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Predictive Failure Analysis – Customer Experience


Sam Knutson, GEICO

Detecting and Diagnosing Problems when z/OS “Thinks” it is Running Okay

Bob Abrams, IBM

Thursday, March 15, 2012

Session Number: 10603



z/OS Predictive Failure Analysis (PFA)

- **Health Checker runs checks supplied by IBM, vendors or written by you to detect existing or potential problems primarily with variation from understand successful practices**
- **GEICO has been running Health Checker for z/OS since the prototype and the first implementation in z/OS in 2005 in z/OS 1.7 base was optional download for z/OS 1.4 to 1.6**
- ***We run Health Checker all the time from IPL. You should too!***
- **PFA will attempt to detect problems which require analysis of history and current trends to detect. PFA can help you avoid soft failures.**
- **PFA was introduced with z/OS 1.10**
- **We run PFA all the time from IPL**

z/OS Predictive Failure Analysis (PFA)

- **PFA checks have been delivered in each z/OS release starting with 1.10 currently for me on 1.12 I run these**
 - **PFA_COMMON_STORAGE_USAGE**
 - **PFA_FRAMES_AND_SLOTS_USAGE**
 - **PFA_LOGREC_ARRIVAL_RATE**
 - **PFA_MESSAGE_ARRIVAL_RATE**
 - **PFA_SMF_ARRIVAL_RATE**
- **IBM plans to extend PFA over time PFA so PFA will be useful today but like Health Checker your investment will be returned with interest in the future**
- **PFA uses the Health Checker for z/OS infrastructure but PFA checks are different and need to be treated differently**
- ***“Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future” Niels Bohr***

z/OS Predictive Failure Analysis (PFA)

- PFA is constructed largely in Java and the majority of the CPU used by PFA is eligible to run on zAAP speciality engines
- APAR OA27495 NEW FUNCTION - ZAAP ON ZIIP ENHANCEMENT
 - ZZ=YES in IEASYSxx
 - zAAP on zIIP does not change in any way what is eligible for specialty processing just allows you to consolidate to have only one pool of specialty engines. If you have z/OS 1.11 or the PTF for APAR OA27495 applied to 1.10 or 1.9 AND you have only zIIP engines but NO zAAP engines AND you set a new operating system parameter ZZ=YES then zAAP eligible workloads will run on the zIIP alongside zIIP eligible workloads.
- *Using zAAP on zIIP is like buying colorsafe Cheer for your washing machine and being able to mix the lights and the darks☺*

Dealing with Health Checker Exceptions

- Resolution of a Health Checker exception frequently requires other subject matter experts cooperation
- Understanding of PFA exceptions and tuning has required recurring assistance from IBM Level-2 to adjust the proper “knob” correctly
- Don’t break existing system. Health Checker is reporting a potential problem don’t make an immediate visible one trying to hurry in a change.
- Avoid persistent outstanding exceptions it will lead to 'cry wolf syndrome' and Health Checks being disregarded.
- Running Health Checker and PFA and not looking at the output does not help you☹

Identifying Exceptions

- Automate notifications from Health Checker!
- We trap **HZS*** WTO using CA-OPSMVS
 - MLWTO avoid processing same event more than once
 - Consider “normal” error HZS0011E READING THE HZSPDATA DATA SET may want to just process HZS0001I, HZS0002E, HZS0003E, HZS0004I
 - EVENTUAL exceptions are emailed
 - CRITICAL exceptions are sent by email and pager
- Most well known SPOOL browsers and MVS monitors including IOF, SDSF, SYSVIEW, TMON, provide on-line interfaces to view and manage exceptions

Sending PFA documentation to IBM

- IBM Level-2 will typically need to see the data that is causing PFA to raise an exception
- Package the directory for the exception using the PAX command in batch
- PFA component ID is 5752SCPFA useful to know when opening a PMR

```
//UNPAX EXEC PGM=IKJEFT01
//SYSTSPRT DD SYSOUT=*
//SYSEXEC DD DSN=SYS1.SBPXEXEC,DISP=SHR
//SYSTSIN DD *
  oshell cd /u/pfauser/PFA_SMF_ARRIVAL_RATE ; +
  pax -wvzf /tmp/PMR93649.499.000.BTST.AUG11.PFASAR.pax .
/*
```

Sending PFA documentation to IBM

- **FTP documentation to IBM this is an example using batch directly from z/OS but you may have different procedures**

```
//FTP EXEC PGM=FTP,PARM='(EXIT'  
//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=*  
//SYSIN DD *  
testcase.software.ibm.com (timeout 720 exit=12  
anonymous  
you@yoursite.com  
cd /toibm/mvs  
lcd /tmp  
SENDSITE  
binary  
put PMR93649.499.000.BTST.AUG11.PFASAR.pax  
quit  
/*
```


PFA : Installation

- **RACF userid with OMVS segment we made it unique as doc specified and it's home directory is where PFA will store historical information**
- **Initially just added /pfauser to our primary USER file system. Most groups are segregated but odd users like ekmserv and others we have just created in /u. Once PFA had been running for a while saw zFS filling up and needing to be grown i.e. IOEZ00078E zFS aggregate OMVS.BTST.U.ZFS exceeds 95% full (2140/2250)**
- **Historical collection creates LOTS of small files which add up over time so a separate USS filesystem is a good idea.**

PFA : Installation

- z/OS 1.12 added the automatic retention of past exception data. Up to 30 snapshots of data related to past exceptions saved each in a unique directory. This can be useful historical data for support.
- It can also contribute to the space use of the USS file system filling it up. This is another good reason to segregate PFA into its own file system.
- **IOEZ00551I Aggregate OMVS.ASYS.PFA.ZFS ran out of space.**
- **IOEZ00445E Error extending OMVS.ASYS.PFA.ZFS.**
- You may want to setup a CRON job or manually purge EXC_* directories (example EXC_20111106182) from the exception directories. Requirement to improve the purge and control retention has been voiced to IBM.
- **APAR OA38786** (open with a ++APAR available) corrects a problem where file descriptors are left open is the root cause of space problem

PFA : Installation

- On each system BEFORE starting PFA you need to copy the PROC from SYS1.SAMPLIB(AIRPROC) to your execution PROC. I used SYS1.PROCLIB(PFA)
- On each system BEFORE starting PFA you need to use the supplied script to create a directory structure

```
$ cd /u/pfauser
```

```
$ su
```

```
# pwd
```

```
/u/pfauser
```

```
# sh /usr/lpp/bcp/AIRSHREP.sh
```

All existing data files and directories removed.

Successfully created the Common Storage Usage Check Directory Structure.

Successfully created the Logrec Arrival Rate Check Directory Structure.

Successfully created and populated ini file for the Common Storage Usage Check.

Successfully created and populated ini file for the Logrec Arrival Rate Check.

PFA : Installation zFS

- Allocated zFS and mounted for PFA. Must have RACF access to PFSCCTL or UID 0 to format ZFS
 - zSeries File System (zFS) PARMLIB(IOEPRM00) has aggrfull(90,5) and aggrgrow=on
 - IDCAMS
 - DEFINE CLUSTER (NAME(OMVS.ASYS.PFA.ZFS) -
LINEAR CYL(500,500) SHAREOPTIONS(3))
 - IOEAGFMT
 - PARM=('-aggregate OMVS.ASYS.PFA.ZFS -compat')
 - MOUNT FILESYSTEM('OMVS.ASYS.PFA.ZFS')
MOUNTPOINT('/u/pfauser') TYPE(ZFS) MODE(RDWR)
 - Don't forget to update SYS1.PARMLIB(BPXPRMxx)
- ```

MOUNT FILESYSTEM('OMVS.&SYSNAME..PFA.ZFS')
MOUNTPOINT('/u/pfauser') /* ZFS for /u/pfauser */
TYPE(ZFS) /* Filesystem type ZFS */
MODE(RDWR) /* Mounted or read/write */

```

## z/OS Predictive Failure Analysis (PFA)

- PFA checks have had to be customized via HZSPRMxx updates to avoid spurious notifications in many cases relief later provided by APARs

**/\* Predictive Failure Analysis Checks \*/**

**ADDREPLACE POLICY STMT(PFA2) UPDATE**  
**CHECK(IBMPFA,PFA\_MESSAGE\_ARRIVAL\_RATE)**  
**PARM='DEBUG(0) STDDEV(16) COLLECTINT(15) MODELINT(360)**  
**COLLECTINACTIVE(1) TRACKEDMIN(0) EXCEPTIONMIN(5)'**  
**REASON('less sensitive to avoid spurious trips')**  
**DATE(20110221)**

**ADDREPLACE POLICY STMT(PFA4) UPDATE**  
**CHECK(IBMPFA,PFA\_MESSAGE\_ARRIVAL\_RATE)**  
**PARM='DEBUG(0) STDDEV(3) COLLECTINT(15) MODELINT(720)**  
**COLLECTINACTIVE(1) TRACKEDMIN(0) EXCEPTIONMIN(10)'**  
**REASON('less sensitive to avoid spurious trips')**  
**DATE(20110728)**

## PFA APARs of interest

- **OA31644 LOGREC ARRIVAL RATE SPURIOUS AIRH110E MESSAGE**
- **OA34655 PFA FRAMES AND SLOTS USAGE SPURIOUS. PREDICTIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS**
- **OA34586 HIGH CPU IN PFA AFTER PTF UA50081 FOR APAR OA29963 APPLIED**
- **OA35820 PREDICTIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS. Abend0C4 RC4 AIRHMEMA.x'FF' DECIMAL 255 PERSISTENT JOBS CAUSES A LOOP IN PFA THAT OVERLAYS STORAGE**
- **OA36462 ABEND0C4 IN AIRHMEXC**
- **OA36837 PREDICTIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS (PFA) TREATS TSO USERID AS PERSISTENT JOBS IN PFA\_FRAMES\_AND\_SLOTS\_USAGE CHECK**

## PFA APARs of interest

- **OA38175 PREDICTIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS ENHANCEMENT TO DETECTING EXCEPTIONS** - An enhancement to the logic in detecting exceptions in z/OS 1.13 is being rolled back. This can help with some false positive exceptions. **PTF UA63721 for 1.12**
- **OA38416 PREDICTIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS FALSE EXCEPTION JES\_SPOOL\_USAGE (JSU). (1.13 > only)**
- **OA38279 PREDICTIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS PFA\_COMMON\_STORAGE\_USAGE CHECK FALSE EXCEPTION ESQA - PFA\_COMMON\_STORAGE\_USAGE check can issue false exceptions for ESQA if there is no conversion of ECSA to ESQA storage and PFA detects that ESQA may exceed 100% This will trigger an exception to be issued. This is not valid because ECSA can still be used and the system is not in danger of being exhausted of storage.**
- **OA37801 PFA\_SMF\_ARRIVAL\_RATE DEFAULT SETTINGS MAY CAUSE FALSE EXCEPTIONS PREDICTIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS**

# AIRH109E A problem with common storage usage



## -----Original Message-----

**From:** Enterprise Event Management

**Sent:** Friday, July 24, 2009 3:51 PM

**To:** Knutson, Sam

**Subject:** z/OS Health Checker BTST 24 Jul 2009 HZS0004I

**CHECK|IBMPFA,PFA\_COMMON\_STO**

**z/OS Health Checker BTST 24 Jul 2009 HZS0004I**

**CHECK|IBMPFA,PFA\_COMMON\_STORAGE\_USAGE|: AIRH109E A problem with common storage usage |CSA and SQA| above the line was predicted to occur by 07/24/2009 21:51:17. The current usage is higher than expected based on an evaluation of the total capacity plus the threshold, the current usage, the current prediction, and the future prediction modeled at 07/24/2009 15:51:17.**

```

* EMAIL NOTIFICATION SENT FROM OPS/MVS *
*
* SYSTEM :BTST
* RULE :MSGACTN.HZSINFO
* GROUP :SKNUTSON
* DATE :24 Jul 2009 TIME: 15:51:17 *

```



# AIRH109E A problem with common storage usage



Session A - application LU SYSVIEWT Connected to ASYS

File Edit Font Transfer Macro Options Window Help

PA1

SYSVIEW VTAM BTST ----- VSMTRACK.SUMMARY, Common Storage Tracking  
Command =====>

Formats DEFAULT CSA ECSA ESQA ORPHAN SQA  
Status SRT NoLIM NoSEL NoDST NoPFX NoOWN NoUPD NoPRT NoCAP

Options SPN CALLER SUMMARY MEMSWT ADJCNVT NOTRACKSTAT UNACCT

Jobname SYSVUSER ASID 0092 Jobid STC62017

| Region | ASize | UnAlloc/Large | Alloc/Pct% | Used/Pct% | Free  | Cnvert | Sel/Pct%  |
|--------|-------|---------------|------------|-----------|-------|--------|-----------|
| E-CSA  | 250M  | 163M 147M     | 87.5M 35%  | 85.8M 34% | 1.72M | -0     | 85.8M 34% |
| E-SQA  | 68.3M | 0 0           | 68.3M 100% | 53.2M 78% | 15.1M | +0     | 53.2M 78% |
| SQA    | 780K  | 0 0           | 780K 100%  | 262K 34%  | 517K  | +0     | 262K 34%  |
| CSA    | 4M    | 2.98M 2.98M   | 1.02M 25%  | 935K 23%  | 104K  | -0     | 935K 23%  |

| Cmd  | Jobname  | Jobid    | ASID | EndDate | EndTime | CSA   | E-CSA | SQA   | E-SQA | Total | NCmp | Owner   | VAB     |
|------|----------|----------|------|---------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|---------|---------|
| ---- | *SYSTEM* |          |      |         |         | 104K  | 20.1M | 170K  | 30.6M | 51M   |      | SYSTEM  |         |
| ---- | CAMSM    | STC62349 | 00BE |         |         |       | 18.9M |       | 296   | 18.9M |      | ADDRSPC | 02E43B0 |
| ---- | NET      | STC61970 | 0064 |         |         | 36392 | 13.7M |       | 1376  | 13.7M |      | ADDRSPC | 02E4362 |
| ---- | *MASTER* |          | 0001 |         |         | 253K  | 5.59M | 40688 | 3.45M | 9.33M |      | ADDRSPC | 021FC7E |
| ---- | DB2SMSTR | STC62075 | 00B8 |         |         | 13848 | 3.37M | 64    | 8136  | 3.39M |      | ADDRSPC | 02E43BE |
| ---- | DB2SDIST | STC62078 | 00BB |         |         | 136   | 2.61M | 64    | 1552  | 2.61M |      | ADDRSPC | 02E43B9 |
| ---- | SMSVSAM  |          | 000A |         |         |       | 2.18M | 64    | 8704  | 2.19M |      | ADDRSPC | 02E4309 |

- Good exception system is still healthy only 34% used on ECSA but a task was out of profile. Testing on test Sysplex had found new bug.
- Recycle of started task temporarily resolved the problem and CA-CCI RO10195 and CA-DATACOM PTFs RO10065 were created

# PFA\_LOGREC\_ARRIVAL\_RATE



CHECK(IBMPFA,PFA\_LOGREC\_ARRIVAL\_RATE)  
START TIME: 08/18/2009 12:03:47.499169  
CHECK DATE: 20080330 CHECK SEVERITY: MEDIUM  
CHECK PARM: DEBUG(0) **STDDEV(2)** COLLECTINT(60) MODELINT(360)  
COLLECTINACTIVE(1)

**\* Medium Severity Exception \***

The LOGREC entry arrival rate is higher than expected and could cause a system problem by  
08/18/2009 17:49:35.

When the LOGREC entry rate is higher than expected, it can indicate recurring failures on the system which can eventually lead to system hang. The prediction used in the comparison was modeled at  
08/18/2009 11:49:35.

# PFA\_LOGREC\_ARRIVAL\_RATE



## LOGREC Arrival Rate Prediction Report

Last successful model time : 08/18/2009 11:49:35

Next model time : 08/18/2009 17:49:35

Model interval : 360

Last successful collection time: 08/18/2009 11:52:37

Next collection time : 08/18/2009 12:52:37

Collection interval : 60

| Key 0 | Key 1-7 | Key 8-15 |
|-------|---------|----------|
|-------|---------|----------|

Arrivals in last

|                      |    |     |   |
|----------------------|----|-----|---|
| collection interval: | 77 | 364 | 8 |
|----------------------|----|-----|---|

Predicted rates based on...

|                 |   |   |   |
|-----------------|---|---|---|
| 1 hour of data: | 9 | 0 | 5 |
|-----------------|---|---|---|

Jobs having LOGREC arrivals in last collection interval:

| Job Name      | ASID        | Arrivals   |
|---------------|-------------|------------|
| <b>DSMD0D</b> | <b>0205</b> | <b>438</b> |
| NONE-FRR      | 00D0        | 1          |
| U38T20        | 0344        | 1          |

# PFA\_LOGREC\_ARRIVAL\_RATE

- ABEND rate can vary widely and quickly
- Out of the box check tends to trip spuriously
- Remember this is saying “look at me” not I am broken
- Adjusted STDEV temporarily
- APAR OA31644 LOGREC ARRIVAL RATE SPURIOUS AIRH110E MESSAGE was the real resolution to spurious trips from this check and has been effective

## PFA Customer Experience Summary

- I run Health Checker and PFA and you should too
- There are many opportunities for new and improved PFA checks. I would like to see PFA doing global monitoring of private virtual storage use for persistent address spaces
- Please work with IBM to tune your checks to work accurately and improve PFA for everyone
- z/OS 1.12 contained some useful enhancements to PFA which will not be rolled back to previous releases
- The goal of automatically configured proactive detection failures or looming problems is laudable
- This is a hard problem and I am not sure when PFA exceptions will be sufficiently accurate to treat them as operational alerts
- *HAL: I've just picked up a fault in the AE35 unit. It's going to go 100% failure in 72 hours. 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968)*

## PFA : References

- Session 2866 IBM Experience Building Remote Checks for the IBM HEALTH CHECKER for z/OS presented at SHARE in Austin by James Caffrey
- Manual: [z/OS Problem Management](#) G325-2564-04 April 2009 not included in -02 on April 2009 z/OS V1R10 and Software Products DVD Collection need to obtain this from the web or a later DVD
- [WSC Flash WP101454](#) by Riaz Ahmad can be found on the web, [www.ibm.com/support/techdocs](http://www.ibm.com/support/techdocs) under the category of “White Papers.”
- Session 2858 Health Checker: User Experience Beyond Installation presented at SHARE in Tampa by Sam Knutson and Dave Danner
- Session 2208 Bit Bucket x'26' presented at SHARE in Denver



## Acknowledgements (Knowing or unKnowing)

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- **John Wallingford (GEICO)**
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- **Bob Rogers (IBM)**
- **Geoff Miller (IBM)**

## Bob's Agenda:

*Detecting and Diagnosing Problems when z/OS “Thinks” it is Running Okay*



## Soft Failures: Detection, Prevention, Diagnosis

- Soft Failure detection & avoidance
  - Provided at multiple levels of the stack
  - Types of problems handled by each type of soft failure detection
- Soft Failure Detect/Diagnose/Avoid Capabilities in z/OS
  - **Detection:** z/OS Components
  - **Avoidance:** Health Checks
  - **Detection & diagnosis:** PFA, Runtime Diagnostics
  - **Business Application view:** Systems Management products
- Lessons learned on reducing impact of soft failures

*All elements work together for an integrated IBM solution approach*



# What is a soft failure?

“Your systems don’t break. They just stop working and we don’t know why.”

*“Sick, but not dead” or Soft failures*


## Soft Failures

- Exhaustion of shared resources
- Recurring or recursive failures
- Serialization problems (deadlocks, priority inversions)
- Unexpected state transition

## Manifested as


- Stalled / hung processes
  - Single system, sysplex members
  - Sympathy Sickness
- Resource Contention
- Storage growth
- CF, CDS growth
- I/O issues (channel paths, response time)
- Repetitive errors
- Queue growth
- Configuration
  - SPOF, thresholds, cache structure size, not enabling new features

# Integrated z/OS Soft Failure Detection & Prevention




**Systems Management  
Products**

**Soft Failure Detection**  
- Performance  
- Events  
- Take corrective actions



**Operating System**



## Some general considerations ...

- The key to reducing the impact of soft failures is
  - Avoid them using z/OS Health Checker
  - Enable system checking where possible
  - Automate alerts
    - Display, take action
- z/OS can survive / recover from most soft failures
  - Take advantage of what the base operating system has to offer
    - Soft failure detection across many z/OS components
    - Start Health Checker, PFA, RTD (R13) at IPL (e.g., COMMNDxx)
  - Predictive trend analysis is not intended to find immediate problems that will bring down a system
    - PFA Sampling minimum is 1 minute ... 15 minutes for some checks

# Detection of Soft Failures by z/OS Components


- z/OS attempts to detect soft failures as close to the source as possible
  - Uses the least amount of resources
  - Requires the smallest amount of the stack to do detection
- Detection of a soft failure requires ability to identify when something is wrong
  - Thresholds set by the installation
- *Whenever possible, components try to avoid soft failures*
- Examples ...

## Component Examples: Detection, Identification of soft failures ... Single system




| Component            | Features                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| GRS                  | Enhanced contention analysis for ENQ, Latch<br>GRS Latch Identify string<br>WLM management of blocking units                                                                             |
| UNIX System Services | Latch identity exploitation<br>XCF communication improvements (R13)<br>System limits<br>D OMVS, WAITERS to diagnose file system latch contention                                         |
| JES2                 | JES2 Monitor                                                                                                                                                                             |
| IOS                  | Missing Interrupt Handler<br>Identify systems sharing a reserve<br>Captured UCB protection<br>I/O timing facility<br>Detect & remove “flapping links”<br>Dynamic Channel Path Management |
| DFSMS                | CAS contention detection<br>VSAM RLS index traps<br>Media Manager recovery from I/O errors                                                                                               |

## Component Examples: Detection of soft failures ... Sysplex




| Component | Features                                                                  | Functions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| XCF / XES | Stalled member support                                                    | Identify unresponsive system, restore to normal operation OR remove it to avoid sympathy sickness                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|           | Exploitation of BCPii to determine dead system more quickly               | Avoid waiting the Failure Detection Interval (FDI) if the system is truly dead ... detect & reset failed system, eliminate data corruption, avoid sympathy sickness.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|           | Sysplex Failure Management, scenarios<br><br><i>How long to allow ...</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Not updating status, Not sending signals</b> (ISOLATETIME(0): Fencing initiated n seconds after FDI exceeded)</li> <li>• <b>System updating status, not sending signals</b> (Loss of connectivity: CONNFAIL(YES): remove systems with low weights)</li> <li>• <b>System Not Updating Status, But IS Sending Signals</b> (SSUMLIMIT(900) ... length of time system can remain not updating heartbeat (semi-sick), but sending signals)</li> <li>• <b>Sysplex Member Stalled</b> (MEMSTALLTIME ... break out of of an XCF signaling jam by removing the largest build-up)</li> <li>• <b>Structure Hang conditions</b> ... Take action when connector does not respond, avoiding user hangs (CFSTRHANGTIME) (R12)</li> </ul> |
|           | Critical Member support;<br>GRS exploitation (R12)                        | If a critical member is "impaired" for long enough, XCF will eventually terminate the member; GRS: remove system                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |

# Integrated z/OS Soft Failure Detection & Prevention




**Systems Management  
Products**

**Soft Failure Detection**  
- Performance  
- Events  
- Take corrective actions



**Operating System**



**Soft Failure  
Avoidance**

**Soft Failure  
Problem  
Determination**

**Soft Failure  
Detection**

# IBM Health Checker for z/OS

## Soft Failure Avoidance



- Health checker's role is to keep subtle configuration errors from resulting in Soft Failures
  - Performance
  - System effects
  - Check configuration for best practices
  - Single points of failure for log structures, data sets, CDS
  - Storage utilization, running out of resources
  - How many ASIDs do I have left? LXs? When will I run out?
  - Whether DAE is inactive
  - VSAM RLS latch contention, CF Cache size, CDS SPOF, etc.
  - System Logger structure usage
  - I/O timing, protection
  - ...
- Also used to emit PFA alerts
  - Warnings of detected soft failures
- 187 z/OS Health Checks in z/OS R13 (plus ISVs)



# Health Checker: Soft Failure avoidance

## Important examples



| Component | Health Check           | Functions                                                                                                                                                  |
|-----------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| XCF       | XCF_CDS_SPOF           | Evaluate primary & secondary CDS configuration to determine if Sysprog inadvertently created a <b>single point of failure</b>                              |
|           | XCF_SFM_SUM_ACTION     | Check ISOLATETIME value, to allow SFM to fence and partition a system without operator intervention and without undue delay.                               |
|           | XCF_SFM_SUMLIMIT       | Checks status update missing (SUMLIMIT) value                                                                                                              |
|           | XCF_SFM_ACTIVE         | Verifies SFM active, policy values                                                                                                                         |
|           | XCF_SFM_CFSTRHANG TIME | Verifies CFSTRUCTURE hang time                                                                                                                             |
|           | XCF_SFM_CONNFAIL       | Threshold for loss of connectivity                                                                                                                         |
| RACF      | RACF_GRS_RNL           | Evaluates whether the RACF ENQ names are in a GR SRNL list: system exclusion resource name list (SERNL) or the system inclusion resource name list (SIRNL) |

## Health Checker: Soft Failure avoidance examples




| Component            | Health Check               | Functions                                                                                                                                                                  |
|----------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Serviceability       | DAE_SUPPRESSING            | DAE suppressing duplicate SVC dumps, saving system resources for unnecessary dumps                                                                                         |
|                      | SVA_AUTOIPL_DEFINED        | Check whether Program-Directed IPL and not GDPS, and whether AUTOIPL policy is active                                                                                      |
|                      | SVA_AUTOIPL_DEV_VALIDATION | Validates SADMP, MVS IPL devices                                                                                                                                           |
| UNIX System Services | USS_PARMLIB                | Validate current system against parmlib IPL'd with<br>Remind you to update parmlib (due to dynamic changes)                                                                |
|                      | USS_CLIENT_MOUNTS          | With Sysplex, some file systems accessed locally, some of function shipped to the File system owner. <i>Some are accessed locally, but are configured to function ship</i> |
|                      | USS_FILESYS_CONFIG         | Checks if mount attribute access is read only; whether HFS's in Sysplex root                                                                                               |

## Important considerations when enabling z/OS Health Checks


1. Don't just change the configuration ... investigate the exception and then take appropriate action
2. There are 187 Health Checks in z/OS R13
  - a. Start Health Checker, activating all checks and try to resolve exceptions
  - b. *Don't* think that you must activate all health checks **at once** to get benefit
  - c. Goal should be to remove all exceptions
    - by fixing the condition
    - by tuning the check so that it looks for what you need it to look for
    - *(as a last resort)* by deactivating the check
  - d. Consider categorizing health checks by
    - 1) Checks I expect no exceptions from
    - 2) Checks not turned on because exceptions not cleaned up yet
    - 3) Plan to move checks to group 1 as you clean up exceptions
  - e. Once you can run cleanly, you will be in the ideal position to know that an exception indicates something has changed
3. GDPS recommendations for changing z/OS checks trump z/OS in a GDPS environment

# Integrated z/OS Soft Failure Detection & Prevention




**Systems Management  
Products**

**Soft Failure Detection**  
- Performance  
- Events  
- Take corrective actions



**Operating System**



# Problem Determination in a complex environment



## Installation Pain Points

Risk to the business

- The impact of the symptoms
- Risk of recurrence
- Impact in getting system stabilized
- Mean time to recovery too long

Complexity of performing the task

Troubleshooting a live system and recovering from an apparent failure

Data collection very time-consuming

Significant skill level needed to analyze problems, interact with IBM and ISVs to obtain additional diagnostic info



## Requirement Areas

**Requirement:** Detect “sick, but not dead” event **BEFORE** it causes problems; turn it into a correctable incident

**Solution:** Predictive Failure Analysis

**Requirement:** Diagnose the cause in **real time** to allow operations to mitigate event inquiries

**Solution:** Runtime Diagnostics


**Requirement:** Manage / capture data to determine cause of problem

**Solution:** z/OSMF Incident Log

# Soft Failures: Hypothetical IT Example



1. A transaction --
  - ▶ that has worked for a long time starts to fail, or
  - ▶ occasionally (yet, rarely) fails
  - ▶ Example – “Reset Password and send link to registered email account”
2. The transaction starts failing more regularly
3. Recovery is successful –
  - ▶ Such that the overall, applications continue to work
  - ▶ Generates burst of WTO's, SMF records and LOGREC entries
4. BUT, THEN! Multiple, failing transactions occur together on a heavily loaded system
  - ▶ Recovery occurs
  - ▶ Slows down transaction processor
  - ▶ Random timeouts of other transactions occur
  - ▶ System becomes “sick, but not dead”



This is a hypothetical problem which is a combination of multiple actual problems

## Soft Failure Detection: Predictive Failure Analysis



- Models trends in certain z/OS system resources & metrics
- Predicts expected, normal behavior as well as future behavior; identifies exceptions as Soft Failures
  - ... when the resources will run out, or when metrics become abnormal when compared to expected prediction
  - Machine-learning technology used to determine what's normal
  - Statistical analysis used to identify exceptions ... focusing on metrics affecting different layers of the software stack
    - Exceptions alerted and reports written using Health Checker for z/OS
    - Tune comparison algorithms using configurable parameters such as STDDEV; defaults selected based on IBM test systems and customer data
    - Tunable sensitivity and configuration parameters per check
- Identifies areas related to
  - resource exhaustion
  - damaged address spaces and damaged systems
- Invokes Runtime Diagnostics to check for hung address spaces (R13); RTD validates and suggests next steps



# How PFA Chooses Address Spaces to Track



- **Some metrics require data for the entire system to be tracked**
  - ▶ Exhaustion of common storage for entire system
  - ▶ LOGREC arrivals for entire system grouped by key
- **Some metrics call for tracking only persistent address spaces**
  - ▶ Those that start within the first hour after IPL.
  - ▶ For example, tracks frames and slots usage to detect potential virtual storage leaks in persistent address spaces.
- **Some metrics are most accurate when using several categories**
  - ▶ *“Chatty” persistent* address spaces tracked individually
    - Start within the first hour after IPL and have the highest rates after a warm-up period
    - Data from first hour after IPL is ignored.
    - After an IPL or PFA restart, if all are running, same address spaces are tracked.
    - Duplicates with the same name are not tracked
    - Restarted address spaces that are tracked are still tracked after restart.
  - ▶ *Other persistent* address spaces as a group
  - ▶ *Non-persistent* address spaces as a group
  - ▶ *Total system rate* (“chatty” + other persistent + non-persistent)



# PFA Functions

- **PFA address space ...**
  - *Collects data* from the system
  - *Models the data* from the system to create predictions (complex algorithms)
  - *Performs comparisons* on current vs. predictions
  - *Issues exceptions or “OK” messages and reports* via IBM Health Checker for z/OS
- **When PFA detects a problem ...**
  - *Health check exception* written to console
    - New exceptions suppressed until new model is available
  - *Prediction report* available in SDSF (s.ck)
    - *“Top address spaces”* = potential villains
    - *Address spaces causing exception*
    - *Current and predicted values* provided
    - Reports also available when no problem occurs
  - *Modeling automatically runs* more frequently

# Example Report: Logrec Arrival Rate Prediction Report



- Available in SDSF (s.ck)
- Heading information
  - Configuration and status
  - Current and predicted information for metric
- Top predicted users
  - Tries to pinpoint potential villains
- IBM Health Checker for z/OS message in its entirety

```
LOGREC Arrival Rate Prediction Report
(heading information intentionally omitted)

 Key 0 Key 1-7 Key 8-15
 _____ _____ _____
Arrivals in last
 collection interval: 1 0 2
Predicted rates based on...
 1 hour of data: 1 0 1
 24 hours of data: 0 0 1
 7 days of data: 0 0 1
 30 days of data: 0 0 1
Jobs having LOGREC arrivals in last collection interval:
Job Name ASID Arrivals
_____ _____ _____
LOGREC08 0029 2
LOGREC00 0027 1
```

# The PFA Health Checks

- z/OS 1.10 SPE
  - Common storage exhaustion check
    - CSA + SQA below the line
    - ECSA + ESQA above the line
  - LOGREC arrival rate check
    - Groups arrivals by key
    - Four time ranges
- z/OS 1.11
  - Frames and slots usage check
    - Tracks all address spaces that start within an hour after IPL (persistent)
  - Message arrival rate (WTO/WTOR) check
    - Chatty, persistent address spaces
    - Non-chatty, persistent address spaces
    - Non-persistent address spaces
    - Total system
- z/OS 1.12
  - SMF arrival rate check
    - Same categories as message arrival rate check
  - Modeling improvements
    - More granular common storage check
    - Supervised learning (exclude jobs)
    - Dynamic modeling
  - Performance and serviceability
- z/OS 1.13
  - JES spool usage check
    - Tracks all persistent address spaces
    - JES2 only
  - Enqueue request rate check
    - Chatty, persistent address spaces
    - Total system
  - Integration with Runtime Diagnostics to detect rates that are “too low”


# PFA updates

- **Eliminate setup issues**
  - Use zFS size recommendations in Doc APAR (OA33776)
    - Problem where PFA not closing files ([++OA38786 – HIPER](#))
    - Use supported Java version and configure location
    - Java 5.0 and up (31-bit only)
    - Use one PFA ini file (/etc/PFA/ini) (R12)
  - Follow instructions in *z/OS Problem Management*
- **Tune comparison algorithms**
  - Adjust sensitivity -- STDDEV, EXCEPTIONMIN, etc.
  - EXCLUDED\_JOBS (exclude jobs with erratic behavior)
- **Use a zAAP and start PFA at IPL**
- ***Get the latest PTFs!!***
  - Some algorithms tuned -- FSU, MAR, CSA, JSU checks
  - Changed EXCEPTIONMIN & STDDEV defaults
  - Design changes
    - Exclude interactive users from being persistent jobs
    - Skip comparisons for ESQA

*Details in backup*

## Runtime Diagnostics

- Analyzes a “sick, but not dead” system in a timely manner
- Performs analysis similar to a very experienced system programmer
  - But faster – goal of 60 seconds or less
  - More comprehensive
  - Looks for specific evidence of “soft failures”
  - Provides suggested next steps
- Runtime Diagnostics
  - Is not automation or a monitor
  - Takes no corrective action, but recommends next steps
  - Has no background processing and minimal dependencies on system services



# Runtime Diagnostics Invocation and Output



- z/OS 1.12 → Started task -- “Run” the analysis via a START command
  - **START HZR,SUB=MSTR**
- z/OS 1.13 → Address space – Start with command above and Run with modify command
  - **f hzr,analyze**

```
f hzr,analyze
HZR0200I RUNTIME DIAGNOSTICS RESULT 581
SUMMARY: SUCCESS
 REQ: 004 TARGET SYSTEM: SY1 HOME: SY1 2010/12/21
- 13:51:32
INTERVAL: 60 MINUTES
EVENTS:
 FOUND: 04 - PRIORITIES: HIGH:04 MED:00 LOW:00
 TYPES: HIGHCPU:01
 TYPES: LOOP:01 ENQ:01 LOCK:01

EVENT 02: HIGH - HIGHCPU - SYSTEM: SY1 2010/12/21
- 13:51:33
ASID CPU RATE:99% ASID:002E JOBNAME:IBMUSERX
STEPNAME:STEP1 PROCSTEP: JOBID:JOB00045
USERID:IBMUSER
JOBSTART:2010/12/21 - 11:22:51
 ERROR: ADDRESS SPACE USING EXCESSIVE CPU TIME. IT MIGHT BE LOOPING.
 ACTION: USE YOUR SOFTWARE MONITORS TO INVESTIGATE THE ASID.

EVENT 03: HIGH - LOOP - SYSTEM: SY1 2010/12/21
- 13:51:14
ASID:002E JOBNAME:IBMUSERX TCB:004FF1C0
STEPNAME:STEP1 PROCSTEP: JOBID:JOB00045
USERID:IBMUSER
JOBSTART:2010/12/21 - 11:22:51
 ERROR: ADDRESS SPACE MIGHT BE IN A LOOP.
 ACTION: USE YOUR SOFTWARE MONITORS TO INVESTIGATE THE ASID.
```

## Example output

- Left → HIGHCPU and LOOP
- Below → GRS Latch Contention

```
x F HZR,ANALYZE
HZR0200I RUNTIME DIAGNOSTICS RESULT 692
SUMMARY: SUCCESS
 REQ: 002 TARGET SYSTEM: SY1 HOME: SY1 2010/12/21 14:32:01
INTERVAL: 60 MINUTES
EVENTS:
 FOUND: 02 - PRIORITIES: HIGH:02 MED:00 LOW:00
 TYPES: LATCH:02

EVENT 01: HIGH - LATCH - SYSTEM: SY1 2010/12/21 14:32:01
LATCH SET NAME: SYSTEST.LATCH_TESTSET
LATCH NUMBER:3 CASID:0039 CJOBNAME:TSTLATCH
TOP WAITER - ASID:0039 - JOBNAME:TSTLATCH- TCB/WEB:004E2A70
TOP BLOCKER ASID:0039 - JOBNAME:TSTLATCH- TCB/WEB:004FF028
 ERROR: ADDRESS SPACES MIGHT BE IN LATCH CONTENTION.
 ACTION: D GRS,AN,LATCH,DEP,CASID=0039,LAT=(SYSTEST.L*,3),DET
 ACTION: TO ANALYZE THE LATCH DEPENDENCIES. USE YOUR SOFTWARE
 ACTION: MONITORS TO INVESTIGATE BLOCKING JOBS AND ASIDS.
```

# Runtime Diagnostics Symptoms Detected

- **z/OS 1.12**
  - **Component-specific, critical messages in OPERLOG**
    - Looks one hour back, if available
    - Additional analysis for some msgs
    - Message summary found in output
    - Can analyze messages in other system in sysplex
  - **Enqueue Contention Checking**
    - Looks for system address space waiting > 5 seconds
    - Lists both waiter and blocker
    - Can detect contention in other system in sysplex
  - **Local Lock Suspension**
    - Any address space whose local lock suspension time is > 50%
- **z/OS 1.12 (continued)**
  - **CPU Analysis**
    - Takes 2 samples over 1 sec. interval
    - Any task using > 95% is considered a potential problem
  - **Loop Detection**
    - Investigates all tasks in all address spaces looking for TCP loops
- **z/OS 1.13**
  - **z/OS UNIX Latch Contention**
    - Looks for z/OS UNIX latch contention or waiting threads that exit for > 5 minutes.
  - **GRS Latch Contention**
    - Obtains latch contention info from GRS
    - Omits z/OS UNIX file system latch contention
    - Returns longest waiter for each latch set



# z/OS 1.13 PFA Integration with Runtime Diagnostics



- **Detects damaged or hung system or address space based on rates being “too low”**
  - When PFA detects too low, Runtime Diagnostics is executed
- **Output**
  - **“Too low” exception** message sent as WTO by default
  - **Runtime Diagnostics output** included in PFA report
  - Prediction report and result message **available in SDSF** (sdsf.ck)
  - **PFA current rates and predictions** relevant to category causing exception
- **Supported for** Message Arrival Rate, SMF Arrival Rate, Enqueue Request Rate

```
Message Arrival Rate Prediction Report
(Heading information intentionally omitted.)

Persistent address spaces with low rates:

Job Name ASID Message Arrival Rate 1 Hour 24 Hour 7 Day

JOBS4 001F 1.17 23.88 22.82 15.82
JOBS5 002D 2.01 8.34 11.11 12.11

Runtime Diagnostics Output:

Runtime Diagnostics detected a problem in job: JOBS4
EVENT 06: HIGH - HIGHCPU - SYSTEM: SY1 2009/06/12 - 13:28:46
ASID CPU RATE: 96% ASID: 001F JOBNAME: JOBS4
STEPNAME: PFATEST PROCSTEP: PFATEST JOBID: STC00042 USERID:
+++++++
JOBSTART: 2009/06/12 - 13:28:35
Error:
ADDRESS SPACE USING EXCESSIVE CPU TIME. IT MAY BE LOOPING.
Action:
USE YOUR SOFTWARE MONITORS TO INVESTIGATE THE ASID.


EVENT 07: HIGH - LOOP - SYSTEM: SY1 2009/06/12 - 13:28:46
ASID: 001F JOBNAME: JOBS4 TCB: 004E6850
STEPNAME: PFATEST PROCSTEP: PFATEST JOBID: STC00042 USERID:
+++++++
JOBSTART: 2009/06/12 - 13:28:35
Error:
ADDRESS SPACE APPEARS TO BE IN A LOOP.
Action:
USE YOUR SOFTWARE MONITORS TO INVESTIGATE THE ASID.

(Additional output intentionally omitted.)
```

## Extending to Systems Management Products

- Many (ISV) Systems Management products support
  - Actions based on WTO message events
  - Automation of Health Check events
    - PFA Health Check events = soft failures
  - Performance analysis
  - Policy to control corrective actions
  - Integration of Alert displays, performance exceptions, event based actions

# Integrated z/OS Soft Failure Detection & Prevention




**Multi-domain consolidation**  
**Networks**  
**Business applications**  
**Security**

**Performance analysis**  
**Resource management**



**Automation**

**Systems Management  
Products**


**Soft Failure Detection**  
- Performance  
- Events  
- Take corrective actions



# Integrated z/OS Soft Failure Detection & Prevention



# zMC Health Check display







Host: wlaa.tivlab.raleigh.ibm.cor

Port: 23

LU Name:

Disconnect

02/16/2012 13:22:40

Command ==>  
KMSHCSTSAuto Update : Off  
Plex ID : LPAR400J  
SMF ID : SYS

## Health Checker

## Health Check Status

|                           |         |                             |         |
|---------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|---------|
| Proc Name.....            | HZSPROC | Task Identifier.....        | HZSPROC |
| Status.....               | Active  | Exceptions SevMed.....      | 18      |
| Checks Deleted.....       | 0       | Exceptions SevLow.....      | 21      |
| Checks Eligible.....      | 140     | Exceptions SevHigh.....     | 3       |
| Checks NotDeleted.....    | 171     | Exceptions SevNone.....     | 0       |
| Checks Ineligible.....    | 31      | Exceptions Outstanding..... | 42      |
| Checks DeletePending..... | 0       |                             |         |

Columns 1 to 2 of 2

Rows 1 to 1 of 1

| Version Identifier | Parmlib Members |
|--------------------|-----------------|
| z/OS 01.13.00      | 00              |

## Health Checks

Columns 1 to 5 of 26

Rows 1 to 30 of 171

| ΔCheck<br>Name                    | ΔCheck<br>Owner | ΔCheck<br>Status | ΔResult | +Reason                                                              |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| - XCF_CDS_SPOF                    | IBMXCF          | EXCEPTION-HIGH   | 12      | Ensure that couple data sets are configured without single points of |
| - RACF_SENSITIVE_RESOURCES        | IBMRACF         | EXCEPTION-HIGH   | 12      | Sensitive resources should be protected.                             |
| - USS_PARMLIB_MOUNTS              | IBMUSS          | EXCEPTION-HIGH   | 12      | BPXPRMxx parmlib mount failures can cause outages if not handled in  |
| - SMS_CDS_SEPARATE_VOLUMES        | IBMSMS          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | Prevent single point of failure for ACDS and COMMDS                  |
| - VSM_SQA_THRESHOLD               | IBMVSM          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | Monitor the allocation of SQA                                        |
| - ASM_LOCAL_SLOT_USAGE            | IBMASM          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | To check on the local page data set utilization                      |
| - SVA_AUTOIPL_DEFINED             | IBMSVA          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | To ensure AutoIPL function is in use when available.                 |
| - XCF_SFM_ACTIVE                  | IBMXCF          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | An SFM policy provides better failure management.                    |
| - XCF_SYSTATDET_PARTITIONING      | IBMXCF          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | Ensure that partitioning can recognize when a system has truly faile |
| - XCF_CDS_SEPARATION              | IBMXCF          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | Ensure that CDS separation has been maintained.                      |
| - XCF_SIG_PATH_SEPARATION         | IBMXCF          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | XCF signaling connections should have no single point of failure.    |
| - XCF_CFRM_MSGBASED               | IBMXCF          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | CFRM message-based event management improves recovery time for users |
| - XCF_CF_STR_POLICYSIZE           | IBMXCF          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | Too large a difference between INITSIZE and SIZE may waste coupling  |
| - XCF_CF_STR_DUPLEX               | IBMXCF          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | Allocated structures with DUPLEX(ALLOWED) or DUPLEX(ENABLED) specifi |
| - XCF_CF_STR_AVAILABILITY         | IBMXCF          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | Each structure preference list definition should have two usable cou |
| - HSM_CDSB_BACKUP_COPIES          | IBMHSB          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | Ensure critical level of HSM CDS backups specified.                  |
| - HSM_CDSB_VALID_BACKUPS          | IBMHSB          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | Ensure critical level of valid HSM CDS backups exist.                |
| - CSTCP_CINET_PORTRNG_RSV_TCPIP6  | IBMCS           | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | CHECK THAT CINET INADDRANYPORT RANGE IS RESERVED FOR OMVS ON THE TCP |
| - CSTCP_CINET_PORTRNG_RSV_TCPIP62 | IBMCS           | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | CHECK THAT CINET INADDRANYPORT RANGE IS RESERVED FOR OMVS ON THE TCP |
| - USS_FILESYS_CONFIG              | IBMUSS          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | Avoid performance problems in Unix System services and improve recov |
| - USS_AUTOMOUNT_DELAY             | IBMUSS          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | Low automount delay times in a SYSplex can cause the system to hang, |
| - USS_PARMLIB                     | IBMUSS          | EXCEPTION-MEDIUM | 8       | Reconfiguration settings should be kept in a permanent location so t |
| - JES2_z11_UPGRADE_CHK_JES2       | IBMJES2         | EXCEPTION-LOW    | 4       | JES2 z11 upgrade checks                                              |
| - RSM_REAL                        | IBMRSM          | EXCEPTION-LOW    | 4       | Performance may be impacted                                          |
| - VSM_ALLOWUSERKEYCSA             | IBMVSM          | EXCEPTION-LOW    | 4       | Validate the AllowUserKeyCSA DIAGxx Setting                          |
| - XCF_DEFAULT_MAXMSG              | IBMXCF          | EXCEPTION-LOW    | 4       | Avoid problems with XCF signalling.                                  |
| - GRS_AUTHQVL_SETTING             | IBMGRS          | EXCEPTION-LOW    | 4       | If the AUTHQVL parameter is not set to the maximum level, certain r  |
| - CSV_APP_EXISTS                  | IBMCSV          | EXCEPTION-LOW    | 4       | An entry in the APP list might refer to an obsolete data set.        |
| - CSV_LNKLST_SPACE                | IBMCSV          | EXCEPTION-LOW    | 4       | PDS data sets in a LNKLST that use only primary space are protected  |
| - CSV_LPA_CHANGES                 | IBMCSV          | EXCEPTION-LOW    | 4       | Changes in LPA can affect the size of the private area available for |

Thursday February 16 2012

01/002

Connected to remote server/host wlaa.tivlab.raleigh.ibm.com using lu/pool TCPA0196 and port 23


# Overall: Reducing Impact of Soft Failures

- Automation of alerts is key
  - Display, take action
- z/OS can survive / recover from most soft failures
  - But, take advantage of what the base operating system has to offer
    - Soft failure detection across many z/OS components
    - Start Health Checker, PFA, RTD (R13) at IPL (e.g., COMMNDxx)
- Most metrics are very time sensitive
  - Defaults selected based on z/OS test environments; should be good for most
- Predictive trend analysis typically not done on a Machine-time scale
  - PFA not designed to detect anomalies that could terminate a system on machine-time scale
  - Shortest data comparison is once a minute; identification of a program consuming CSA make take a couple minutes
  - PFA has tuned comparison algorithms using what is learned from your system
    - Configuration parameters are tunable to make the algorithms more accurate for your workloads
    - All checks have configurable parameters, e.g. STDDEV (Lower → more sensitive)



## Summary

IBM provides an integrated solution approach to  
Avoiding, Detection, Diagnosing Soft Failures



All elements work together for an integrated  
IBM soft failure solution ... *Set Them Up!*

# Acknowledgements

- Thank you to all who contributed information for this presentation

|                   |                              |
|-------------------|------------------------------|
| Jim Caffrey       | z/OS Predictive Technologies |
| Karla Arndt       | PFA / RTD                    |
| Scott Bender      | USS Kernel                   |
| Ron Bretschneider | DFSMS - Media Manager        |
| Mark Brooks       | XCF, XES, CF                 |
| John Case         | USS File System              |
| Brian Kealy       | Omegamon                     |
| Nick Matsakis     | GRS, Availability            |
| Terri Menendez    | DFSMS - RLS                  |
| Peter Relson      | Health Checker               |
| Dale Riedy        | IOS                          |
| Wayne Rhoten      | DFSMS                        |
| Dave Surman       | z/OS Architect               |
| Tom Wasik         | JES2                         |
| Doug Zobre        | System Logger                |

## Backup Reference – Recent PFA Enhancements

# How to Get the Most Out of PFA



- **Use check-specific tuning parameters** to adjust *sensitivity of comparisons* if needed
  - ▶ To minimize customer configuration
    - Default parameter values constructed from in-house and external data
    - Some defaults changed via PTFs using customers' data

| Parameter           | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>STDDEV</b>       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➤ Increase value to decrease sensitivity.</li><li>➤ Not available on the Common Storage Usage check.</li></ul>                                                                |
| <b>EXCEPTIONMIN</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➤ Increase value to decrease exceptions issued for relatively low rates.</li><li>➤ Not available on the Common Storage Usage check or Frames and Slots Usage check.</li></ul> |
| <b>THRESHOLD</b>    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➤ Increase value to decrease sensitivity.</li><li>➤ Common Storage Usage check only</li></ul>                                                                                 |
| <b>STDDEVLOW</b>    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➤ Increase value to decrease sensitivity for “too low” checking.</li><li>➤ Available on checks where “too low” checking is supported.</li></ul>                               |
| <b>LIMITLOW</b>     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➤ Defines the maximum rate where “too low” checking is performed</li><li>➤ Available on checks where “too low” checking is supported.</li></ul>                               |

## How to Get the Most Out of PFA (continued)



- Use PFA check-specific parameters to *affect other behavior*

| Parameter                        | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>COLLECTINT</b>                | Number of minutes between collections                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| <b>MODELINT</b>                  | Number of minutes between models <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• PFA automatically and dynamically models more frequently when needed</li><li>• z/OS 1.12 default updated to 720 minutes. First model will occur within 6 hours (or 6 hours after warm-up)</li></ul> |
| <b>COLLECTINACTIVE</b>           | Defines whether PFA should collect and model if check not active/enabled in IBM Health Checker for z/OS                                                                                                                                                                      |
| <b>DEBUG</b>                     | Use only if IBM service requests it                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| <b>CHECKLOW</b>                  | z/OS 1.13 – Turns on/off “too low” checking with RTD for checks that support it                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| <b>TRACKEDMIN</b>                | Requires a persistent job to have this minimum rate at the end of the warm-up in order to be tracked (where supported)                                                                                                                                                       |
| <b>Health Checker parameters</b> | For example, SEVERITY -- All PFA checks default = SEVERITY(MED): Eventual action WTO                                                                                                                                                                                         |

## How to Get the Most Out of PFA (continued)



- z/OS 1.12 – *Eliminate jobs* causing false positives
  - ▶ **Unsupervised learning** is the machine learning that PFA does automatically.
  - ▶ **Supervised learning** allows you to exclude jobs that are known to cause false positives. For example,
    - Exclude test programs that issue many LOGRECs and cause exceptions.
    - Exclude address spaces that issue many WTOs, but are inconsistent or spiky in their behavior and cause message arrival rate exceptions.

# How to Get the Most Out of PFA (continued)



- z/OS 1.12 -- Implementing supervised learning
  - ▶ Supported by all checks except Common Storage Usage
  - ▶ Create EXCLUDED\_JOBS file in the check's /config directory
    - Simple comma-separated value format
      - JobName,Systems,Date,Reason
    - Supports wildcards in both job name and system name
      - KKA\*,\*,04/05/2011,Exclude all KKA\* jobs on all systems
  - ▶ Use `f pfa,update,check(check_name)` if PFA running
  - ▶ PFA creates an EXCLUDED\_JOBS file for some checks during installation
  - ▶ See *z/OS Problem Management* for more information



# How to Get the Most Out of PFA (continued)




- Use a zAAP to offload PFA's Java Processing
- Start z/OS Resiliency functions at IPL
  - ▶ IBM Health Checker for z/OS
  - ▶ PFA
  - ▶ Runtime Diagnostics (z/OS 1.13)
- Automate the PFA IBM Health Checker for z/OS exceptions
  - ▶ Simplest: Add exception messages to existing message automation product
  - ▶ More complex: Use exception messages and other information to tailor alerts
  - ▶ See *z/OS Problem Management* for exceptions issued for each check
- Create a policy in an HZSPRMxx member for persistent changes
  - ▶ Not all check-specific parameters are required on an UPDATE of PFA checks!
    - UPDATE CHECK=(IBMPFA,PFA\_COMMON\_STORAGE\_USAGE)  
**PARM**('THRESHOLD(3)')

# How to Get the Most Out of PFA (continued)



- Get the latest PTFs!
  - ▶ Configuration value default changes
  - ▶ Comparison algorithm tuning changes
  - ▶ Changes to design
    - Exclude interactive users from being persistent jobs
    - Skip comparisons for ESQA
  - ▶ zFS growth problem – in progress (OA38376)
  
- Help us to make PFA's results better for everyone!

# PFA Serviceability



## Modify command to display status

### STATUS examples:

```
f pfa,display
f,pfa,display,status
```

```
AIR017I 10.31.32 PFA STATUS
NUMBER OF CHECKS REGISTERED : 5
NUMBER OF CHECKS ACTIVE : 5
COUNT OF COLLECT QUEUE ELEMENTS: 0
COUNT OF MODEL QUEUE ELEMENTS : 0
COUNT OF JVM TERMINATIONS : 0
```

### SUMMARY examples:

```
f pfa,display,checks
f pfa,display,check(pfa*),summary
```

```
AIR013I 10.09.14 PFA CHECK SUMMARY
```

| CHECK NAME               | ACTIVE | LAST SUCCESSFUL<br>COLLECT TIME | LAST SUCCESSFUL<br>MODEL TIME |
|--------------------------|--------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| PFA_COMMON_STORAGE_USAGE | YES    | 04/05/2008 10.01                | 04/05/2008 08.16              |
| PFA_LOGREC_ARRIVAL_RATE  | YES    | 04/05/2008 09.15                | 04/05/2008 06.32              |

(all checks are displayed)

### DETAIL examples:

```
f pfa,display,check(pfa_logrec_arrival_rate),detail
f pfa,display,check(pfa_*),detail
```

```
AIR018I 02.22.54 PFA CHECK DETAIL
CHECK NAME: PFA_LOGREC_ARRIVAL_RATE
ACTIVE : YES
TOTAL COLLECTION COUNT : 5
SUCCESSFUL COLLECTION COUNT : 5
LAST COLLECTION TIME : 04/05/2008 10.18.22
LAST SUCCESSFUL COLLECTION TIME : 04/05/2008 10.18.22
NEXT COLLECTION TIME : 04/05/2008 10.33.22
TOTAL MODEL COUNT : 1
SUCCESSFUL MODEL COUNT : 1
LAST MODEL TIME : 04/05/2008 10.18.24
LAST SUCCESSFUL MODEL TIME : 04/05/2008 10.18.24
NEXT MODEL TIME : 04/05/2008 16.18.24
CHECK SPECIFIC PARAMETERS:
COLLECTINT : 15
MODELINT : 360
COLLECTINACTIVE : 1=ON
DEBUG : 0=OFF
STDDEV : 10
EXCEPTIONMIN : 25
EXCLUDED_JOBS:
(excluded jobs list here)
```

## Backup Reference – Component Soft Failure detection

## Component Examples: Detection, Identification of soft failures ... Single system



| Component            | Features                                                                                     | Functions                                                                                                                                        |
|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| GRS                  | Enhanced contention analysis for ENQ, Latch                                                  | Identify Blocker/Waiter, Deadly embraces, Job name, Creator ASID                                                                                 |
|                      | GRS Latch identity string                                                                    | Associate name with Latch number                                                                                                                 |
|                      | WLM management of blocking units                                                             | Prevent deadlocks caused by starvation                                                                                                           |
|                      | GRS ENF 51                                                                                   | Prevent exhaustion of common storage resulting from GRSQSCAN processing                                                                          |
| UNIX System Services | Latch identity exploitation                                                                  | Explanations for latch usage on D GRS                                                                                                            |
|                      | XCF communication improvements (R13)                                                         | Detected lost messages in sysplex, via message ordering                                                                                          |
|                      | System Limits                                                                                | Checks for buildup of processes, pages of shared storage (process & system level)                                                                |
|                      | D OMVS, WAITERS to diagnose file system latch contention (enhanced R13: file latch activity) | Identifies holders, waiters, latches, file device numbers, file inode numbers, latch set identifiers, file names, and owning file systems        |
| JES2                 | JES2 Monitor                                                                                 | Assists in determining why JES2 is not responding to requests<br>"Monitor" msgs issued for conditions that can seriously impact JES2 performance |

## Component Examples: Detection, Identification, recovery of soft failures ... Single system




| Component | Features                           | Functions                                                                                                |
|-----------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| IOS       | Missing Interrupt Handler          | Detect incomplete I/O operations, within a policy driven time period (device, CU, fabric); recover, FFDC |
|           | Identify systems sharing a reserve | Identify partner system sharing device<br>D U,VOL= ... D GRS,DEV= ...                                    |
|           | Captured UCB protection            | Prevent accidental overlays of real UCBs in SQA by Legacy applications                                   |
|           | I/O timing facility                | Abnormally end I/O requests exceeding I/O timing limits for device; Hyperswap devices as well            |
|           | Detect & remove "Flapping Links"   | Improved channel recovery (hardware)                                                                     |
|           | Dynamic Channel Path Management    | WLM dynamically move channel paths from one CU to another, in response to workload changes               |
| DFSMS     | CAS contention detection           | Identify, terminate service tasks beyond a monitored wait time                                           |
|           | VSAM RLS index traps               | Checks the structure of all index CIs before writing them to DASD                                        |
|           | Media manager                      | Recover channel program error retry from I/O errors, using a lower level protocol                        |

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*Details in backup section*

## Component Examples: Detection of soft failures ... Sysplex



| Component | Features                                                                  | Functions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| XCF / XES | Stalled member support                                                    | Identify unresponsive system, restore to normal operation OR remove it to avoid sympathy sickness                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|           | Exploitation of BCPii to determine dead system more quickly               | Avoid waiting the Failure Detection Interval (FDI) if the system is truly dead ... detect & reset failed system, eliminate data corruption, avoid sympathy sickness.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|           | Sysplex Failure Management, scenarios<br><br><i>How long to allow ...</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not updating status, Not sending signals (ISOLATETIME(0): Fencing initiated n seconds after FDI exceeded)</li> <li>• System updating status, not sending signals (Loss of connectivity: CONNFAIL(YES): remove systems with low weights)</li> <li>• System Not Updating Status, But IS Sending Signals (SSUMLIMIT(900) ... length of time system can remain not updating heartbeat (semi-sick), but sending signals)</li> <li>• Sysplex Member Stalled (MEMSTALLTIME ... break out of of an XCF signaling jam by removing the largest build-up)</li> <li>• Structure Hang conditions ... Take action when connector does not respond, avoiding user hangs (CFSTRHANGTIME) (R12)</li> </ul> |
|           | Critical Member support;<br>GRS exploitation (R12)                        | If a critical member is "impaired" for long enough, XCF will eventually terminate the member; GRS: remove system                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |



## Detection of Soft Failures on a z/OS image: GRS serialization



- Enhanced contention analysis for ENQ / Latch
  - D GRS,ANALYZE,BLOCKER / WAITER / DEPENDENCY
  - D GRS,ANALYZE,LATCH,BLOCKER / WAITER / DEPENDENCY
    - Blocker/Waiter, Deadly embraces, Job name, Creator ASID, etc.
- GRS Latch identity string
  - Associate name with latch number
  - Included in D GRS latch analysis responses
  - Exploited by USS, RRS, Logger, RACF
- GRS interacts with WLM to manage priority of blocking units of work
  - Prevent deadlocks causing starvation
  - WLM's "trickle" support ensures that critical work is given cycles gradually to resolve any deadlocks
- GRS monitor
  - ENF 51 generates blocks in common storage (SQA)
  - SRBs suspended due to stuck receiver (e.g., RMF)
    - Therefore too many requests can cause common storage outage
  - GRS piped the requests elsewhere to avoid exhausting common storage
- Exploits XCF Critical member support (see XCF critical member support)

## Detection of Soft Failures on a z/OS image: **UNIX System Services serialization**



- Latch identity explanations for the latches used by USS (R13)
  - FS: <fs name> ... MOUNT ... MessageQ ID=<msg-ID in decimal>
    - System traversing or modifying structures related to the message queue
- XCF communication improvements
  - Lost XCF message detection (R13)
    - Utilizes XCF message ordering to detect lost messages
    - Activate with parmlib option, SETOMVS LOSTMSG=ON/OFF
  - Member Gone detects stall, attempts fix; if takeover fails, initiates sysplex-wide dump
- USS System Limits (R10)
  - Checks for buildup of processes, pages of shared storage (process & system level)
  - When 85% process utilization is reached, WTO messages are issued
  - For example: MAXASSIZE, MAXCPU TIME, MAXFILEPROC, MAXPROCUSER, MAXQUEDSIGS, MAXTHREADS
  - Displayed via D OMVS,LIMITS
- DISPLAY OMVS,WAITERS to diagnose file system latch contention problems
  - Enhanced in R13 to show a table for file latch activity
  - Holders, waiters, latches, file device numbers, file inode numbers, latch set identifiers, file names, and owning file systems

# Detection of Soft Failures on a z/OS image: IOS examples

## Missing Interrupt Handler

- Incomplete I/O: Prevents an application or system outage due to an error in any one of the following places:
  - ▶ Device
  - ▶ Control Unit
  - ▶ Fabric
  - ▶ Operator/CE error (IML, cable pulls, etc...)
- Outage is prevented by:
  - ▶ Detecting when an I/O operation has not completed within a policy driven time period
  - ▶ Invoking system diagnostic routines to understand the scope of the error
  - ▶ Driving hardware and software recovery mechanisms
  - ▶ First Failure Data Capture

## Identify sharing systems holding a reserve

- Start-pending MIH condition → D U,VOL= to identify device number
- D GRS,DEV=dddd to determine reserve status
- Identify other system with reserve, in message (IOS431I device reserve to CPU ...)

## Captured UCB protection

- Creates a temporary copy of UCBs for Legacy applications
- Prevents accidental overlays of real UCBs in SQA

## I/O Timing Facility – Identify slow I/O response time

- Times the entire I/O request
  - If exceeds timing limit ...
  - Abnormally ends I/O requests exceeding I/O timing limits for device
  - Application posted with permanent error, error logged to Logrec
- Facility can trigger a Hyperswap when I/O timeout occurs for a device monitored
  - Whether I/O operation should be terminated or started on the “swap TO” device

Application  
Issues I/O

Application  
Posted




Figure 1 - MIH vs. I/O Timing

## Improved Channel Recovery

- For frequently-occurring path errors, better to have hardware problem cause path taken offline than continue to cause problems
  - IOS recovery delays application I/O even when there are other paths

### Proactively Removing Paths – Flapping Links

- Logic path between channel & control unit becomes available, unavailable multiple times over a short period
- Drives IOS recovery for all devices on the affected link
- May cause application I/O delays
- When channel detects that link has “flapped” 5-9 times in 5 minutes, it stops attempting to establish a logical path

### Dynamic Channel Path Management

- Simplify I/O configuration definition task
- Static channel path definitions needed to be re-evaluated when workloads shift
- DCM lets WLM dynamically move channel paths from 1 CU to another, in response to workload changes
- Improve workload management
- DASD I/O resources are used more efficiently
- Improves Availability
- Foundation for auto-configuration
- Balance mode, Goal mode

## Detection of Soft Failures on a z/OS image: DFSMS examples



- **CAS Contention Detection**

- Runs as part of the CAS analysis task
- Periodically checks the Catalog Address Space (CAS) service tasks list (every 30 seconds or upon request)
  - Based on a set wait time and reason class, determines those tasks which are beyond the wait time.
    - *Checks for service tasks that are active and waiting on the SYSZTIOT enqueue. It sets timer for each waiting task (10 min)*
  - Creates a symptom record for each task past the limit
  - Terminates some of the violating tasks, which were considered safe to terminate

- **VSAM RLS index traps**

- Set the trap using a V SMS,MONDS command
- Checks the structure of all index CIs before writing them to DASD.
  - If problem, abend is issued and write is avoided

- **Media Manager**

- Channel program error retry from I/O errors, using a lower level protocol supported by the device
  - zHPF transport mode channel program
  - Command mode channel program with MIDAWs
  - Command mode channel program with IDAWs
- Media Manager will retry the I/O with one of the lower level protocols

## Detection of Soft Failures on a z/OS image: JES2 Monitor



- Assists in determining why JES2 is not responding to requests (single system)
- “Monitor” messages issued when conditions exist that can seriously impact JES2 performance (z/OS or JES2 issues)
- Automatically started when JES2 is started
- Results displayed via `$JD STATUS` command
  - Any conditions the monitor detected that could impact JES2
- Corresponding monitor address space for each JES2 address space
  - `$JD MONITOR` displays status info for each monitor task
  - Samples values at regular intervals
- Incident categories:
  - Normal processing
  - Tracking: processing time exceeds threshold
  - Alerts: Incident being tracked crosses a second (sampling) threshold
    - Exclusive incidents focus attention on primary incident
- Resource utilization
  - Low, high, average, current utilization
- `$JD HISTORY` displays up to 72 hours of resource utilization & CPU sample statistics

For more information, see JES2 Diagnosis book, GA22-7531



## Detection of Soft Failures in a Sysplex: XCF stalled member support



- A system may appear to be healthy with respect to XCF system status monitoring:
  - Updating status in the sysplex CDS
  - Sending signals
- But is the system actually performing useful work?
  - There may be critical functions that are non-operational, making the system unusable
    - Could induce sympathy sickness elsewhere in the sysplex
    - Waiting for a response; waiting to get an ENQ, latch, lock
  - Causes include
    - Dead system
    - Loops (spin, SRB)
    - Low weighted LPAR
    - Loss of a Coupling Facility
- *Long periods of sympathy sickness may have a greater negative impact on the sysplex than termination of an XCF group member, address space, structure connector, or even a system*
- Action should be taken to restore the system to normal operation OR remove it to avoid sympathy sickness
  - Helps reduce the incidence of sysplex-wide problems that can result from unresponsive critical components



# Detection of Soft Failures in a Sysplex: Sysplex Failure Management (SFM)



- Single system “Sick but not dead” issues can escalate to cause sysplex-wide problems
  - Typically holds resources needed by other systems in the sysplex
- Implements best practices of a resilient sysplex
- Enables automatic, timely, corrective action to be taken when applications or systems appear to be causing sympathy sickness
- Protects your sysplex when your operators and/or your automation are inattentive, unable, or incapable of resolving the problem
- Define an SFM policy to help meet availability and recovery objectives
  - Applications or systems are not permitted to linger in an extremely sick state such that they adversely impact other systems in the sysplex
  - Applications or systems are not terminated prematurely
  - Failure Detection Interval (FDI): amount of time a system is permitted to appear unresponsive (Not updating heartbeat, Not sending signals)
- Use of BCPii to determine a system is down dramatically improves this detection (over use of heartbeat) (see BCPii topic)

# Detection of Soft Failures in a Sysplex: SFM

- **System Not Updating Status, Not Sending Signals**
  - ISOLATETIME(0)
    - n seconds after the FDI exceeded fencing is initiated by all systems
    - Commands are sent across the coupling facility to the target system and I/O is isolated
    - After fencing completes successfully, sysplex partitioning continues
- **System updating status, not sending signals**
  - Loss of connectivity: CONNFALL(YES)
    - SFM determines sets of systems that do have full signal connectivity
    - Selects a set with largest combined system weights
    - Systems in that set survive, others are removed
    - Ensure the weights assigned to each z/OS system adequately reflect the relative importance of the system
- **System Not Updating Status, But IS Sending Signals**
  - SSUMLIMIT(900)
    - Indicates the length of time a system can remain in the state of not updating the heartbeat and sending signals
    - *This is the amount of time a system will remain in a “semi-sick” state.*
    - Once the SSUMLIMIT has been reached the specified action will be initiated against the system
- **Sysplex Member Stalled**
  - MEMSTALLTIME (600-900)
    - Enable XCF to break out of an XCF signaling traffic jam
    - SFM automatically starts removing the largest build-up, adversely impacting other systems in the sysplex
    - Action XCF will take: terminate the stalled member with the highest quantity of signals backed up

# Detection of Soft Failures in a Sysplex: SFM



## Taking Action When a Connector Does Not Respond

- Connectors to CF structures participate in processes, respond to relevant events
  - XES monitors the connectors, reports unresponsive connectors
  - Users of the structure may hang until offending connector responds or is terminated
- CFSTRHANGTIME (z/OS R12)
  - How long the system should allow a structure hang condition to persist before taking action
  - Enables XES to automatically take action if a connector does not respond to a structure event in a timely fashion
- XES corrective actions:
  - Stop rebuild
  - Force user to disconnect
  - Terminate connector task, address space or system
  - RAS: ABEND026 dumps collected
  - CFSTRHANGTIME(900-1200)

# Detection of Soft Failures in a Sysplex: SFM



BCPii: Avoid waiting the FDI+ if the system is truly dead !

- BCPii allows XCF to query the state of other systems via authorized interfaces through the support element and HMC network
- Benefits:
  - XCF can detect and/or reset failed systems more quickly
  - Works in scenarios where fencing cannot work
    - CEC checkstop or powered down
    - Image reset, deactivated, or re-IPLed
    - No CF
  - Eliminates the need for manual intervention, which may lead to data corruption problems
  - **Reduction in sympathy sickness time**
  - ***Set this up. It is a critical component of Resiliency AND Soft Failure Avoidance***

## Detection & Prevention of Soft Failures in a Sysplex: Critical Member support

- A Critical Member is a member of an XCF group that identifies itself as “critical” when joining its group
- If a critical member is “impaired” for long enough, XCF will eventually terminate the member
  - Per the member’s specification: task, space, or system
  - SFM parameter MEMSTALLTIME determines “long enough” before terminating the stalled member with the highest quantity of backed up signals
- **GRS declares itself a “critical member”**
  - If GRS cannot perform work for as long as the FDI, GRS is said to be “impaired”
  - XCF will remove a system from the sysplex if GRS on that system becomes “impaired” (key tasks not operating) to avoid sympathy sickness
    - Based on SFM MEMSTALLTIME(n)
    - For MEMSTALLTIME(NO),  $N = \text{MAX}(\text{FDI}, 120 \text{ seconds})$

# Health Check details

# Health Checker: Soft Failure avoidance

## Important examples



| Component | Health Check          | Functions                                                                                                                                                 |
|-----------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| XCF       | XCF_CDS_SPOF          | Evaluates primary & secondary CDS configuration to determine if Sysprog inadvertently created a single point of failure                                   |
|           | XCF_SFM_SUM_ACTION    | Checks ISOLATETIME value, to allow SFM to fence and partition a system without operator intervention and without undue delay.                             |
|           | XCF_SFM_SUMLIMIT      | Checks status update missing (SUMLIMIT) value                                                                                                             |
|           | XCF_SFM_ACTIVE        | Verifies SFM active, policy values                                                                                                                        |
|           | XCF_SFM_CFSTRHANGTIME | Verifies CFSTRUCTURE hang time                                                                                                                            |
|           | XCF_SFM_CONNFALL      | Threshold for loss of connectivity                                                                                                                        |
| RACF      | RACF_GRS_RNL          | Evaluates whether the RACF ENQ names are in a GRSRNL list: system exclusion resource name list (SERNL) or the system inclusion resource name list (SIRNL) |



# Health Checker: Soft Failure avoidance examples



| Component            | Health Check               | Functions                                                                                                                                                                     |
|----------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Serviceability       | DAE_SUPPRESSING            | DAE suppresses duplicate SVC dumps so that system resources (processor cycles and dump space) are not used for a dump which provides little or no additional diagnostic value |
|                      | SVA_AUTOIPL_DEFINED        | Check whether Program-Directed IPL and not GDPS, and whether AUTOIPL policy is active                                                                                         |
|                      | SVA_AUTOIPL_DEV_VALIDATION | Validates SADMP, MVS IPL devices                                                                                                                                              |
| UNIX System Services | USS_PARMLIB                | Validate current system against parmlib IPL'd with<br>Remind you to update parmlib (due to dynamic changes)                                                                   |
|                      | USS_CLIENT_MOUNTS          | With Sysplex, some file systems accessed locally, some of function shipped to the File system owner. Some are accessed locally, but are configured to function ship           |
|                      | USS_FILESYS_CONFIG         | Checks if mount attribute access is read only; whether HFS's in Sysplex root                                                                                                  |

# Health Checker: Soft Failure avoidance examples



| Component     | Health Check           | Functions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|---------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| IOS           | IOS_CAPTUCB_PROTECT    | UCB capture protection is enabled, allowing UCBs to be temporarily copied to 24-bit storage for legacy software access                                                                                                                                                |
|               | IOS_CMRTIME_MONITOR    | Detects if any control units in the system are reporting inconsistent average initial command response (CMR) time (round trip delay) for their attached channel paths. Exception issued when a CU has a path with highest avg CMR time greater than a threshold/ratio |
|               |                        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| System Logger | IXGLOGR_STRUCTUREFULL  | Primary structure full; need to offload                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|               | IXGLOGR_ENTRYTHRESHOLD | High number of entries in element pools                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|               | IXGLOGR_STAGINGDSFULL  | Full staging data space                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |

# z/OS Health Check: *Example Categories*



| Category                        | Examples                                                                                                                                                    |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Detect Single points of failure | VSAMRLS_SINGLE_POINT_FAILURE (SHCDS data sets)<br>XCF_CDS_SPOF (XCF Couple Data Sets)<br>XCF_CF_CONNECTIVITY (CF links, SPOF)                               |
| Security                        | RACF_GRS_RNL (for RACF datasets)<br>SDSF_CLASS_SDSF_ACTIVE (SDSF settings)                                                                                  |
| Address space checks            | IEA_ASIDS (number of ASIDs remaining)<br>IEA_LXS (number of LX's remaining)<br><b>SUP_LCCA_ABOVE_16M</b>                                                    |
| GRS                             | GRS_MODE (system configured in STAR mode)<br>GRS_SYNCHRES (GRS synchronous reserve processing enabled)<br>GRS_CONVERT_RESERVES (reserves converted to ENQs) |
| I/O                             | IOS_CAPTUCB_PROTECT<br>IOS_CMRTIME_MONITOR (Check for inconsistent average initial command response (CMR))<br>IOS_MIDAW (MIDAW enabled)                     |

## z/OS Health Check: *Example Categories*



| Category                   | Examples                                                                                         |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Optimal component settings | ALLOC_* (Allocation)<br>CNZ_* (Consoles)<br>CSRES (Comm Server), CSTCP_* (TCP/IP)<br>SDSF_*, ... |
| Sysplex configuration      | XCF_*<br>XCF_CF_*<br>CSTCB_*<br>RRS_*<br>IXGLOGR_*<br>VSAMRLS_*<br>XCF_SFM_*<br>CNZ_*<br>Etc.    |

# z/OS Health Check: *Example Categories*



| Category                             | Examples                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Serviceability (Dump, Trace options) | SDUMP_AVAILABLE<br>SDUMP_AUTO_ALLOCATION (auto-alloc SDUMP data sets)<br>CSTCP_SYSTCPIP_CTRACE (CTTRACE active, options)<br>CSVAM_VIT_SIZE (VTAM Internal Trace table size)<br>CSVAM_VIT_DSPSIZE (VTAM Internal Trace)<br>SVA_AUTOIPL_DEFINED<br>SVA_AUTOIPL_DEV_VALIDATION<br>DAE_SHAREDSDN<br>DAE_SUPPRESSING |
| Buffer sizes, storage limits         | CSTCP_TCPMAXRCVBUFRSIZE<br>CSVAM_CSM_STG_LIMIT<br>VSAMRLS_CFCACHE_MINIMUM_SIZE<br>XCF_MAXMSG_NUMBUF_RATIO<br>RSM_MEMLIMIT<br>RSM_MAXCADS<br>RSM_AFQ<br>RSM_REAL<br>RSM_RSU<br>VSM_*                                                                                                                             |

## z/OS Health Check: *Example Categories*



| Category                  | Examples                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Hardware                  | SUP_HIPERDISPATCH (Verify Hiperdispatch enabled)<br>SUP_HiperdispatchCPUConfig (monitors the number of CPUs installed and Hiperdispatch state of the system)                                                                                                                                                                              |
| Other component specifics | Console configuration<br>HSM control data set backups<br>JES2 ready to upgrade<br>Reconfiguration<br>SMS CDS configuration<br>System logger<br>Staging data sets full, entry thresholds, structure full<br>USS/ zFS: File system issues<br>VSAM RLS: false contention, monitor contention, monitor unresponsive CICS regions, TVS enabled |
| Migration checks          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |

# Health Checker: Soft Failure avoidance examples



- **DAE\_SUPPRESSING**

- DAE suppresses duplicate SVC dumps so that system resources (processor cycles and dump space) are not used for a dump which provides little or no additional diagnostic value
- IBM recommendation is to activate this function.
  - If turned off, then health checker will issue an exception to alert the team to this sub optimal configuration.

- **XCF\_CDS\_SPOF**

- z/OS uses two coupling data sets (CDS) to manage a parallel sysplex, primary and alternative.
- This check evaluates the I/O configuration to determine if the I/O configuration has inadvertently created a single point of failure (SPOF) when accessing the data on the primary and alternative CDS.
- Alternative CDS created to handle a problem with a switch or a storage device.

- **SVA\_AUTOIPL\_DEFINED, SVA\_AUTOIPL\_DEV\_VALIDATION**

- Check whether environment can support AUTOIPL, whether active
- Validates SADMP, MVS IPL devices




# Health Checker: Soft Failure avoidance examples



- **System Logger**
  - IXGLOGR\_STRUCTUREFULL
    - Primary structure full; need to offload
  - IXGLOGR\_ENTRYTHRESHOLD
    - High number of entries in element pools
  - IXGLOGR\_STAGINGDSFULL
    - Full staging data space
- **UNIX System Services**
  - USS\_PARMLIB
    - Validate current system against parmlib IPL'd with
    - Remind you to update parmlib (due to dynamic changes)
  - USS\_CLIENT\_MOUNTS
    - With Sysplex, some file systems accessed locally, some of function shipped to the File system owner. Some are accessed locally, but are configured to function ship
    - Check if function ship but could be done locally (performance awareness)
  - USS\_FILESYS\_CONFIG
    - Checks if mount attribute access is read only
    - HFS's in Sysplex root
- **Sysplex Failure management**
  - Examines / validates SFM values
    - XCF\_SFM\_ACTIVE
    - XCF\_SFM\_CFSTRHANGTIME
    - XCF\_SFM\_CONNFALL
    - XCF\_SFM\_SSUMLIMIT
    - XCF\_SFM\_SUM\_ACTION

## Health Checker: Soft Failure avoidance examples

- **IOS\_CAPTUCB\_PROTECT**
  - UCB capture protection is enabled, allowing UCBs to be temporarily copied to 24-bit storage for legacy software access
- **IOS\_CMRTIME\_MONITOR**
  - Fabric issues have resulted in unacceptable I/O service times
    - RMF device activity reports show average service times to be higher than normal
    - I/O queuing reports show abnormally high “initial command response” times on a subset of the paths to a device (5x)



# Tivoli Management Products




- Tivoli Management Products integrate
  - Soft Failures detected by PFA
    - Health Check exceptions surfaced by zMC (to be supported on *Omegamon XE*)
    - *Tivoli System Automation* policy to control of corrective actions
  - Performance issues detected by *Omegamon*
    - Evaluate entire software stack
    - Customer-defined model, selection of critical events
  - *Netcool/OMNibus* provide centralized monitoring of Health Check Alerts, Performance, Situations, Network activity, etc.

# Event Pump for z/OS

## Each subsystem writes messages to z/OS

- These messages may contain state and status information
- The Event Pump parses the message, interprets the resource information, and converts the message to an EIF event



# How PFA Detects Soft Failures



## ■ Causes of “sick, but not dead”

### ▶ **Damaged systems**

- Recurring or recursive errors caused by software defects anywhere in the software stack

### ▶ **Serialization**

- Priority inversion
- Classic deadlocks
- Owner gone

### ▶ **Resource exhaustion**

- Physical resources
- Software resources

### ▶ **Indeterminate or unexpected states**

## ■ Predictive failure analysis uses

- ▶ *Historical data*
- ▶ *Machine learning and mathematical modeling*

to detect abnormal behavior and the potential causes of this abnormal behavior

## ■ Objective

- ▶ Convert “sick, but not dead” to a correctable incident

