

S H A R E

Technology • Connections • Results

Cost-effective Automated Mainframe Security

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3rd March 2011
Session Number: **8589**



Agenda

- Introduction
- Language
- So what's it all about?
- So how could we do it?
- Scheduled Automation
- Automatic Enforcement
- Automate manual processes
- Other functions
- Summary
- Questions
- Reference Material

Introduction

- I am a mainframe technician with some knowledge of RACF
- I have been doing this for almost 30 years
- This session will look at how to automate system z security functions using zSecure
- Happy to take questions as we go

Language!

- And I don't mean bad language!
- Two countries separated by a common language!
- When is a ZEE not a ZEE?
- When it's a ZED
- What is PARMLIB(e)?
- When its PARMLIB

What's this?



- Zeebra?
- No it's a Zebra!
- Hopefully this will help you understand me 😊

Cost Effective Automated Mainframe Security

So what's it all about?

So what's it all about?

- Because of its reputation for providing the most secure platform in the enterprise, many organizations run their mission-critical applications and centralise their data on mainframes
- It can be a challenge dealing with the complexity and scope of provisioning users, controlling resource access, auditing event and compliance reporting
- Cost-effective security can be achieved with simplified administration, consistent security policy enforcement, state-of-the-art event analysis and automated audit and compliance reporting
- Effective mainframe security can help you reduce costs, improve service and manage risk in your enterprise

Some of the things we need to do?

- Verify the protection of the Trusted Computing Base
 - Identify exposures, document your parameters to the auditors
- Know your privileged users
 - No excessive privileges, unneeded access
- Limit authorities and data access to current job roles
 - Remove unneeded and obsolete authorities
- Remove inactive user ids
- Remove inconsistencies, redundant entries
- Remove superfluous access rights

What's Automation

- Scheduled processes for regular tasks
- Automatically enforcing policy
- Automating manual processes

Scheduled Automation

- We can schedule regular batch processes to:
 - Automation of regular Audit functions
 - Perform Status Audit
 - Perform compare against baseline

Automatic Enforcement

- Provide automation to enforce the agreed security policy
 - Enforce policy for all RACF commands issued
 - Deny command
 - Correct command
 - Automatically react to events as they happen


Automating Manual Processes

- Automate the generation of RACF commands when:
 - Creating, Modifying, Listing & Deleting RACF Profiles:
 - Users
 - Groups
 - Datasets
 - General Resources
 - Performing housekeeping tasks such as mass cleanup of a RACF database

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So how could we do it?

IBM Tivoli zSecure Suite



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Scheduled Automation

Automation of regular Audit functions

Regular Audits

- zSecure Audit standard reports
 - Many standard audit reports readily available
 - Others can be composed via the standard panels
 - Finally, build your own reports with CARLa

zOS Status Audit – Detailed Reports

Session A - [32 x 80] zSecure Admin+Audit for RACF Display Selection Line 1 of 109

Name	Summary	Records	Title
SYSTEM	1	1	System settings and software levels
SYSTEMAU	1	3	System settings - audit concerns
IPLPARM	1	1	Effective system IPL parameters
SMFSUBOP	1	6	SMF subsystem-dependent settings
SUBSYS	1	108	Subsystem Communication Vector Tables
VSM	1	21	Virtual storage map
WRITABLE	1	7	Globally Writable Common Storage
MPFMSG	1	23	Message Processing Facility message intercepts
JOBCLASS	1	36	JES2 Job Class parameters (e.g. MVS command auth / B
CONSOLE	1	71	Operator Consoles
PPT	1	101	Program Property Table
SVC	1	160	Supervisor Call Audit Display
PC	2	1054	Program Call Audit Display
TAPE	1	1	Tape protection settings (RACF)
IOAPP	0	0	Authorized I/O Appendage table
DMS	0	0	DMS system settings
DMSAUDIT	0	0	DMS system settings - audit concerns
EXITS	1	59	Exit and table overview
DASDVOL	163	163	DASD Volume Protection and Sharing
MOUNT	0	0	Effective UNIX mount points
SENSAPF	1	337	APF data set names
SENSLINK	1	65	Linklist data set names
SENSLPA	1	24	LPA list data set names
SENSALL	1	980	All sensitive data sets by priority and type
SETROPTS	1	1	RACF system, ICHSECOP, and general SETROPTS settings
SETROPAU	2	22	SETROPTS settings - audit concerns
ROUTER	1	2	SAF router table (ICHRFR01)

Command ==> _____ Scroll==> CSR

MA a 04/001

Automated Vulnerability Assessment

```
Session A - [32 x 80]
SETROPTS settings - audit concerns                               Line 1 of 11
                                                                4 Sep 2007 12:17

  Pri Complex System Count
  34 ZT01      ZT01      11
  Pri Parameter Value Audit concern
  34 PROTECTALL Warning Warnings do not prevent unauthorized a
  30 BATCHALLRACF No Allowing unidentified batch work makes
  30 REVOKE No Too many password violations allowed
  20 OPERAUDIT No OPERATIONS activity undetectable
  15 AUDIT_GROUP No Profile changes in GROUP class are not
  15 AUDIT_USER No Profile changes in USER class are not
  15 ERASEONSCRATCH None Disk scavenging threat not countered /
  15 HISTORY No Users can use same passwords over and
  11 MINCHANGE No Without MINCHANGE users can thwart the
  10 INACTIVE No Apparently unused userids increase ris
  2 TAPEDSN No Tape datasets are unprotected unless T
***** Bottom of Data *****
Command ==> Scroll==> CSR
MA a 31/015
```

SMF “exceptions” report

```
Session A - [32 x 80]
zSecure Audit for RACF Display Selection                29 s elapsed, 20.3 s CPU

  Name      Summary  Records  Title
--
  USEOPER   3         376    Use of OPERATIONS Attribute
  CMDSPEC   4         155    Commands issued by SPECIAL users
  CMDFAIL   3           9    Command violations
  AUDUSER   2        5815    Auditing of Users
  DSETVIOL  11         24    Data Set Access Violations by Profile and User
  GRESVIOL  3          17    General Resource Access Violations by Class, Profile
  VWBYUSER  9          41    Violations and Warnings by User
  LOGTERM   0           8    Attempted Logon by Pwd/Userid Guessing, > 5 per Term
  LOGUSER   0           8    Attempted Logon by Password Guessing, > 5 per Userid
  LOGREVK   1           2    Attempted Logon by Revoked User
  LOGATTN   0           1    Attempted Logon, attention required
***** Bottom of Data *****

Command ==>
Scroll==> CSR
MA a 32/015
```

Status Auditing


What Can Happen!

- Shows definitions, like all users with system special
- Large amount of output, hopefully every day the same



What we want to happen!

- Exceptions summarised in an email
- Detail reports available for review and archiving
- Needs to be resource efficient & scalable



What we want to happen!

■ Change detection

- Detect differences with previous reporting run
- Changes may be missed when a report was skipped/lost


■ Baseline verification

- Shows when the definitions do not fit the standards
- Typically by comparing the status against a baseline

■ Automation allows you to move from “Auditing” to “Monitoring”

ISO27001 Recommendations for Information Security Management Systems (ISMS)

- Describes the values
 - Lists the a
- When a system are c...ent
 - No a ...eeded
- If a discrepancy is found
 - Review change, or Update the baseline
- Baseline becomes the li...
documentation...mentation
 - Report will show... until it is fixed



How Can we automate?

■ Compliance requirements

- Monitor changes to operating system and security
- Monitor activities of privileged users
- Monitor irregular logons
- Verify operating system parameters against baselines
- Verify users with specific (high) application authority

How can we automate?

- zSecure Audit customised reporting:
 - Built with CARLa report specification
 - Using your policy and naming conventions
 - Baselines document the security implementation standards
 - Show parameters that are in conflict
 - Approved changes must be reflected in the baseline
 - Inappropriate changes will show up until they have been addressed

View for the Compliance Manager

The screenshot shows a Lotus Notes window titled "Security Monitor summary for RACF reports generated on: 11 Jun 2007 - Lotus Notes". The window displays an email with the following details:

- To:** Compliance and Security Management Team
- cc:** Change Management Team
- Subject:** Security Monitor summary for RACF reports generated on: 11 Jun 2007

The email body contains the following text:

Security Monitor summary for RACF reports generated on: 11 Jun 2007

- 13 Accounts that were last used 60...90 days ago on system: DEMO
- 2656 Accounts that were last used >90 days ago on system: DEMO
- 19 Userids with an non-expiring password on system: DEMO
- 236 New or incompliant started tasks on system: DEMO
- 59 Unknown/Unverified accounts with system level attributes on system
- 29 Unknown/Unverified accounts with UID=0 on system: DEMO
- 13 Profiles in WARNING mode for system: DEMO
- 12 Unknown/unverified global access checking table entry on system: D
- 65 Unknown/Unverified group level privileged accounts on system: DEMO
- All systems have compliant RACF dataset profiles
- 322 New/unverified/incompliant dataset profiles found on system: DEMO
- RACF Authorized Caller Tables are empty, compliant to Baseline
- 7 Unknown/Unverified active EXIT(s) found on system: DEMO
- 2 RACF database name, location or attributes changed on system: DEMO
- All SPT entries are compliant to the Baseline
- 198 Non-compliant resource class setting on system: DEMO
- 125 Non-compliant PPT entries on system: DEMO
- 16 Non compliant RACF SETROPTS settings system: DEMO
- 1 Non-compliant z/OS General Setting on system: DEMO

At the bottom of the window, there is a status bar with the text "Could not find 'Change Management Team'" and a "Disconnected" indicator.

View for the Technician

```
Session B - [32 x 80]
Menu Utilities Compilers Help

BROWSE DEMO.COMPLIAN.REPORTS Line 00000000 Col 001 080
***** Top of Data *****
Non compliant RACF SETROPTS settings system: DEMO

SETROPTS setting description Current Desired
Batch userid req BATCHALLRACF Yes No
Default uid local UNDEFINEDU ++++++ ?UNKNOWN
Default uid remote NJEUSERID ???????? ?NJEDUMM
Enhanced Generic Naming No Yes
Key change required day None 30
Password change interval 90 30
Password change warning day No 7
Password rule 1 ***** LENGTH(5:8) LLLLLLLL LENGTH(8:8)
Prefix one-level dsns ONEQUAL SINGDSN
Prevent logon if unused days 255 180
Prevent uncataloged dsns Yes/fail No
Real datasetnames in SMF Yes No
Revoke after password attempt 5 3
Tape dataset check TAPEDSN Yes No
Tape volume protection active Yes No
Undefined terminal TERMUACC NONE READ
***** Bottom of Data *****

Command ==>
Scroll ==> CSR
Mâ b 32/015
```

Cost Effective Automated Mainframe Security

Automatic Enforcement

What Do We Do Today?

■ Situation:

- Security management outsourced
- User administration delegated to non-technical users
- Departments with their own applications, responsibility and security administrators
- Way too many Group & System Special Users!!

What Do We Do Today?

- Solutions Available:
 - Implement GROUP SPECIAL or GROUP AUDITOR
 - Impractical when profile ownership is not clearly specified in RACF
 - ISPF front end to build RACF commands
 - Users do not key in RACF commands, but privilege is not protected

zSecure Option

- RACF command screening using zSecure Command Verifier
 - Each security change verified against granular policy
 - Using masks for classes and profiles
 - Inappropriate commands prevented
 - Missing or incorrect parameters can be fixed
 - Even controls commands issued by system special users

Command Verifier – Example 1

- All controlled via profiles defined in the RACF XFACILIT class
- If you forget to code an OWNER, take first 3 letters of userid as OWNER

Profile

APPLDATA

UACC

C4R.USER./OWNER.**

=USERID(3)

READ

Command Verifier – Example 2

- Do not allow the use of the TRUSTED and PRIVILEGED keywords

Profile	UACC
C4R.STARTED.STDATA.ATTR.PRIVILEGED.**	NONE
C4R.STARTED.STDATA.ATTR.TRUSTED.**	NONE

The Results .. ta da.....

```
Session A - [24 x 80]
setr password(nohistory)
C4R751E SETROPTS PASSWORD.HISTORY not allowed, command terminated
READY
setr password(interval(180))
C4R751E SETROPTS PASSWORD.INTERVAL not allowed, command terminated
READY
permit irr.password.reset class(facility) id(ibmuser) access(update)
C4R607E ACL setting for self to UPDATE not allowed, command terminated
READY
ralter facility irr.password.reset uacc(update)
C4R600E UACC UPDATE setting not allowed, command terminated
READY
setropts noclassact(facility)
C4R754E CLASSACT not allowed for class FACILITY, command terminated
READY
permit 'sys1.parmlib' gen id(ibmuser) access(update)
C4R646E Management of locked profiles not allowed, command terminated
READY
connect ibmuser group(sys1)
C4R548E You may not connect yourself to group SYS1, command terminated
READY
-
MA a 22/001
```

Command Audit Trail

Command Audit Trail - What

- Keep track of significant changes to profiles
 - Adding/changing/deleting application segments
 - like OMVS, TSO, CICS and STDATA
 - Adding/removing user attributes
 - like Special, Operations, Restricted
 - Connecting/removing users from groups
 - Adding/removing attributes for datasets and general resources
 - Permit commands for datasets and resources adding/deleting members on resource profiles
 - the last 64 additions/changes/removals will be tracked

Command Audit Trail - Why

■ Answer questions like

- Since when does this user have TSO authority?
- Who gave this user Special?
- Since when has this Group/User access to this dataset?
- Was anything changed in the access list of this resource recently?
- Who put this profile in warning mode, and when did (s)he do it?

Command Audit Trail - When

- Maintained when activation profile exists
 - C4R.class.=CMDAUD.data-type.more
 - Data-type is
 - =SEGMENT - adding, changing and deleting segments
 - =ATTR - adding and deleting attributes
 - =CONNECT - adding, changing and deleting user to group connections
 - =ACL - use of the PERMIT command
 - =MEMBER - adding and deleting members in a grouping resource class profile
 - E.g. C4R.DATASET.=CMDAUD.=ACL.**
 - Permits, UACC etc. on activation profile are ignored

Command Audit Trail – List

- List the whole audit trail
 - UPDATE on the activation profile

```
c4rcatmn list class(user) profile(ibmuser)
```

```
Command Audit Trail for USER IBMUSER
```

```
Segment:  CICS      Added on 05.241/03:19 by C4RTEST
           CICS      Changed on 05.241/03:20 by C4RTEST
           TSO       Changed on 05.241/03:19 by C4RTEST
Attrib:   PASSWRD   Removed on 05.238/14:24 by C4RTEST
           INTERV   Changed on 05.241/04:42 by C4RTEST
           RESTR    Added on 05.238/14:24 by C4RTEST
Connect:  BCSC      Added on 05.238/14:24 by IBMUSER
GrpAttr:  ADSP      BCSC      Removed on 05.238/14:24 by IBMUSER
```

```
| Command Audit Trail for USER IBMUSER  
| Segment: CICS Added on 05.241/03:19 by C4RTEST  
| Changed on 05.241/03:20 by C4RTEST  
| TSO Changed on 05.241/03:19 by C4RTEST  
| Attrib: PASSWRD Removed on 05.238/14:24 by C4RTEST  
| INTERV Changed on 05.241/04:42 by C4RTEST  
| RESTR Added on 05.238/14:24 by C4RTEST  
| Connect: C4RGRP1 Added on 05.238/14:24 by IBMUSER  
| GrpAttr: ADSP C4RGRP1 Removed on 05.238/14:24 by IBMUSER
```

```
| Command Audit Trail for DATASET IBMUSER.**  
| Segment: DFP Added on 05.245/05:21 by C4RTEST  
| Attrib: WARNING Added on 05.245/05:20 by C4RTEST  
| Access: C4RGRP1 access READ on 05.234/09:39 by C4RTEST  
| C4RGRP2 access READ on 05.234/09:39 by C4RTEST  
| C4RTEST access READ on 05.234/09:39 by C4RTEST  
| SYS1 access READ on 05.234/09:39 by C4RTEST  
| IBMUSER access READ on 05.234/09:39 by C4RTEST  
| * access UPD on 05.234/09:39 by C4RTEST  
| CRMBGUS access Removed on 05.234/09:39 by C4RTEST  
| **ALL** access Removed on 05.257/15:06 by IBMUSER
```

```
| Command Audit Trail for GCICSTRN CICSA.SPRO  
| Member: CICSA.CEDA Added on 05.249/14:21 by C4RTEST  
| CICSA.CEMT Removed on 05.249/14:21 by C4RTEST
```

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Automating Manual Processes

Generating RACF Commands

- Perhaps the most straight forward function provided by zSecure Admin
- Ability to generate large amounts of RACF commands in a timely manner
- Simple task of cloning a RACF group can require 100's of commands
 - ADDGROUP
 - CONNECT's
 - PERMITS

Generating RACF Commands

- Can be done via:
 - ISPF interface
 - CARLa Code Interactively
 - CARLa Code in batch

Group Selection Panel in ISPF

```
zSecure Admin+Audit for RACF - RACF - Group Selection
Command ==> _____ _ start panel

_ Add new group or segment

Show groups that fit all of the following criteria
Group id . . . . . PMI (group profile key or filter)
Owner . . . . . _____ (group or userid, or filter)
Subgroup of . . . . . _____ (group or filter)
With subgroup . . . . . _____ (group or filter)
Installation data . _____ (data scan, no filter except *)

Additional selection criteria
_ Profile fields      _ Connect fields      _ Segment presence      _ Absence

Output/run options
_ Show segments      - All      - Expand universal      - Specify scope
_ Print format      Customize title      Send as e-mail
  Background run      Full detail form      Sort differently      Narrow print
  Print connects      Print names      Print subgroups
```

Copy Group

```
zSecure Admin+Audit for RACF GROUP PMI Overview          0 s elapsed, 0.0 s CPU
Command ==> _____ Scroll==> PAGE
like PMI                                               21 Feb 2008 17:35
  Group      Complex  SupGroup X Owner      Grps  Users  Conn U nTU Created
C PMI      ED02      CRMTRAIN CRMTRAIN    4      4      4      ___ 08Jun2007
***** Bottom of Data *****
```

```
zSecure Admin+Audit for RACF - RACF - Group Copy
Command ==> _____
From group . . . . . PMI
To id . . . . . PMID
OMVS gid . . . . . _____ (numeric id(suffix S for SHARED) or AUTO)
_ Generate RACF commands even when the target group exists
_ Copy permits only (target id may be a group or a user)
Specify options for new group
_ Copy catalog aliases (only if CKFREEZE is present)
_ Issue ADDSD/RDEF for user resources
_ Copy RACFVARS profiles/members too (if option above selected)
```

Copy Group Return Code

```
zSecure Admin+Audit for RACF GROUP PMI Overview          Commands queued, RC=4
Command ==> _____ Scroll==> PAGE
like PMI                                               21 Feb 2008 17:48
  Group      Complex  SupGroup X Owner      Grps   Users  Conn U nTU Created
PMI      ED02      CRMTRAIN CRMTRAIN    3     4     4     08Jun2007
***** Bottom of Data *****
```

Generated Commands

```
EDIT          ORI.C2R1FD8.CKRCMD          Columns 00001 00072
Command ==> _____ Scroll ==> PAGE
***** ***** Top of Data *****
==MSG> -Warning- The UNDO command is not available until you change
==MSG>         your edit profile using the command RECOVERY ON.
000001         /* CKRCMD file CKR1CMD complex ED02 NJE TVT4107 generated 21 Fe
000002         /* CKRCMD file CKR1CMD complex ED02 NJE TVT4107 generated 21 Fe
000003         /* Commands generated by COPY USER/GROUP */
000004         addgroup PMID          +
000005             data('Drama admin group') +
000006             owner(PMI) supgroup(PMI)
dd0007         connect TOMZEEH group(PMID) owner(PMID) auth(USE) uacc(NONE)
000008         /* Commands generated by COPY PERMIT */
000009         permit STGADMIN.IGG.DEFDEL.UALIAS cl(FACILITY) ac(READ) id(PMID
000010         permit MVS.START.STC.PMIX.** cl(OPERCMD) ac(UPDATE) id(PMID
000011         permit ISFOPER.SYSTEM cl(SDSF      ) ac(READ) id(PMID      )
000012         permit PMIOPER.SUBMIT cl(SURROGAT) ac(READ) id(PMID      )
000013         permit 'CRMBERT.TRT.**' generic ac(NONE) id(PMID      )
000014         permit 'PMI.**' generic ac(READ) id(PMID      )
dd0015         permit 'PMI.CKFREEZE' generic ac(ALTER) id(PMID      )
```

Running the Generated Commands

```
zSecure Admin+Audit for RACF  Enter R to run commands
Command ==> _____

The following selections are supported:
  B Browse file                S Default action (for each file)
  E Edit file                  R Run commands
  P Print file                 J Submit Job to execute commands
  V View file                  W Write file into seq. or partitioned data set
  M E-mail report

Enter a selection in front of a highlighted line below:
_  SYSPRINT  messages
_  REPORT    printable reports
_  CKRTSPRT  output from the last TSO command(s)
R  CKRCMD    queued TSO commands
_  CKR2PASS  queued commands for zSecure Admin+Audit for RACF
_  COMMANDS  zSecure Admin+Audit for RACF input commands from last query
_  SPFLIST   printable output from PRT primary command
_  OPTIONS   set print options
```

Command Output

```
BROWSE      SYS08088.T133434.RA000.INST001.R0100427      Line 00000001 Col 001 080
Command ==> _____      Scroll ==> 1
=====
=== Multiple TSO command output file - scroll max down for overview ===
=== Input data set INST001.C2R1E05.CKRCMD                      ===
=====
/* CKRCMD file CKR1CMD complex RCOB generated 28 Mar 2008 13:34 */
/* CKRCMD file CKR1CMD complex RCOB generated 28 Mar 2008 13:35 */
/* No CKFREEZE present, no resource copying commands will be generated */
/* Commands generated by COPY USER/GROUP */

===== 28Mar08 13:37:53.67719 start record 5 =====
addgroup PMID      data('Drama admin group') owner(PMI) supgroup(PMI)

===== 28Mar08 13:37:53.76738 start record 8 =====
addgroup PMIDU     data('Drama user group') owner(PMID) supgroup(PMID)

===== 28Mar08 13:37:53.83565 start record 11 =====
addgroup PMIDR     data('Drama resource group') owner(PMID) supgroup(PMID)
=====
=== All commands completed successfully                      ===
=====
```

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Other Functions

Other Functions

- Given we only have an one hour not enough time to cover all facilities available:
 - zSecure Alert
 - Access Monitor
 - RACF Offline
- So one slide on each.....

zSecure Alert

■ Situation

- Too many technicians with access to business databases
- Must keep financial data confidential to prevent insider trading
- Allow technicians to do their work

■ Real-time alert as mitigating control using zSecure Alert

- Reduce need to implement separation of access
- sysprogs keep their “must be able to read/change anything” status
- No need for political battle or costly re-orgs
- Quick install, instant visibility

Access Monitor


■ Situation

- Profiles from old applications
- Permits and connects from previous job
- CICS transactions, no longer needed
- Must fix profiles to fit current needs
- PCI-DSS, SOX, HIPAA, etc all demand appropriate authorities

■ zSecure Admin, Access Monitor

- Logs RACF access decisions efficiently
- Identifies unused profiles, groups, permits, members
- Generates RACF commands to delete

RACF Offline



Cost Effective Automated Mainframe Security

Summary

Summary

- Using the out of the box facilities provided by the zSecure product suite it is possible to vastly improve the security posture of your system z estate
- With a little time and effort you can implement effective security controls that will assist in meeting all of your compliance & audit requirements
- You will also make your technical, administration and audit teams extremely effective when it comes to system z security management

Questions?



Reference Material

- zSecure Homepage:
<http://www-01.ibm.com/software/tivoli/products/zsecure/>
- zSecure information center:
<http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/tivihelp/v2r1/topic/com.ibm.zsecure.doc/welcome.html>
- zSecure release note information:
<http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/tivihelp/v2r1/topic/com.ibm.zsecure.doc/releaseinfo/releaseinformation.html>
- zSecure forum:
<http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/forums/forum.jspa?forumID=1255>
- zSecure Redbook:
<http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/abstracts/sg247633.html?Open>
- zSecure Quarterly Newsletter:
(send e-mail to jamie_pease@uk.ibm.com to join)

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And finally...

Now you can...



...get outta here!!!