiates the negotiation of a new SA
- Command activation
  - ► ipsec -y activate command
    - Requires definition of local dynamic VPN policy:
- Autoactivated
  - ► Activation attempted when a stack connects to IKED or when IP Security filter policy is reloaded
    - Requires definition of local dynamic VPN policy:



# IP Security dynamic SAs overview






# z/OS Communications Server IP security

**Special Topics** 



# The IPSec NAT traversal problem


- Network Address Translation (NAT) alters addressing information in packet
  - ► IP addresses in IP headers
  - ► Addresses in data payload for some protocols
- Some NATs do port translation (NAPT)
  - ► IP addresses in IP headers
  - ► Ports in TCP and UDP headers
  - ► Addresses and ports in data payload for some protocols
- IPSec and NAT / NAPT at original RFC levels were not compatible
  - ► IPSec SA could not traverse NAT/NAPT device
  - ► Forced configuration where multiple SAs required to make end-to-end connection
    - Cascaded SAs





### The IPSec NAT Traversal Solution

- Later IETF RFCs address this incompatibility for NAT / NAPT alterations in IP and transport headers
  - ► RFC 3947 and 3948
  - ► Does not address translation of addresses in data payload
    - Application protocol specific solution required (e.g. FTP EPSV support which eliminates use of addresses in data payload)






# VIPA takeover and sysplex distributor support for IPSec traffic - Sysplex Wide Security Associations

Sysplex Wide Security Assocations (SWSA) provides sysplex support to IPSec protected traffic

with a DVIPA security endpoint



The initial security association is established with the distributing TCP/IP stack but the end-point of the security association gets distributed to the target stacks via XCF links

Outbound traffic

Must specify
DVIPSEC on
IPCONFIG

TCP/IP
Profile

### SWSA Sysplex Distributor support

- ➤ Distributes IPSec-protected workload with connection distribution
  - Consistent filter policies needed across processors in Sysplex

### ■ SWSA VIPA Takeover support


- ► IPSec phase 1 & 2 SAs automatically restarted on backup after takeover
  - Phase 1 & 2 info needed for restart saved in Coupling Facility
- No administrative movement of SAs required.
  - Policy filters at backup host must be able to accommodate filter rules and SAs for backup processor



# IKEv2 (added in V1R12)

See session 10829 for more information

- IKE version 1 (IKEv1) specified by RFCs 2407-2409
- IKE version 2 (IKEv2) specified by RFCs 4306, 5996




#### IKEv2 protocol

- ► Supports all of the same configurations as IKEv1
- ► Different protocol than IKEv1
  - similar function
  - different messages and flows
  - different terminology
- ► More efficient than IKEv1:
  - fewer messages per negotiation
  - new formats allow for smaller messages
- ► More robust than IKEv1:
  - Request/response model for all flows
  - Built-in dead peer detection

#### ■ z/OS IKEv2 implementation

- ► Coexists and concurrently supported with IKEv1 in **IKFD**
- ► Fully supported by Configuration Assistant for z/OS
- ► Requires network security services (NSS) for certificate-based authentication
- ► NAT traversal for IPv4
  - Not supported in V1R12,
  - Supported added in V1R13
- ➤ System-Wide Security Associations (SWSA)
  - Not supported in V1R12
  - -Support added in V1R13





- Centralized network security services for a set of
  - ► Images can be non-sysplex, intra- or inter-sysplex
- NSS digital signature services
  - ► Allows central administration of RACF certificates and private keys
    - Sign and verify during runtime IKE negotiations
- NSS monitoring services
  - ► Allows selection of single focal point as IPSec management hub
    - ipsec command for administrator
    - NMI API for management applications
- Availability options
  - ► Backup NSS can be specified

#### NSS role extended in z/OS V1R12

 NSS is required for z/OS V1R12 advanced certificate support

iked.conf

Stack

One

IKE

Daemon

Stack

Eight

- ➤ Certificate Revocation List
- ➤ Certificate Trust Chain

IKE peer


IPSec SAs

NSS is required for ALL IKEv2 certificate services



# IPSec Cryptographic Enhancements (V1R12)

IKEv1 Phase 1 and IKEv2 IKE SA			IKEv1 Phase 2 and IKEv2 Child SA		
Purpose	Existing	New z/OS V1R12	Purpose	Existing	New z/OS V1R12
Encryption algorithm	DES, 3DES, AES_CBC KeyLength 128	AES_CBC Keylength 256	Encryption algorithm	DES, 3DES, AES_CBC KeyLength 128	AES_CBC KeyLength 256, AES_GCM_16 KeyLength 128   256
Diffie-Hellman group	Group1, Group2, Group5, Group14	Group19, Group20, Group21, Group24	Authentication algorithm	HMAC_MD5, HMAC_SHA1	AES_GMAC_128   256, AES128_XCBC_96, HMAC_SHA2_256_128, HMAC_SHA2_384_192, HMAC_SHA2_512_256
IKEv1 hash algorithm	MD5, SHA1	SHA2_256, SHA2_384, SHA2_512	Perfect forward secrecy group	Group1, Group2, Group5, Group14	Group19, Group20, Group21, Group24
Partner authentication	PreSharedKey,	ECDSA-256, ECDSA-			



HMAC\_SHA2\_384, HMAC\_SHA2\_512

384, ECDSA-521 (these


**RSASignature** 

IKEv2 message

verification algorithm

IKEv2 pseudo random


function




SA: Security Association aka. the tunnel



## FIPS 140 mode for IPSec (V1R12)





#### ■ Federal Information Processing Standard 140

- ► US government standard
- ► Current version is FIPS 140-2
- ► Governs the integrity and functionality of cryptographic modules (not systems or even applications)
  - Clearly defined boundaries and interfaces
  - Integrity of algorithms including self-test
  - Limits on supported algorithms (no MD5, DES, 512-bit RSA or certain AES modes)
  - Security of keys
  - Other things that are beyond the scope of this discussion
- ► Originally written for hardware devices now extending to software modules

#### ■ When enabled for z/OS IPSec, all crypto functions are performed by z/OS FIPS 140 crypto modules:

- ► System SSL in with FIPS 140 mode enabled
- ► ICSF's PKCS #11 interface with FIPS 140 mode enabled
- ► All other crypto services that IKED or the stack's IPSec support may otherwise use are disabled

#### ■ FIPS 140 option provided for IKED, NSSD and stack's IPSec function

- ► Stacks configured individually
- ► IKED and NSSD must be enabled if any TCP/IP stack is enabled



## z/OS Communications Server IP security

IP Security
Displays and Controls



## ipsec command summary - primary command options

Primary Command	Main functions provided
ipsec -f	<ul> <li>Display information about active filter set</li> <li>Display information about default IP filter rules</li> <li>Display information about IP Security filter rules</li> <li>Make the default IP filter rules the active filter set</li> <li>Make the IP Security filter rules the active filter set</li> </ul>
ipsec -m	Display information about manual tunnels     Activate manual tunnels     Deactivate manual tunnels
ipsec -k	Display information about IKE tunnels     Deactivate IKE tunnels     Refresh IKE tunnels
ipsec -y	<ul> <li>Display information about dynamic tunnels (stack's view)</li> <li>Display information about dynamic tunnels (IKED's view)</li> <li>Activate dynamic tunnels</li> <li>Deactivate dynamic tunnels</li> <li>Refresh dynamic tunnels</li> </ul>
ipsec-i	Display interface information
ipsec -t	Locate matching filter rule
ipsec -o	Display NAT port translation table information
ipsec -?	Help

See the "IP System Administrator's Commands" for the complete syntax




## z/OS Communications Server IP security

# Configuring and Enabling IP Security



### z/OS Communications Server IP security infrastructure overview



- TCP/IP stack
  - IPSec and IP filtering
- Policy agent
  - Reads and manages IPSec and IKE policy
- Configuration Assistant for z/OS Communications Server
  - ➤ Creates policy definitions
- IKE daemon
  - ► Negotiates security associations

- ipsec command
  - Displays and controls IP filtering, IPSec, and IKE
- trmd
  - Monitors TCP/IP stacks for log messages
- syslogd
  - Write log messages to syslogd destinations
- Network Security Services daemon
  - Provides certificate services for IKE



## Configuration required for IP security

#### ■ z/OS system preparation tasks

- ► TCP Profile updates to enable IP security, define default filter rules, enable SWSA
- ► Policy infrastructure applications configuration and JCL procedures
  - IKE daemon (IKED)
  - Policy agent
  - Network Security Services daemon (NSSD)
  - Traffic regulation management daemon (TRMD)
  - Syslog daemon (syslogd)
- SAF access control for:
  - Applications
  - ipsec command
- ► Integrated Cryptographic Services Facility (ICSF) for hardware encryption
  - Preparation not included with Configuration Assistant

#### ■ IP security policy definition

- ► For each TCP/IP stack create a policy rule set
  - Policy is composed of conditions and actions

#### ■ SAF keyrings for x.509 certificates

Certificate Authority certificates and Host certificates

Prior to z/OS V1R11, the Configuration Assistant helps configure the policy definitions

Starting in z/OS V1R11, the Configurations Assistant can help with the z/OS System **Preparation Tasks!** 




## Configuration Assistant for z/OS Communications Server



#### **Configuration Assistant**

for z/OS Communications Server

Version 1, Release 13



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All Rights Reserved. U.S Government Users Restricted Rights - Use, duplication or disclosure restricted by GSA ADP Schedule Contract with IBM Corp.. IBM is a registered trademark of IBM Corp. in the U.S. and/or other countries. Java and all Java-based trademarks are trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States, other countries, or both.




- GUI-based approach to configuring multiple policy disciplines:
  - **►IDS**
  - ► AT-TLS
  - ► IPSec and IP filtering
  - ► QoS
  - ► Policy-based Routing (PBR)
- Separate perspectives but consistent model for each discipline
- Focus on high level concepts vs. low level file syntax
- z/OSMF-based web interface (strategic) and standalone Windows application
- Builds and maintains
  - ► Policy files
  - ► Related configuration files
  - ► JCL procedures and RACF directives
- Supports import of existing policy files

Download the Windows-based Configuration Assistant at: http://tinyurl.com/cgoqsa




## Application setup task checklist

Assistance with the z/OS System Preparation Tasks - Use the Application Setup Task Checklist





## Configuration Assistant Policy Definition Model and Steps




- 1. Create system image and TCP/IP stack image
- 2. Create one or more Requirement Maps to define desired security for common scenarios (e.g. intranet, branch office, business partner)
  - ► Create or reuse Security Levels to define security actions
  - ► Create or reuse Traffic descriptors to define application ports to secure
- 3. Create one or more Connectivity Rules between Data Endpoints (IP addresses) and associate with a configured Requrement Map
- 4. If using IPSec, configure Security Endpoints (IKE peers)
- 5. Optionally, set additional options (e.g. logging, SA activation methods, effective time for Connectivity Rules)



## SAF Certificates and Keyrings - peer-to-peer certificate relationships

Each host needs only its own end-entity certificate and the certificate of the trusted Certificate
 Authority that signed the peer's end-entity certificate





## Certificate Creation and Installation Example Using RACF

```
//CERTADD JOB 1, ALFRED, CLASS=A, MSGCLASS=X, NOTIFY=USER1
//*
//IEFPROC EXEC PGM=IKJEFT01, REGION=4M, DYNAMNBR=10
                                                                          Create our selfsigned CA
//SYSTSPRT DD SYSOUT=*
                                        BATCH TSO SESSION LOG
                                                                          certificate by which all our other
//SYSTSIN DD *
                                                                          certificates will be signed.
RACDCERT CERTAUTH GENCERT
         SUBJECTSDN (CN ('ABC CA')
         OU('CS Z/OS CA')
                                                                          Create our IKE daemon
         O('IBM') C('US'))
                                                                          certificate and sign it
         NOTBEFORE (DATE (2007-01-01)) -
                                                                          with our CA certificate.
         NOTAFTER (DATE (2010-12-31)) -
         WITHLABEL ('ABC CA')
                                                                          Export our CA certificate so that
RACDCERT ID (IKED) GENCERT
                                                                          the remote IKE peer can download
         SUBJECTSDN (CN ('ABC IKE Daemon') -
         OU('CS Z/OS Server')
                                                                          and install as trusted root in
                                                                          remote key database
         O('IBM') C('US'))
         NOTBEFORE (DATE (2007-01-01))
         NOTAFTER (DATE (2010-12-31))
         WITHLABEL('IKE Daemon')
         SIGNWITH (CERTAUTH LABEL ('ABC CA'))
RACDCERT CERTAUTH EXPORT (LABEL ('ABC CA')) DSN ('USER1.ABCCA.B64')
                                                                           Create our IKED keyring
RACDCERT ID (IKED) ADDRING (IKEDKEYRING)
RING(IKEDKEYRING) USAGE(PERSONAL) )
RACDCERT ID (IKED) CONNECT (CERTAUTH LABEL ('REMOTE IKE CA')
                                                                           Connect both our IKE daemon
         RING (IKEDKEYRING) USAGE (CERTAUTH) )
                                                                           certificate and our peer's CA
RACDCERT ID (IKED) LISTRING (IKEDKEYRING)
                                                                           certificate to that keyring (presumes
                                                                           that remote peer's CA certificate has
                                                                           been added to the certificate
                                                                           database).
```



## z/OS Communications Server IP security features

#### Supports many configurations

- ► Optimized for role as endpoint (host), but also support routed traffic (gateway)
- ► IPSec NAT Traversal support (address translation and port translation)
- ► IPv4 and IPv6 support

#### Policy-based

- ► Configuration Assistant GUI for both new and expert users
- ► Direct file edit into local configuration file

#### Default filters in TCP profile provide basic protection before policy is loaded

#### Cryptographic algorithms

- ► RSA signature-based authentication
- ► ECDSA signature-based authentication
- ► HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-MD5 authentication
- ► HMAC-SHA-2, AES-XCBC, AES-GMAC authentication
- ➤ AES-CBC, 3DES and DES encryption
- ► AES-GCM (128- and 256-bit) encryption
- ► Uses cryptographic hardware if available for most algorithms
- ► FIPS 140 mode

#### zIIP Assisted IPSec

Moves most IPSec processing from general purpose processors to zIIPs

#### ■ IP Security Monitoring Interface

► IBM Tivoli OMEGAMON XE for Mainframe Networks uses the CommServer NMI interfaces for IP Security

#### Support for latest IPSec RFCs

- ► RFCs 4301-4305, 4307-4308
- ➤ RFCs 4306, 5996 (IKEv2)

## ■ z/OS CommServer V1R12 successfully completed USGv6 interoperability testing including the IPSec, IKE, and ESP test suites

http://www.iol.unh.edu/services/testing/ipv6/usgv6tested.php



## For more information ...

URL	Content
http://www.twitter.com/IBM_Commserver	IBM Communications Server Twitter Feed
http://www.facebook.com/IBMCommserver facebook	IBM Communications Server Facebook Fan Page
http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/	IBM System z in general
http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/hardware/networking/	IBM Mainframe System z networking
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http://www.ibm.com/software/network/commserver/zos/support/	IBM z/OS Communications Server technical Support – including TechNotes from service
http://www.ibm.com/support/techdocs/atsmastr.nsf/Web/TechDocs	Technical support documentation from Washington Systems Center (techdocs, flashes, presentations, white papers, etc.)
http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfcsearch.html	Request For Comments (RFC)
http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/os/zos/bkserv/	IBM z/OS Internet library – PDF files of all z/OS manuals including Communications Server