



The Truth About FTP And Why It Is Not Secure

Colin van der Ross Software Diversified Services

March 14th 2012 Session Number 10548



Agenda

- FTP Today and in the Workplace
- Security Breaches and Compliance
- Risks associated with FTP
- Options to Secure FTP





FTP Today





- Been around since 1971 (before TCP and IP protocols – very aged protocol)
- Millions of critical files and data exchanged by corporations daily
- Few Managers realize the Security and Management Risks with the prevalent use of FTP
- FTP has not "evolved" over the years and is rife with Security Exposures



FTP in the Workplace





- Most Computers have the ability to exchange data (Users desktop)
- Embedded in services of TCP/IP
- Business to Business FTP transfers are uncontrolled and insecure
- Critical Lynchpin in Business to Business
 Communications
- Facility used for file transfers between diverse computing platforms
- The manner in which the way FTP is implemented by Business needs attention
- FTP activity is Rampant. Do you really know what is happening?



SHARE Techniqg - Conscious - Results

FTP and Compliance – Recently in the News

Security pros say that hackers have the upper hand

Posted on 13 October 2011.

www.net-security.org

Healthcare Information Security Articles

www.healthcareinfosecurit

TRICARE Hit With \$4.9 Billion Lawsuit

y.com



credit Damages Sought for Privacy Violations in Breach Incident

Eligible October 14, 2011 - Howard Anderson, Executive Editor, HealthcareInfoSecurity.com

NEWS

Verizon PCI report finds firms struggling to maintain compliance <u>Techtarget.com/news/</u>

Robert Westervelt, News Director



Published: 28 Sep 2011





FTP and Compliance

1.PCI-DSS

1. Any time credit card information is sent it must abide by the PCI-DSS compliance standards for security and confidentiality.

2. HIPAA, SOX, GLBA, FISMA & Others

- **1. HIPAA** The HIPAA Security Rule mandates health plan providers, healthcare clearing houses, and other organizations processing health information to take reasonable and appropriate precautions to protect health information.
- 2. **SOX** Section 404 of SOX requires top management to establish an adequate internal control structure and include an assessment of its effectiveness in the annual report. Additionally, an external auditor needs to verify the management assertions.
- 3. GLBA The Safeguards Rule issued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is established standards for financial institutions to develop, implement, and maintain administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer information
- **4. FISMA** FIPS 140-2 requires certified cryptographic modules to meet the compliance requirements for government agencies and certain contractors
- 5. California SB 1386, Basel II, Massachusetts Privacy Law





Risks associated with FTP



- Anyone with READ access, also has "Transfer Out" access
- Read Clear Text Exposure
- Password interception
- Eavesdropping
- Hijacking
- "Man in the middle"
- Connection "hijack"
- Spyware
- Wireless Connectivity
- Can open portal behind firewall





FTP Packet Trace Example

ine.	Length	Time (Agent Local)	Delta (Δ)	Local IP		Dir	Remote IP	Proto	Other Information
- 4		13,23,35,013 (3130)2000)	001001100	10,17,0,1,21		\vdash	172,100,10,100,3103		364-5010150103 [MCV] MCV-3110303150 MIII-03333
3	108	13:25:39.867 (31Jul2008)	00:00.054	10.14.0.1:21		\Rightarrow	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=3178565720 [ACK_PUSH] Ack=2010128189 Win=32768
4	40	13:25:40.103 (31Jul2008)	00:00.236	10.14.0.1:21		\leftarrow	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=2010128189 [ACK] Ack=3178565788 Win=65467
5	102	13:25:40.103 (31Jul2008)	00:00.000	10.14.0.1:21		\Rightarrow	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=3178565788 [ACK_PUSH] Ack=2010128189 Win=32768
6	40	13:25:40.403 (31Jul2008)	00:00.300	10.14.0.1:21		\Leftarrow	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=2010128189 [ACK] Ack=3178565850 Win=65405
7	52	13:25:59.847 (31Jul2008)	00:19.444	10.14.0.1:21		\Leftarrow	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=2010128189 [ACK_PUSH] Ack=3178565850 Win=65405
8	67	13:25:59.851 (31Jul2008)	00:00.004	10.14.0.1:21		\Rightarrow	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=3178565850 [ACK_PUSH] Ack=2010128201 Win=32756
9	40	13:26:00.105 (31Jul2008)	00:00.254	10.14.0.1:21		\leftarrow	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=2010128201 [ACK] Ack=3178565877 Win=65378
10	53	13:26:03.253 (31Jul2008)	00:03.148	10.14.0.1:21		(192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=2010128201 [ACK_PUSH] Ack=3178565877 Win=65378
11	65	13:26:03.392 (31Jul2008)	00:00.139	10.14.0.1:21		\Rightarrow	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=3178565877 [ACK_PUSH] Ack=2010128214 Win=32755
12	40	13:26:03.661 (31Jul2008)	00:00.269	10.14.0.1:21		\leftarrow	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=2010128214 [ACK] Ack=3178565902 Win=65353
	VIP Trace .ength: 53 .inkname: IP Header) OSALNKR1			+0010 +0020	0 0a06 0 5018	00035 d4134000 7d e0001 0c5d0015 77 8ff62 5e1b0000 <mark>50</mark> 16e0d <mark>0a</mark> 000000	d01f49	





Passwords are in the **CLEAR**

ne	Length	Time (Agent Local)	Delta (∆)	Local IP	Dir	Remote IP	Proto	Other Information
4		10.20.05.010 (010012000)		10.17.0.1.21	-	152,100,10,100,3103		364-5010150103 [WCV] WCV-3110303150 MIII-03333
3		13:25:39.867 (31Jul2008)		10.14.0.1:21	\Rightarrow	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=3178565720 [ACK_PUSH] Ack=2010128189 Win=32768
4		13:25:40.103 (31Jul2008)		10.14.0.1:21	←	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=2010128189 [ACK] Ack=3178565788 Win=65467
5	102	13:25:40.103 (31Jul2008)	00:00.000	10.14.0.1:21	\Rightarrow	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=3178565788 [ACK_PUSH] Ack=2010128189 Win=32768
6	40	13:25:40.403 (31Jul2008)	00:00.300	10.14.0.1:21	←	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=2010128189 [ACK] Ack=3178565850 Win=65405
7	52	13:25:59.847 (31Jul2008)	00:19.444	10.14.0.1:21	←	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=2010128189 [ACK_PUSH] Ack=3178565850 Win=65405
8	67	13:25:59.851 (31Jul2008)	00:00.004	10.14.0.1:21	\Rightarrow	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=3178565850 [ACK_PUSH] Ack=2010128201 Win=32756
9	40	13:26:00.105 (31Jul2008)	00:00.254	10.14.0.1:21	←	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=2010128201 [ACK] Ack=3178565877 Win=65378
10	53	13:26:03.253 (31Jul2008)	00:03.148	10.14.0.1:21	←	192.168.10.186:3165	TCP	Seq=2010128201 [ACK_PUSH] Ack=3178565877 Win=65378
	IP Training IP Training IP Training IP Training IP	+0000 450000 +0010 0a0e00 +0020 5018ft +0030 6d6166	001 Oc5 62 5e1	d0015 77d0 b0000 <mark>504</mark> 1	1 f 49	bd7510f5	سر ا	.5@.}.T> M'y]wI.u)¦¤.5 .b^PASS bat &.□.;/£ n



What Are The Options To Secure Your FTP Secure ?



Firewalls / VPN

FTPS /SFTP/ Vendor Solutions /IBM Ported Tools


FTP Server Off M/F

PGP



Truth about FTP








The Truth about FTP






What are some alternatives



The Truth about FTP






- What are some alternatives
- Why or why not use the methods and tools



The Truth about FTP






- What are some alternatives
- Why or why not use the methods and tools
- When is a good time to use the solution



FTP (File Transfer Protocol)








FTPS (FTP over SSL)






- FTP
- FTPS



FTP over SSH Tunnel






- FTP
- FTPS
- FTP over SSH Tunnel



SFTP (SSH Secure FTP)






- FTP
- FTPS
- FTP over SSH Tunnel

SFTP



FTP/SFTP Hybrid






- FTP
- FTPS
- FTP over SSH Tunnel

- SFTP
- FTP to SFTP



VPN (Virtual Private Network)






- FTP
- FTPS
- FTP over SSH Tunnel

- SFTP
- FTP to SFTP
- VPN



PGP (Data at rest)






- FTP
- FTPS
- FTP over SSH Tunnel

- SFTP
- FTP to SFTP
- VPN
- PGP








- FTP
- FTPS
- FTP over SSH Tunnel

- SFTP
- FTP to SFTP
- VPN








- FTP
- FTPS
- FTP over SSH Tunnel

- SFTP
- FTP to SFTP








- FTP
- FTPS
- FTP over SSH Tunnel








- FTPFTPS








- Pros
 - Ubiquitous








- Pros
 - Ubiquitous
 - Common knowledge








Pros

- Ubiquitous
- Common knowledge
- Included in base OS








- Pros
 - Ubiquitous
 - Common knowledge
 - Included in base OS

- Cons
 - Very little security








- Pros
 - Ubiquitous
 - Common knowledge
 - Included in base OS

- Cons
 - Very little security
 - Not firewall friendly



Active Firewall











Active FTP with Firewall








Passive FTP










- Pros
 - Ubiquitous
 - Common knowledge
 - Included in base OS

- Cons
 - Very little security
 - Not firewall friendly
 - No native compression








- Pros
 - •Ubiquitous
 - Common knowledge
 - Included in base OS

- Cons
 - Very little security
 - Not firewall friendly
 - No native compression
 - Lacks integrity validation








- Common uses
 - Public information



FTP






- Common uses
 - Public information
 - Intranet transfers (careful, not everyone on the intranet is safe)



FTP






- Common uses
 - Public information
 - Intranet transfers (careful, not everyone on the intranet is safe)
 - Far too many things that should really use something better










- Pros
 - Same FTP familiarity








- Pros
 - Same FTP familiarity
 - Included in base z/OS










Pros

- Same FTP familiarity
- Included in base z/OS
- Supports X.509 certificates (trusted authority) and keberos










Pros

- Same FTP familiarity
- Included in base z/OS
- Supports X.509 certificates (trusted authority) and keberos
- RACF keyrings supported








- Pros
 - Same FTP familiarity
 - Included in base z/OS
 - Supports X.509 certificates (trusted authority) and keberos
 - RACF keyrings supported

- Cons
 - Not firewall friendly (even worse than straight FTP)






Passive FTP










- Pros
 - Same FTP familiarity
 - Included in base z/OS
 - Supports X.509 certificates (trusted authority) and keberos
 - RACF keyrings supported

Cons

- Not firewall friendly (even worse than straight FTP)
- Can't assume it's available on the other end








- Common Uses
 - z/OS to z/OS








- Common Uses
 - z/OS to z/OS
 - z/OS to i/Series








- Common Uses
 - z/OS to z/OS
 - z/OS to i/Series
 - Servers and clients available on platforms








- Pros
 - Same FTP familiarity








- Pros
 - Same FTP familiarity
 - Firewall friendly








- Pros
 - Same FTP familiarity
 - Firewall friendly
 - Compression of data








Pros

- Same FTP familiarity
- Firewall friendly
- Compression of data
- Good checksums of data, at least for the internet piece








- Pros
 - Same FTP familiarity
 - Firewall friendly
 - Compression of data
 - Good checksums of data, at least for the internet piece

- Cons
 - More parts need to be choreographed








- Pros
 - Same FTP familiarity
 - Firewall friendly
 - Compression of data
 - Good checksums of data, at least for the internet piece

- Cons
 - More parts need to be choreographed
 - Requires SSH and FTP on both ends








- Common uses
 - Sites that have a significant reliance on FTP already in place that need to implement SSH encryption for transit








- Pros
 - Point to point encryption








- Pros
 - Point to point encryption
 - Compression and Integrity built-in








- Pros
 - Point to point encryption
 - Compression and Integrity built-in
 - Already ready to go on Unix/Linux servers








- Pros
 - Point to point encryption
 - Compression and Integrity built-in
 - Already ready to go on Unix/Linux servers

- Cons
 - Not part of base on z/OS or Windows








- Pros
 - Point to point encryption
 - Compression and Integrity built-in
 - Already ready to go on Unix/Linux servers

- Cons
 - Not part of base on z/OS or windows
 - May not be as familiar to users








- Pros
 - Point to point encryption
 - Compression and Integrity built-in
 - Already ready to go on Unix/Linux servers

- Cons
 - Not part of base on z/OS or windows
 - May not be as familiar to users
 - Only protects data in transit








- Common uses
 - Easy access for distribution to Unix/Linux farms








- Pros
 - Satisfies SFTP requirement








- Pros
 - Satisfies SFTP requirement
 - Can still use the FTP client on the z/OS side








- Pros
 - Satisfies SFTP requirement
 - Can still use the FTP client on the z/OS side

- Cons
 - Not a perfect match of functions








- Common uses
 - Leveraging FTP already in place, but transitioning it to your SFTP knowledgeable partners








- Pros
 - Network to Network encryption (everything covered)








- Pros
 - Network to Network encryption (everything covered)
 - Some integrity built-in








Pros

- Network to Network encryption (everything covered)
- Some integrity built-in
- Compression might be included








Pros

- Network to Network encryption (everything covered)
- Some integrity built-in
- Compression might be included
- Transparent to the applications










- Pros
 - Network to Network encryption (everything covered)
 - Some integrity built-in
 - Compression might be included
 - Transparent to the applications

- Cons
 - More complex to set up








- Pros
 - Network to Network encryption (everything covered)
 - Some integrity built-in
 - Compression might be included
 - Transparent to the applications

- Cons
 - More complex to set up
 - Intranet traffic is unprotected








- Pros
 - Network to Network encryption (everything covered)
 - Some integrity built-in
 - Compression might be included
 - Transparent to the applications

- Cons
 - More complex to set up
 - Intranet traffic is unprotected
 - Usually managed by another group








- Common uses
 - Trusted partner networks








- Pros
 - Full control of sensitive data








- Pros
 - Full control of sensitive data
 - Transport is not important








Pros

- Full control of sensitive data
- Transport is not important
- Compression and Integrity








Pros

- Full control of sensitive data
- Transport is not important
- Compression and Integrity
- Not just for transfers








- Pros
 - Full control of sensitive data
 - Transport is not important
 - Compression and Integrity
 - Not just for transfers



Requires staging of data








- Common uses
 - Sensitive data that needs protection at destination as well as in transit








Common uses

- Sensitive data that needs protection at destination as well as in transit
- When network component is not managed by interested parties





FTP – All The Options



- Common uses
 - Mixed requirements unfortunately, one size rarely fits all properly





Thank You

