

AT-TLS Implementation and Diagnostics at U.S. Bank

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August 4, 2010





Our SHARE Sessions – Boston

- Proactive Network Management at the DTCC Monday, August 2, 2010: 11:00 AM-12:00 PM
- TCP/IP Performance Management for Dummies Monday, August 2, 2010: 4:30 PM-5:45 PM
- AT-TLS Implementation and Diagnostics at U.S. Bank Wednesday, August 4, 2010: 11:00 AM-12:00 PM
- Best Practices for Certificate Management (Panel) Thursday, August 5, 2010: 11:00 AM-12:00 PM
 SHARE in Boston

Agenda



- Business requirements for encryption
- History of implementation
- Problems encountered
- Integration into our operational systems
- Diagnostic methods
- Future plans





Introduction

- The US Bank Corporation is the 6th largest bank in the country. Secure transmission of financial data is imperative. This session will discuss how we have implemented AT-TLS on the TCP/IP network to secure our network.
- US Bank has more than 3,000 branches and 5,000 ATMs. We have over 36,000 Telnet sessions split between two LPARs with 21,000 Telnet sessions just for our branches.







Typical Branch Connectivity (TN3270)





Business Reasons for Encryption

- Today, we have vast communications networks (Internet, Digital (GSM), cell phones, Automatic Teller Machines) offering instant 'secure' communication.
- The future of Electronic Commerce, and, in fact, the electronic world, rests on secure digital communication.
- Unfortunately, so does the success of terrorists, drug rings, people smugglers, child porn, organized crime, spy rings, and 'cyber crime'.





History of Implementation

- We started with using SecurePort for our TN3270 connections.
- We found some problem areas.
- We evaluated AT-TLS by implementing it on our test system.
- We learned to configure Policy Agent for AT-TLS.
- We had some issues because of client handshake problems.
- These were resolved and we now have AT-TLS running in production for our branches.



What is Secure Sockets Layer?



- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is a protocol developed by Netscape for transmitting private documents via the Internet.
- The main functions of SSL are:
 - Server authentication
 - Data privacy and integrity
 - Optional client authentication via digital certificate
- Multiple versions of SSL exist: SSL V2.0 and SSL V3.0.
- The SSL protocol became the Internet standard Transport Layer Security (TLS) described in RFC 2246 and updated in RFC 3546.
- TLS V1.0 is the current version of the secure sockets layer protocol.
- There are slight differences between SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0, but the protocol remains substantially the same.





How to Implement SSL

- To implement SSL, the application program must use special SSL socket calls.
- As far as the TCP stack is concerned, SSL is just a TCP application. It is transparent to the stack.
- Languages such as C/C++ or Java provide application programming interfaces that interface with the sockets APIs for the platform (z/OS, Windows, Linux) to allow applications to establish secure sockets communications.
- SSL is available for TCP applications only. UDP, ICMP or other higher level protocols are not supported.

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SSL Socket Library: TCP Only





What is SecurePort

- SecurePort is when the TN3270 server itself is doing SSL.
- The TN3270 server may be configured with:
 - Port : insecure connections
 - SecurePort : connections with TN3270 using SSL
 - TTLSPort : connections with TN3270 using AT-TLS
- The Policy Agent is required to define security policies if you are using AT-TLS

z/OS
TCP Stack (TCPIP)
Policy Agent (Pagent)
TN3270 Server

TN3270 Profile Port, SecurePort, TTLSPort.....

Shortcomings of SecurePort

- We started with using SecurePort for our TN3270 connections.
- We found shortcomings mostly in the area of problem diagnostics and packet decryption.
- When we had a problem in the application, we had to do simultaneous packet and component trace for hours to see the data. There was lots of CPU overhead and we used many volumes of DASD!





AT-TLS Overview





AT-TLS performs TLS process at the TCP layer for the application

- AT-TLS policy controls when and how to use AT-TLS
 - AT-TLS policy managed by Policy Agent and configured by manual edit or Configuration Assistant for z/OS Communications Server
- Most applications require no change to use AT-TLS
 - ►AT-TLS Basic applications

Applications can optionally exploit advanced features using new SIOCTTLSCTL ioctl call

AT-TLS Aware applications

- Extract information (policy, handshake results, x.509 client certificate, userid associated with certificate)

- ► AT-TLS Controlling applications
 - Control if/when to start/stop TLS, reset session / cipher

AT-TLS basic principles

Configured AT-TLS policy for the TCP application to use AT-TLS:

- Client connects to server and connection becomes established
- Server sends data in the clear and TCP layer queues it.
- TCP layer invokes System SSL to perform SSL handshake under identity of the server.
- TCP layer invokes System SSL to encrypt queued data and sends it to client.
- Client sends encrypted data, TCP layer invokes System SSL to decrypt.
- 6. Server receives data in the clear.







Why Go to AT-TLS?

- The following issues were important to us:
- Being able to look at the encrypted data without compromising the key if we needed to take a trace to see the data to look for patterns.
- We started to get requests from some of our internal customers wondering if we could support FTPs using AT-TLS.
- Network management possibilities in the future. (Alert on handshake failure, see encryption algorithm used.)
- Performance enhancements would be in AT-TLS (TTLS) not SecurePort.





TCPIP and Telnet Profile Changes

TCPCONFIG RESTRICTLOWPORTS TCPSENDBFRSIZE 262144 TCPRCVBUFRSIZE 262144 TTLS ; Appl must be in PORT to use lowports

; Telnet parameters for AT-TLS Port 992 (-> TN&SC.* LUs) TELNETPARMS

TTLSPort 992

CONNTYPE Secure

EXPRESSLOGON

DEBUG Exception

ENDTELNETPARMS

- ; AT-TLS Telnet (Also see in Profile.PORTS)
- ; Default Also consider NEGTSECURE

•





TTLS Policy Agent Changes

TTLSConnectionActionRef	cAct3
}	
TTLSRule	TN3270_TLS_Rule~5
{	
LocalAddr	ALL
RemoteAddr	ALL
LocalPortRangeRef	portR5
RemotePortRangeRef	portR1
Direction	Inbound
Priority	251
TTLSGroupActionRef	gAct1
TTLSEnvironmentActionRef	eAct3
TTLSConnectionActionRef	cAct3
}	
TTLSGroupAction	gAct1
{	
TTLSEnabled	On
}	
TTLSEnvironmentAction	eAct1
{	



TTLS Policy Agent Changes (cont).

TTLSCipherParms {	cipher1~AT-TLSGold
V3CipherSuites	TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
V3CipherSuites	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
}	
PortRange	portR1
{	
Port	1024-65535
}	
PortRange	portR2
{	
Port	21
}	
PortRange	portR3
{	
Port	25021
}	
PortRange	portR4
{	
Port	23023-23024



Implemented on Test system

- We first implemented AT-TLS on our Test systems for our test branches using the Zephyr TN3270 Emulator for a month or so.
- We did not have any issues so we decided to move forward into production.
- We decided to only implement AT-TLS on one of our production CMCs using just one Telnet port for our corporate users who were using Attachmate Extra 9.0.
- We did not want to implement it on our production branches until we exercised about 1,000 Telnet sessions using AT-TLS.



Problems in Production Implementation



- One of the first problems we noticed is we started to see errors codes in syslogd and the Telnet Server log using Attachmate Extra TN3270 emulator that we did not see on our Test system using the Zephyr TN3270 emulator.
- Listed below are listed some of error codes we were getting during the SSL handshake:

Apr 20 09:55:03 plexprd-C0/TCPSTC TCPCA01 TTLS[327704]: 09:55:03 TCPIP EZD1286I TTLS Error GRPID: 0000001 ENVID: 00000001 CONNID: 004ECD9A JOBNAME: TN32CA01 USERID: TELNSTC RULE: TN3270_TLS_Rule~5 RC: 5003 Data Decryption

Apr 20 09:55:03 plexprd-C0/TCPSTC TCPCA01 TTLS[327704]: 09:55:03 TCPIP EZD1286I TTLS Error GRPID: 0000001 ENVID: 00000001 CONNID: 004ECD9A JOBNAME: TN32CA01 USERID: TELNSTC RULE: TN3270_TLS_Rule~5 RC: **406 Initial Handshake** 00000000 7EC1FA98



Looking up the Error Codes

We had to look up the AT-TLS codes in two different IBM manuals to try determine if we had an issue. No users were reporting any problems because they would almost immediately reconnect to a different port when the initial handshake failed.

Rcode is a System SSL or AT-TLS return code that indicates why the event failed. rcode values under 5000 are generated by System SSL and are defined in <u>z/OS Cryptographic Services System SSL Programming</u>.

Rcode values over 5000 are generated by AT-TLS and are defined in Diagnosing AT-TLS problems in z/OS Communications <u>Server: IP</u> <u>Diagnosis Guide.</u>







406 Error while reading or writing data.

Explanation: An I/O error was reported while the System SSL runtime was reading or writing data.

User Response: Ensure that there are no network errors. Collect a System SSL trace containing the error and then contact your service representative if the error persists.





Error Code 5003

5003 Connection Init Clear text data was received on the connection from the remote partner instead of secure data. The connection has been terminated. Check the following:

• Ensure that the remote client is enabled for secure connections.

• If the policy is defined with ApplicationControlled **On**, ensure that the application read all the cleartext data before shaking the secure handshake. If configuring using the IBM Configuration Assistant for z/OS Communications Server, the Application Controlled setting done in each Traffic Descriptor.

Error Codes from the Telnet Server Log



F7BTTXPI

09.55.03 STC09792 EZZ6034I TELNET CONN 004ECD9A LU **N/A** CONN DROP ERR 1030 852

852 IP..PORT: X.X.X.X.1903

1030 TTLS loctl failed for query or init HS.

The PARM1 value is the return value, the PARM2 value is the return code, and the PARM3 value is the reason code for the ioctl failure.





How We Resolved Them

- We decided to run a very large trace for about 4 hours on one of our CMCs to catch the Telnet Sessions that were getting the error.
- Once I had a couple of hits, I stopped the trace and filtered the trace by the failing IP address and Port Number.
- We opened an ETR with IBM and sent them the trace and also fed the trace into SSL Problem Finder.
- We found out that our 3270 Emulator from Attachmate called Extra Extreme 9.0 was not following SSL Handshake protocols. I opened a ticket with Attachmate and they recommended we migrate to SP2.





Other Issues started to surface

- After running few days on one of our CMCs, we started to getting ABENDs on Telnet Server and then the TCPIP stack because of the Telnet Server problem.
- We suspected something with AT-TLS and the bad handshake with using Extra so we backed out AT-TLS while we had opened a SEV1 ticket with IBM.
- There were no immediate plans to update our Extra to SP2 so we hoped that IBM could come up with a fix.
- IBM came up with a PTF UK26977 to resolve the problem but we were not able to put it on for a number of months so the AT-TLS implementation was delayed about 4 months.



IBM Fixes



D140897 Problem Overview:

Embedded blanks and the # character are not allowed to be specified for the IPSec CaLabel parameter on the RemoteSecurityEndpoint statement, or for the CertificateLabel parameter on the TTLSConnectionAdvancedParms statement. Use of embedded blanks or the # character results in the parameter values being truncated.

<u>D140908</u> Problem Overview:

A connection was made to the Telnet server. The server requested a SSL handshake be started. The handshake timedout before the timer could run, a SSL client hello was received on the connection. AT-TLS flagged the data as SSL handshake data and queued a request to a task to process the data. The timer routine ran and reset the AT-TLS flags before the request could be processed. The handshake data was moved to the applications receive queues. When Telnet attempted to read the data, EZBTCMR abended due to non zero band data being on the receive queue.



IBM Fixes

D140925 Problem Overview:

Telnet is writing an SMFTERM record and needs the TCP/IP stack hostname. The connection is terminating because the stack was terminated. A control block no longer exists when Telnet tries to access it for the hostname causing an abend.

D140949 Problem Overview:

It appears that somehow the IPv4 listening socket got dropped. Acceptfails with EBADF and ERRNO2 of 76620446 JRSOCKETCONDROPPED. After the accept error, we loop back and do another select()



Another Recommended AT-TLS fix



- PE PTF List: PTF List: Release 1A0 : <u>UK47489</u> available 09/07/24 (F907) Release 190 : <u>UK47490</u> available 09/07/24 (F907)
- ERROR DESCRIPTION: A connection is using AT-TLS to implement SSL security. The connection was closed by the application, causing AT-TLS to send a SSL close alert and a FIN. The remote SSL application responded with a SSL close alert, another SSL alert, and a FIN. AT-TLS loops trying to read the second SSL alert because every read to SSL returns with a 437, indicating the SSL connection is closed. The alert is never consumed from the TLSX control block, causing AT-TLS to schedule another attempt to read the alert. This loop will continue until the timewait timer expires and the connection is freed.
- VERIFICATION STEPS: 1) High CPU seen in TCPIP address space. D GRS,C may show contention on the SYSZRACF AHSTUSERxxxxxx resource for the TCPIP address space. 2) TCPIP ctrace option TCP will show AT-TLS processing function code x'19', trying to read control data for the same connections in TIMEWAIT.



SSL Problem Finder Analysis



) S PF	SL ROBLEM FINDER	S	Sumr EO8 ort Order : I Showi Trac	narized By Host 31 : plextst-d0 Date / Time Des ng Entries : 1 -1 e File:BAD992h	cending 0	
	Total SSL Handshakes	Total Good SSL Handshakes	Total Bad SSL Handshakes	Minimum SSL Handshake Time (Microseconds)	Average SSL Handshake Time (Microseconds)	Maximum SSL Handshake Time (Microseconds)
	2	1	1	55K	55K	55K
	Drill Dowr	i Handshal	kes Code	Err	or Code Decoded	I
	Drill Dowr	Handshal by Error Code	kes Code	Err	or Code Decoded	
	Drill Down	1 Handshal by Error Code	202 B	Err ad or Incomplete	or Code Decodec Certificate (202)
	Drill Down Drill Ha Down Pe W	I Handshal by Error Code 1 Total Good Indshakes W by C erformance arning	kes Code 202 B /arning Code	Err ad or Incomplete Warni	or Code Decoded Certificate (202	i) i

SSL Problem Finder Bad Handshake Analysis





Show Bad Handshake Analysis Sort Order : Packet Date Showing Entries : 1 -10 Trace File:BAD992

-	Packet Date	Addresses	Error Code	Events
1	2010-04-21 11:38:40.0	Source:	202	 Handshake from client IP address: did not complete properly. The Client Hello was sent at 2009-05-05 17:59:52.359972. The next packet expected is the Server Hello. A Server Hello was sent at: 2009-05-05 17:59:52.361635. The Clipher Suite used is: TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0x0A). The next packet expected is from the server and it is a Server Certificate. A Server Certificate was sent at: 2009-05-05 17:59:52.361635. This indicates that agreement was reached between the client and server on Cipher Suite. The Server Certificate may be sent in multiple packets. The next packet expected is from the server and it is a Server Done packet. No Server Done packet was sent. The Server Certificate may not have been completely sent. There may be a pr at the server. Timing Analysis The time between the TCP handshake and the Client Hello was: 0 seconds, 0 milliseconds, 0 microseconds. A time of less than 100 milliseconds is generally not a problem.
	JIAN	L INBOS	SION	31

Using SSL Problem Finder Good Handshake Bad Handshake





SSL Problem Finder (cont).



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	688106 0	688107 0	688108 0	688109 0	688111 0	688112 0	688113 0	688114 0	688115 0
	Go!	¥		Ŧ	ł	Ŧ	¥	Ŧ	Ŧ
	TCP Open Complete	Your turn		Your turn	Your turn	Your turn	Your turn	Your turn	Your turn Reset - Abort Connection
		Client Hello		Server Hello, Server Certificate	Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake				
	PC: Got 9750	PC: Got 9750		MF: Did you get 0571?	PC: Got 0571		PC: Got 0571		
	-	-			-		-		
	٦		0	821	♠	0	1	0	0
		58	Ļ	Ļ	212	Ļ	2	Ļ	Ļ
. 1	Start 🥭 🔮 (> 🗂 🔹 🕅 🚱 Ca	onrad R Sanders 📔	🜔 (A) tn3270.zws - P	OwerPoint	i Microso	oft PowerPoi	Show SSL Yisual	 « 🔃 🛃 12:15
			JOSION						33

Client sends CRLF (x'0D0A') to the host during the SSL handshake

SSL	Show Packe	t Detail
PROBLEM FINDER	Trace File:B <i>I</i>	AD992dt
688113 C2OO PACKET	T 00000004 17:5	59:52.397516 Packet Trace
From Interface : (OSA2LNK	Device: QDIO Ethernet Full=42
Tod Clock : 2	2009/05/05 17:59:	52.397516 Intfx: 6
Sequence # : (D	Flags: <u>Pkt</u>
Source : 8	8.8.8.8	
Destination : 9	9.9.9.9	
Source Port : 2	2632	Dest Port: 992 Asid: 005E TCB:
0000000		
IpHeader: Version : 4	4	Header Length: 20
Tos : C	00	QOS: Routine Normal Service
Packet Length : 4	42	ID Number: D8F4
Fragment : [DontFragment	Offset: 0
TTL ::	120	Protocol: TCP
CheckSum: DODF FFFF		
Source : 8	5.8.8.8	
Destination : 9	9.9.9.9	
TCP		
Source Port : 2	2632 ()	Destination Port: 992 ()
Sequence Number : 2	241167154	Ack Number: 531830571
Header Length : 2	20	Flags: Ack Psh
Window Size : :	16699	CheckSum: C9F3 FFFF Urgent Data
Pointer: 0000		
Ip Header : 2	20	IP: 8.8.8.8, 9.9.9.9
000000 4500002A D8F440	DOO 7806DODF 0A18	332B1 9C24800C
Protocol Header : 2	20	Port: 2632, 992
000000 0A4803E0 0E5FE	 B32 1FB3172B 5018	3413B C9F30000
Data 🖌 :2	2 Data Lengt	ch: 2
000000 ODOA		1

How To Decrypt SSL



- Depends on what method is used to encrypt the data.
 - SSL / TLS
 - AT-TLS
- Usually, SSL uses two keys to encrypt data – a public key known to everyone and a private or secret key known only to the recipient of the message.
- To decrypt these messages, the private key is required.
- Security folks don't care for this method.
- But, this is the reality. If you could break the decryption without the key, then it would not be secure!



How to Decrypt AT-TLS



- If Application Transparent TLS (AT-TLS) is used on z/OS to provide SSL encryption, then a data trace which captures data at the API layer can be used to see data before it is encrypted.
- You may either capture the data trace using the IBM External Trace Writer or the IBM Network Management Interface (NMI). This trace has only the unencrypted data at the API layer (ie. no IP headers).



Implementation Considerations



 If the NMI option is chosen, then a capture program must be written to collect the data from the NMI after doing a :

V TCPIP,,DATTrace

command. Note that in the configuration for AT-TLS, you have to indicate that you would like to see the data unencrypted in the CTRACE.

- In the TTLSConnectionAction statement specify CtraceClearText.
- If the external writer is used, then just print to SYSTCPDA.







	9153 T000 DATA		00000005 09:50	:19.099	043 Data Tr	ace			
7	Jobname	:	XXXX001	То			Full=10	If it is	ТО
	Tod Clock	:	2009/01/30 09:5	0:19.09	9043		Cid: 0000103E		
	Sequence #	:	0	Flags	: Dat Out			the to	reign
	Source	:	xxx.xx.xxx.x	Desti	nation	: xx.x	xxx.xx.	device	e, the
	Source Port	:	2025	Dest	Port: 1487	Asid:	006C TCB: 0000000	data t	race
								nacke	at will
	Data	:	10 Data Len	gth: 10					
	000000 FFFA2803 040	00	204 FFF0		0			be be	tore
								the	
								Packe	et
	9154 T000 PACKE	2	00000004 09:50	:19.099	075 Packet	Trace		trace	
7	To Interface	:	OSA1LNK	Devic	e: QDIO Eth	ernet	Full=77		
	Tod Clock	:	2009/01/30 09:5	0:19.09	9075		Intfx: 8		
	Sequence #	:	0	Flags	: Pkt Adj O	ut			
	TCP								
	Source Port	:	2025 ()	Desti	nation Port	: 1487	()		
	Sequence Number	:	357267317	Ack N	umber: 2144	402221			
	Data	:	37 Data Len	gth: 37					
	000000 17030000 201	99	794 C3DD546D 3F	7F3703	9pmC.	•_•"••	Tm?.7.		
	000010 F882EF44 A77	732	936 CF9E1E02 DB	46F653	8bx.z	6.	D.s.6F.S		
	000020 EEE58B91 87	S	ton		.V.jg		••••		38

Here is one FROM the remote



9159 T000 PA	CKET 00000004 09:50	:40.172410 Packet Trace	3	
From Interface Sequence # Source TCP	: OSA4LNK : 0 : xx.xxx.xx.xx	Device: QDIO Ethernet Flags: Pkt Adj Destination : xx	Full=93	f it is FROM he foreign device, the
Source Port Sequence Numb Data 000000 17030000 000010 0C981F58	: 1487 () er : 2144402221 : 53 Data Leng 30FF2AC5 FF79CE94 B9 4823E6FD 36E11A5E 9F	Destination Port: 202 Ack Number: 357268567 gth: 53 1C860F E.`.mf 7396D7 .qW;c	25 () 5 () 6 0.*y 6	data trace backet will be after the Packet trace.
000020 3703D7AC 000030 FA949DFA	FE2ECDCA 49DEE5D7 47.	3EE3B7 PVP1 .m	'. 7IG>⊤ 	
9160 T000	DATA 0000005 09:	50:40.174272 Data Trace	·	-
Jobname	: XXXX001	From	Full=25	
Tod Clock	: 2009/01/30 09:5	0:40.174271	Cid: 0000103E	
Sequence #	: 0	Flags: Dat Adj		
Source	: xx.xxx.xx.xxx	Destination : xx	x.xx.xxx.x	
Source Port	: 1487	Dest Port: 2025 Asid	I: 006C TCB: 000000	0
Data	: 25 Data Leng	gth: 25		
000000 07000100	00939687 96954081 97	979389 logon appl	i	
000010 844DA3A2	96855DFF EF	d(tsoe)	.M	39

Data visualized as TN3270 Screen





Future Plans

- We are continuing to add AT-TLS sessions beyond TN3270.
- We plan to change all of our FTPs to use AT-TLS for security reasons.
- Other application groups are approaching us to provide security through AT-TLS.

